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DOWN TO THE SEAS AGAIN
HERBERT R. BAER*
In an earlier article, At Sea With The United States
Supreme Court,** the author discussed recent significant de-
cisions of the Supreme Court which dealt with personal
injury or death claims arising out of illness or injury to
seamen and harbor workers. Limitations of space did not
permit a discussion of the Court's recent decisions in other
areas of maritime law of vital concern to the admiralty law-
yer. Thus questions of marine insurance; limitation of lia-
bility; collision claims of cargo owners; rights of shipowners
against stevedoring companies to recoup funds paid to in-
jured longshoremen; etc., were left for consideration at a
later date. It is the function of this paper to complement the
earlier article by discussing the action of the Supreme Court
in these other areas of maritime law.
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MARINE INSURANCE
What Law is Applicablef
The origin of marine insurance is obscured in antiquity.' The
marine insurance policy is obscurity itself.' But, if after painstaking
'Legal historians have found no direct evidence of the use of marine
insurance policies by the ancient Greeks or Romans. Those people were,
however, well acquainted with the practice of general average and the use
of bottomry and respondentia bonds. In these practices may be found the
germ of marine insurance. Then, as now, under general average, if the
goods of one of several cargo owners were jettisoned to save the cargo of
others appropriate contribution was made by the owners of the saved cargo
to equitably distribute the loss. The shipowner, who gave a bottomry bond
to secure a loan which he was obliged to repay only if his vessel completed
the contemplated voyage in safety, was in effect buying hull insurance. The
same was true of the cargo owner who in consideration of a loan gave a
respondentia bond which likewise obligated repayment only if the cargo
arrived in good order.
Grotius, in discussing the nature of the insurance contract, wrote that it
was "a species of contract scarce known to the ancients, but now forming a
very important branch in all mercantile and maritime concerns." GROTIUS,
DE JuRE BELLI AC PAcds 146 (Campbell trans]. 1901). Sir James Allan
Park (later Justice Park of the English Court of Common Pleas), in his
eminent work on marine insurance, said, "the Romans had no knowledge of
insurances; . . . both Grotius and Bynkershoek have expressly declared,
that among the ancients this contract was unknown. .... " PARK, A SYSTEm
OF THE LAW OF MARINE INSURANCES, at xxi-xxii (2d ed. 1799). For
more recent accounts of the history of marine insurance, see Gow, MARINE
INSURANCE 2 (4th ed. 1909); 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 98 (1909); VANCE, INSURAnCE 7 (3d ed. 1951); WINTER, MARINE
INSURANCE 1 (3d ed. 1952).
' Interesting comments on the obscurity of the marine insurance policy
by common law judges will be found in Brough v. Whitmore, 4 T.R. 206,
208-09, 100 Eng. Rep. 976, 977 (K.B. 1791), where Chief Justice Lord
Kenyon said, "I remember it was said many years ago that, if Lombard
Street had not given a construction to policies of insurance, a declaration
on a policy would have been bad on a general demurrer; but that the uni-
form practice of merchants and underwriters had rendered them intelligible."
In the same case, Justice Buller said, "Without commenting on the words
of the policy, it is sufficient to say that a policy of assurance has at all times
been considered in Courts of Law as an absurd and incoherent instrument;
but it is founded on usage, and must be governed and construed by usage."
Id. at 210, 100 Eng. Rep. at 978. (Italics added.)
More recently in referring to the marine insurance policy in suit in
Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Scott, 345 U.S. 427, 432 (1953), Justice Frankfurter
said, "Construing such conglomerate provisions requires a skill not unlike
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effort the admiralty lawyer has properly discovered the contract out
of the "labyrinth of verbiage"' in which it lurks, he still is in the
unenviable position of not being able to predict with any real assur-
ance what law the Supreme Court will apply in interpreting the
contract and in giving effect to the warranties contained therein.
Conceivably the Court will find English law controlling; perhaps
some overriding federal maritime law will be applied; or the Court
may decide the case on the basis of the law of the state in which the
loss may have occurred. It is with this problem of selecting the
appropriate law that the Supreme Court has had difficulty in recent
years. As a result the marine insurance lawyer, for whom there
is no legal radar, finds himself in the position of the mariner who
must proceed in the densest of fog with a compass whose needle
darts about in all directions due to the prevalence of shifting mag-
netic forces over which he has no control.
"[T] he contract of marine insurance is an exotic in the common
law."4  When Justice Bradley wrote these words he was using
"exotic" as designating something "foreign" although he could,
just as fittingly, have used the term in its other Websterian sense of
((excitingly strange."5 Not only was the contract of insurance for-
eign, but the law and the tribunals established in England to declare
the rights of parties under marine as well as other types of insurance
contracts were strangers to the common law.
that called for in the decipherment of obscure palimpsest texts." In the
Calnar case the Lloyd's form of policy on which had been superimposed
war risk riders was involved. The district court, sitting in admiralty, had
held the underwriters liable; the court of appeals found no liability and the
Supreme Court divided six to three with the majority vacating the court of
appeals decision and remanding the case to it for further proceedings in
light of the Court's opinion.
As a matter of fact, it would have been surprising, indeed, to have found
uniformity in judicial opinion when it is appreciated that in the particular
case the "basic adventures and perils" clause would render the underwriters
liable if the policy were in effect, while the "capture and seizure warranty"
would relieve the underwriters uiless the "war-risk riders" reimposed
liability and it must also be borne in mind that the "free of British capture
warranty" might well in turn absolve the underwriters, unless the "savings
clause" in the latter warranty again imposed liability.
'This is the language chosen by Judge Learned Hand in describing the
marine insurance policy involved in Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Scott, 197 F.2d
795, 796 (2d Cir. 1952), and which policy was commented on in the footnote
just preceding.
'Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 32 (1870).
' See the opinion of Chief Justice Mansfield in Le Cheminant v. Pearson,
4 Taun. 367, 380, 128 Eng. Rep. 372, 377 (C.P. 1812), where in speaking of a
marine insurance policy he said, "this policy of insurance is a very strange
instrument, as we all know and feel .... .
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The first known extensive use of mercantile insurance was during
the middle ages when the Italian republics of Venice, Florence and
Genoa flourished as maritime powers.6 It was during this period
that enterprising merchants of northern Italy developed the marine
insurance policy." In the thirteenth century these Italian merchants,
known as Lombards, came to England and brought with them their
practice of insuring risks. They established their residences and
businesses on what was later to become known as Lombard Street,
London, and there they also set up their own courts composed of
merchants whose function was to settle such disputes as might arise
between the insurer and the insured.8 These courts, although lacking
in enforcement powers, were most effective in disposing of insurance
controversies. However, in due course, certain insureds became
'See Justice Bradley's opinion in Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 1, 33 (1870); 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 105 (1909); VANCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 10.
'VANCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 11. Vance states that the earliest policy
form known to exist was written in Genoa in 1347 and a statutory form
was prescribed in Florence in 1523.
8 PARK, op. cit. supra note 1, at xlii. Park calls specific attention to the
fact that to "this day" there is inserted in all policies of insurance a clause
"'that this writing or policy of assurance shall be of as much force and
effect as any writing heretofore made in Lombard-Street . . . .'" Park was
writing as of 1799 but he could have said the same as to the presence of
these words were he writing today as will appear later in this note.
It is interesting to note that it was to Lombard Street that Edward Lloyd
moved his famous coffee house in 1691. And it was in Lloyd's that it be-
came the custom for individuals to gather over their coffee cups and under-
write marine risks, each underwriter indicating the share of the risk he
assumed until the total insurance applied for was covered. It was at Lloyd's
also where ships were auctioned off "by Inch of Candle" pursuant to which
at the opening of the sale an inch of candle was lighted and bidding con-
tinued until the flame expired, the last bid just before the going out of the
candle securing the property. See WRIGHT & FAYLE, A HISTORY OF LLOYD'S
15, 19 (1928).
Lloyd's became and still is the most important marine insurance concern
of the commercial world. The Lloyd's policy was never drafted as a single
instrument but gradually evolved through the centuries, a great deal of its
terminology going back to the sixteenth century. In 1779 the desirability
of having a standard printed policy form resulted in the adoption of the much
judicially maligned Lloyd's form of marine insurance policy by the under-
writers doing business at Lloyd's. This was not a drafting of a new form
of policy but rather the preservation of the common form then in use. In
1795 this Lloyd's policy was made the standard form by act of parliament
in 35 Geo. 3, c. 63. And, despite much interim criticism of the form of the
policy, it was again adopted by parliament with little change in the Marine
Insurance Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 30. This statutory form still has
retained in it the clause which was referred to by Park and mentioned at
the beginning of this note, namely, that the policy shall be of as much force
and effect as any writing heretofore made in Lombard Street.
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disgruntled with the Merchants' Courts and looked for relief in more
formal tribunals.
The common law courts, due to their tedious delays and technical
procedure, were unsuited for insurance litigation. For a time, liti-
gants sought relief in the court of admiralty but for reasons which
are not clear that court never developed as a repository of insurance
litigation.' In 1601 parliament passed the first insurance act, chap-
ter 12 of 43 Elizabeth, and by that statute established a special court
for the trial of marine insurance litigation.'0 The composition of
the court was unique consisting of the judge of admiralty, the re-
corder of London, two doctors of the civil law, two common lawyers
and eight "grave and discreet merchants."" Any five of these had
authority summarily to try insurance cases.
Unfortunately, however, the insurance court so created had little
success due in part to the fact that the statute creating it limited its
jurisdiction to causes arising on policies issued in London and was
construed to apply only to insurance on merchandise. In addition,
the court could be resorted to only by the insured and not by the
underwriter. At the time Park wrote his work on marine insurance
in 1799 he noted that "the court erected by the statute of Elizabeth
... has now fallen into disuse . ,"' Despite the demise of the
insurance court through lack of use, it is to be noted that prior to
Lord Mansfield's appointment as Chief Justice in 1756 insurance
litigants had not resorted in any great number to the common law
courts, for up to that time, no more than sixty cases on insurance
'3 SELEcT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERIcAN LEGAL HISTORY 112 (1909);
VANCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 15. See also note 20 infra." The preamble to this statute in subdivision (4) is both explanatory of
the past practices of the Merchants' Courts and of the reason for legislative
action. It reads: "And whereas heretofore such assurers have used to stand
so justly and precisely upon their credits, as few or no controversies have
arisen thereupon, and if any have grown, the same have from time to time
been ended and ordered by certain grave and discreet merchants appointed
by the lord mayor of the City of London, as men by reason of their expe-
rience fittest to understand, and speedily to decide those causes, until of late
years that divers persons have withdrawn themselves from that arbitrary
course, and have sought to draw the parties assured to seek their monies of
every several assurer, by suits commenced in her Majesty's courts, to their
great charges and delays."
' Since, as we see by a reading of the preamble of this statute, 1601, 43
Eliz., c. 12, "grave and discreet" merchants made up the personnel of the
Merchants' Courts, parliament doubtless assumed there would be no diffi-
culty in finding merchants of this character for the insurance court and so
provided in paragraph 1(6) of the statute.
"* PAix, op. cit. supra note 1, at xlvii.
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are to be found in the common law reports."3 Thus, for more than
one hundred and fifty years after the establishment of the insurance
court, the bulk of insurance litigation continued to be initiated and
disposed of in the Merchants' Courts.
It was through the diligent efforts of Lord Mansfield that the
common law courts equipped themselves to handle insurance litiga-
tion. This judge, to whom is credited the development of commer-
cial law in England, brought insurance into the common law system.
He recognized the customs of the merchants, honored the decisions
and laws of foreign maritime nations, and in the trial of insurance
cases would empanel as jurors merchants and underwriters."' Re-
ferring to the thirty years that Lord Mansfield was on the bench,
Park wrote, "It is the boast of this age, that in it the great founda-
tions of marine jurisprudence have been laid, by clearly developing
the principles on which policies of insurance are founded, and by
happily applying those principles to particular cases."'" At the time
of Mansfield's retirement from the bench in 1788, insurance litiga-
tion had greatly increased in volume in the common law courts as
merchants recognized that they now had in those courts an appro-
priate and adequate forum in which to dispose of their controversies.
With this brief historical account of the treatment of marine
insurance litigation in England and the nature of the law applied
by the various tribunals, let us now see what action the United
States Supreme Court took in determining the jurisdictional power
of the federal courts over marine insurance litigation and the char-
acter of the law to be applied.
Under the Constitution the judicial power of the courts of the
United States extends to "all cases of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction."'" By the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress specifically
granted to the federal district courts exclusive original cognizance
"of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; saving
to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the
common law is competent to give it .... ",m In 1851, Justice Story,
then sitting on the United States Circuit Court in Massachusetts, held
" Id. at xlviii. The oldest known action in a common law court on a
marine policy was in 1588 before Chief justice Wray at Nisi Prius in Lon-
don. Our knowledge of this case is by reason of reference to it in Lord
Coke's report on Dowdale's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 323 (K.B.
1606).
143 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 116 (1909).1 3 PARK, op. cit. supra note 1, at liii. "U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
1 judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, REv. STAT. § 563(8) (1875).
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that a policy of marine insurance was within (although not exclu-
sively within) the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States courts.' However, it was not until 1870 that the Supreme
Court passed upon the question. Then, in Insurance Company v.
Dunham,9 the Court adopted the view of Justice Story.20 That an
action brought on a marine insurance policy is a controversy within
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts has
been consistently maintained by the Court and reaffirmed from time
to time.2' Accordingly, it is settled law that an action on a marine
insurance policy may be brought, not only in a state court, or, in a
diversity case, on the law side of a federal district court, but also in
the federal court sitting as a court in admiralty.
Having found jurisdictional power in the federal admiralty
courts, the next question to be answered is: what law should the
admiralty courts apply as determinative of the rights of the parties
to a marine insurance policy? It is the Supreme Court's recent
action in this field that has left the marine insurance lawyer insecure.
Suggestions as to what should be the applicable law are to be
found in the old Dunham case. Although Justice Bradley, when
speaking for the Court in that case, was only concerned with the
question of jurisdiction, it is worth while to note some of his com-
ments. Thus he said,
Perhaps the best criterion of the maritime character of
a contract is the system of law from which it arises and by
which is is governed. And it is well known that the con-
tract of insurance sprang from the law maritime, and derives
all its material rules and incidents therefrom.22
16 De Lovio. v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418 tN.. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
1078 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870).
2 0Justice Bradley, speaking for the Court, pointed out that marine insur-
ance contracts had historically been subject to the jurisdiction of admiralty
courts in the maritime countries of Europe. Also, he noted that it was only
because the common law courts of England prevailed in their conflict for
jurisdictional power that the English admiralty courts were denied juris-
diction of suits on insurance contracts except in the unlikely situation where
the contract had been made on the high seas.
2 See for example the language of the Court in Wilburn Boat Co. v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 313 (1955), where the Court in
citing Dunham said, "Since the insurance policy here sued on is a maritime
contract the Admiralty Clause of- the Constitution brings it within federal
jurisdiction."
278 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 31. (Emphasis added.)
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Speaking further of the character of marine insurance law, Justice
Bradley said,
It is, in fact, a part of the general maritime law of the world;
slightly modified, it is true, in each country, according to the
circumstances or genius of the people.3
Then, quoting from the Italian writer, Roccus, Justice Bradley
went on to say,
"These subjects of insurance and disputes relative to ships
are to be decided according to maritime law, and the usages
and customs of the sea are to be respected."2 4
Some fifty years later the Supreme Court was called upon to
construe the phrase "all consequences . . . of hostilities or warlike
operations"2 5 appearing in the marine policies involved in the case
of Queen Insurance Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co.
20
As frequently happens, two insurance policies had been issued-one
was an ordinary marine insurance policy and the other a marine
war risk policy. Losses attributable to "warlike operations" were
excluded from the former and covered by the latter policy. In de-
termining that a loss resulting from a collision of ships traveling in
convoys without lights in time of war was not a loss due to "war-
like operations" the court of appeals2 7 felt obliged to follow the con-
struction placed on those words by the English courts. In affirming
the court of appeals, Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court,
said,
There are special reasons for keeping in harmony with the
marine insurance laws of England .... We repeat that we
are dealing not with general principles but only with the con-
struction of an ancient form of words which always have been
taken in a narrow sense .... 28
In 1938, when discussing the subrogation rights of hull insurers
on a valued marine insurance policy, Justice Stone, speaking for the
2 Id. at 34.
24 Ibid.
2 For a collection of English and American cases construing this phrase,
see Derby, What Are Warlike Operations under the F. C. & S. Clause in
Marine Policies, 33 CALIP. L. REv. 128 (1945).28263 U.S. 487 (1924).
22282 Fed. 976 (2d Cir. 1922).
28 263 U.S. at 493.
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Court, said, "We recognize that established doctrines of English
maritime law are to be accorded respect here .. 29 HI-e then
proceeded to apply what he found to be "established principles of
maritime insurance law"30 and refused to follow an English deci-
sion31 of the Court of Queen's Bench which had never been adopted
by an English appellate court and which had been later questioned
by eminent English judges.
In 1950 the Supreme Court was again called upon to interpret
the phrase "all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations" in
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States.32 A collision
had occurred between a Standard Oil tanker and a Navy mine
sweeper then engaged in sweeping mines outside New York harbor.
It was agreed that faulty navigation on the part of both vessels
contributed to the collision. Standard's vessel was covered by a
government war risk policy. Standard contended that under Eng-
lish case law the government, as war risk insurer, was liable for the
loss as a matter of law. The district court33 disagreed with Standard
but found that as a matter of fact the "warlike operation" of the
navy vessel was a proximate cause of the loss. The court of ap-
peals 4 reversed. Although it conceded that language in English
cases might make the government liable as a matter of law it refused
to follow such cases and contrary to the district court found that the
warlike phase of the minesweeper's operation was not a proximate
cause of the collision.
On certiorari the Supreme Court divided six to three. The
majority, in affirming the court of appeals, refused to follow deci-
sions of the House of Lords which would impose liability on the
war risk insurer as a matter of law. Speaking for the Court, Justice
Black said,
It is true that we and other American courts have emphasized
the desirability of uniformity in decisions here and in Eng-
land in interpretation and enforcement of marine insurance
"0Aetna Ins. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 304 U.S. 430, 438 (1938).
30 Id. at 439." North of England Iron S.S. Ins. Ass'n v. Armstrong, L.R. 5 Q.B. 244
(1870).
( 340 U.S. 54 (1950), discussed in Note, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 99 (1951).
On the same date the Court decided a companion case of Libby, McNeill &
Libby v. United States, 340 U.S. 71 (1950), and declared its opinion in
Standard was dispositive of Libby, a case comparable on its facts.
"81 F. Supp. 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
'178 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1949).
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contracts.... But this does not mean that American courts
must follow House of Lords' decisions automatically. Ac-
tually our practice is no more than to accord respect to estab-
lished doctrines of English maritime law. 5
Justice Black then pointed out that the particular English cases
relied on by Standard had produced such an unfavorable reaction
among English underwriters that the policy provision in question
was revised so as to avoid the injurious effects of those decisions.
Justice Frankfurter, writing a dissent in which Justice Jackson
concurred, was of the opinion the court of appeals should be reversed
and the district court affirmed. Speaking of the law to be applied,
he said,
The clause that is our concern, "all consequences of hos-
tilities or warlike operations," was not derived from the
American "war risk" charter term and therefore is not to
draw its meaning from the cases construing that term. It is
a clause evolved by English maritime insurers. . . . And
the language has often been construed in English courts....
It is only natural that American courts have looked to the
English cases for illumination just as courts look to the de-
cisions of another State for aid in determining the meaning of
a statute adopted from that State.8
Justice Douglas filed a separate dissent and contended that the
English decisions construing the phrase in question should be re-
garded as stating the standards for interpretation. After citing
English cases in point, he said,
Adherence to British precedents in this field was early ad-
monished. Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe Ins. Co., 263 U.S. 487,
493. The rule of the foregoing English cases is for me the
most authentic standard for interpreting the present contract. 7
35340 U.S. at 59."RId. at 65.
" Id. at 70. The language of Justice Douglas and his reference to the
Queen Ins. Co. case was echoed by Justice Frankfurter three years later
when speaking for the Court in Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Scott, 345 U.S. 427,
442-43 (1953). Although the court of appeals had found no English cases
precisely in point, the district court, in holding the underwriter liable on a
war risk policy, had relied on the English case of Rickards v. Forrestal Land,
Timber & Ry., [1942] A.C. 50. Justice Frankfurter cautiously stated that
the case "may support the position of the District Court." Then, in the only
reference to the weight to be given English decisions which is to be found
(Vol. 40
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Whether, in determining the rights of parties to marine insur-
ance policies, the Court was to follow the English case law or to
merely accord respect to the decisions of the English courts in mold-
ing its own law, it is clear from the above cases that the Court did
not contemplate applying a rule based on the law of some individual
state of the United States. It remained for the two cases of Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Cushing"s and Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. 9 to raise these questions, and, unfortunately, to leave
the marine insurance bar in a state of uncertainty if not outright
confusion.
The Cushing case involved the right of representatives of de-
ceased seamen to sue a marine liability insurer under a Louisiana
direct action statute. The Wilburn Boat case was an action on a
marine fire insurance policy. It presented the question of whether
a statute of Texas, which declared that a breach of warranty in a
policy of insurance was not to prevent recovery unless the breach
contributed to the loss, was to prevail over the generally accepted
rule applied to maritime insurance that a breach of warranty re-
lieved the insurer irrespective of the causal connection between the
breach and loss. Although the Cushing case was decided in 1954
and the Wilburn Boat case in 1955, the nature of the problems in-
volved merits consideration of the Wilburn Boat case first.
Glenn, Frank and Henry Wilburn were the owners of a small
houseboat, the Wanderer, which they insured against fire loss and
other perils with Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. The policy
contained the following terms or warranties:
It Is Also Agreed that this insurance shall be void in case this
Policy or the interest insured thereby shall be sold, assigned,
transferred or pledged without the previous consent in writing
of the Assurers.
Warranted by the Assured that the within named vessel
shall be used solely for private pleasure purposes during the
currency of this Policy and shall not be hired or chartered
unless permission is granted by endorsement hereon.4 °
in the case, Justice Frankfurter, citing Queen Ins. Co., said, "It is persuasive
authority, since '[t]here are special reasons for keeping in harmony with
the marine insurance laws of England, the great field of this business .... '"
S347 U.S. 409 (1954).
' 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
'0Id. at 311 n.1.
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While moored on Lake Texoma, an inland lake between Texas
and Oklahoma, the Wanderer was destroyed by fire of unknown
origin. Claim was made against the insurer but it refused to pay
because of violations of the above stated conditions and warranties
in the policy. Those violations were that the three Wilburns, with-
out the consent of the insurer, had sold the vessel to Wilburn Boat
Company, a corporation of which they were sole owners; that the
vessel had been chattel mortgaged; and that instead of being solely
used for private pleasure purposes it had lieen chartered and used
for hire.
Suit was brought against the insurer in a Texas state court by
the three Wilburns and the Wilburn Boat Company. The case was
transferred to the federal district court by reason of diversity and
trial was had before the district judge sitting without a jury. Plain-
tiffs contended that the policy had been delivered in Texas and that
Texas law should control in determining the effect to be given to
the breaches of the policy provisions. Under Texas law breaches
of the policy provisions would afford the insurer no defense unless
the breach contributed to the loss. Without determining whether
the policy had been delivered in Texas, the district judge held that
state law was immaterial because the policy was a maritime contract
and, as such, was "governed by the general admiralty law and not
by the law of Texas."41 The district judge found that Lake Texoma
was a part of the navigable waters of the United States and that
finding was not questioned. He then held that the plaintiffs could
not recover because he found the established admiralty rule requires
literal fulfillment of every policy warranty and that a breach of any
warranty bars recovery even though the breach in no way con-
tributes to the loss.
The court of appeals affirmed the district judge in all respects.
42
The liability of the insurer was to be measured by the maritime law
even though the proceeding was instituted in a common law
court43 . . . . Under the general maritime law, contracts of
"This portion of the district court's unreported opinion is found in id.
at 312 n.4.
42201 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1953).
" Id. at 835. The court of appeals at this point quite properly cited Car-
lisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922), and Chelentis v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918). Thus in Carlisle Packing Co.,
the Court said, "The general rules of the maritime law apply whether the
proceeding be instituted in an admiralty or common law court." 259 U.S.
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insurance must be enforced as written .... [A]nd . . . "a
breach of the warranty releases the company from liability
regardless of the fact that a compliance with the warranty
would not have avoided the loss .... "
That both the district court and court of appeals properly expounded
the general maritime law as to the effect of a breach of warranty
cannot be questioned. 5
On certiorari the Supreme Court divided three ways. The
majority reversed and remanded the case to the trial court with
at 259. This view has also been accepted by textwriters. See 1 BENEDICT,
ADMIRALTY 55 (6th ed. 1940), where the author states, "The view now is
that maritime rights are to be determined according to maritime law not only
whenever the parties seek a maritime remedy in the admiralty court but also
whenever they seek a common law remedy under the 'saving clause' of the
Judiciary Act of 1789."
"201 F.2d at 836.
'= In view of the importance of this basic proposition, we deem it not
amiss to quote pertinent remarks by recognized authorities on the subject of
maritime insurance in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries.
PARKS, A SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF MARINE INSURANCE 318-19 (2d ed.
1799): "A warranty in a policy of insurance is a condition or a contingency,
that a certain thing shall be done or happen, and unless that is performed,
there is no valid contract. It is perfectly immaterial for what view the war-
ranty is introduced; or whether the party had any view at all: but once
inserted, it becomes a binding condition on the insured: and unless he can
shew that he has literally fulfilled it, or that it was performed, the contract
is the same, as if it had never existed .... We have said that a warranty
must be strictly and literally performed; and therefore whether the thing,
warranted to be done, be or be not essential to the security of the ship; or
whether the loss do or do not happen, on account of the breach of the
warranty, still the insured has no remedy . ... "
IHUGHES, INSURANCE 308-09 (1828): "A warranty in a policy of insur-
ance is regarded as a condition; that is, as a stipulation upon the strict
compliance or non-compliance with which the validity of the policy depends.
... It is immaterial whether the purpose intended by the warranty has been
answered or not; whether the loss was attributable to a violation of the
warranty, or to any other cause . . . . So if a ship be warranted to sail
with a certain number of men, and she sail with a less number, the condition
of the policy is broken, although the jury find that the number of men with
which the ship sailed rendered her as safe as she would have been with the
number specified."
Gow, MARINE INSURANCE 263 (4th ed. 1909): "Penalty for Breach.-
In these cases it is evident that there is no hardship to the assured in de-
manding the exact fulfillment of the very words of the warranties; to pass
any less strict application of them as permissible would be to deprive the
warranties of the most of their value. To prevent any misuse of warranties
the penalty attaching to their non-fulfillment has been made severe; if the
statement is false or the promise broken, the party to whom it is made is
entitled to rescind the contract, and is discharged and exonerated."
And finally, MULLINS, MARINE INSURANCE DIGEST 274 (1959): "In case
of a breach of an express warranty, the underwriter may avoid all losses
occurring thereafter even though there is no connection between the breach
and the loss."
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instructions to apply "appropriate state law."4  Although it found
the policy was a maritime contract this did not mean that the con-
tract was controlled by some federally defined admiralty rule. The
national government, we are told, has left much regulatory power
in the states." Congress has not dealt with the effect to be given
to breaches of warranties in marine insurance policies.48 Neither
has there been declared by the Supreme Court a judicial rule govern-
ing warranties in such policies. 9 Consequently, the majority con-
cludes that since Congress has not spoken on the subject and the
Court has not pronounced a controlling federal admiralty rule, the
state law relative to warranties must control unless the Court should
now proceed to fashion a federal admiralty rule of law defining the
effect of breaches of warranty which have not contributed to the
loss.50
This task the majority refused to do. After recognizing the
opposing views taken in various state jurisdictions, some requiring
a literal interpretation of the warranty, others, like Texas, requiring
that the breach contribute to the loss in order to avoid an insurer's
liability, Justice Black, speaking for the Court, said,
Thus there are a number of ... possible rules from which this
Court could fashion one for admiralty. But such a choice
involves varied policy considerations and is obviously one
which Congress is peculiarly suited to make. And we decline
to undertake the task.51
Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate opinion in which he con-
curred with the result reached by the majority but disagreed with
its reasoning. Under the majority's opinion Justice Frankfurter
says state law would apply whether the vessel were the Queen Mary
or the Wanderer. Such a result he finds intolerable.
Is it to be assumed that were the Queen Mary, on a world
pleasure cruise, to touch at New York City, New Orleans and
Galveston, a Lloyd's policy covering the voyage would be
subjected to the varying insurance laws of New York, Loui-
siana and Texas? Such an assumption, I am confident,
would not prevail were decision necessary. The business of
marine insurance often may be so related to the success of
'6 348 U.S. at 321. ," Id. at 313.
'"Id. at 314. "Id. at 316.50Ibid. " Id. at 320.
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many manifestations of commercial maritime endeavor as to
demand application of a uniform rule of law designed to
eliminate the vagaries of state law and to keep harmony with
the marine insurance laws of other great maritime powers.
52
It is Justice Frankfurter's opinion that as to certain vessels, such
as the Wanderer, the court should leave the interpretation of war-
ranties in the marine policy to state law, but as to other vessels,
such as the Queen Mary, the Court should not abdicate its power to
formulate a federal admiralty rule. Put very simply, if Justice
Frankfurter's view were to be adopted, counsel would, as to a great
number of vessels, be left in doubt as to what law would be applied
to the warranty terms of the policy. The Wanderer would be a
precedent for houseboats with rather limited range of travel. The
Queen Mary would under Justice Frankfurter's view require the
Court to formulate a federal admiralty rule. But where the line is
to be drawn between vessels of lesser tonnage and cruising radius
than the Queen Mary but greater than the Wanderer would be left
open. It is submitted that the law of marine insurance should be
accorded greater certainty than would be derived by applying Justice
Frankfurter's views.
Justice Reed wrote the dissenting opinion concurred in by Justice
Burton. Contrary to the majority he finds that there is an established
federal admiralty rule governing warranties in marine policies. That
rule is that the warranty must be strictly enforced and a breach of it
relieves the insurer although the breach did not contribute to the
loss. It is the rule we acquired from England and has never been
changed by act of Congress or decision of the Supreme Court. Thus
he says,
Our admiralty laws, like our common law, came from Eng-
land. As a matter of American judicial policy, we tend to
keep our marine insurance laws in harmony with those of
England. Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe Ins. Co., 263 U.S. 487,
493; Calmar Steamship Corp. v. Scott, 345 U.S. 427,
442-443. Before our Revolution, the rule of strict compliance
with maritime insurance warranties had been established as
the law of England. That rule persists. While no case of
this Court has been cited or found that says specifically that
12 Id. at 323.
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the rule of strict compliance is to be applied in admiralty and
maritime cases, that presupposition has been consistently
adopted as the basis of reasoning from our earliest days.
Other courts have been more specific. No case holds to the
contrary.
5 3
An examination of the many lower federal court cases cited by
Justice Reed fully confirms his conclusion. But, the Justice con-
tinues, if Congress or the Supreme Court wished to modify the
strict maritime rule as to warranties that could be done. Since the
majority does not wish to formulate a federal rule, Justice Reed
states that he would follow the established rule and hold the insured
to his warranty.54
Commenting on a statement made by the majority to the effect
that regulation of marine insurance has been left to the states, Jus-
tice Reed stresses that all courts, state and federal, which have
jurisdiction to enforce "maritime or admiralty substantive rights
must do so according to federal admiralty law."5  Further, the
"issue of an insurer's liability upon an insured's broken warranty
is clearly a matter of substantive law."5" Although a state may
provide a remedy the state's authority "does not extend to changing
the general substantive admiralty law."
57
Justice Reed emphasizes the uniform nature of admiralty law
and says, "If uniformity is needed anywhere, it is needed in marine
insurance. It is like the question of seaworthiness which must be
controlled by one law."55  Insurers certainly should know the risks
they are assuming when they fix the premiums. And if the majority
view is to be followed, Justice Reed asks, "What law is to govern-
that of the state where the insurance contract was issued, the state
of the accident, or the state of the forum ?""' To permit the many
states to declare the substantive law of marine insurance seems to
Justice Reed to be "an unreasonable interference with maritime
activity."60
As to Justice Frankfurter's concurring views permitting state
law to be applied to the Wanderer, Justice Reed points out that the
Wanderer had navigated the waters of five states and he disapproves
1; Id. at 325-26. "' Id. at 327.
15 Ibid. Id. at 328.
57 Id. at 332. 8Id. at 333.
"OId. at 334. 60 Ibid.
[Vol. 40
DOWN TO THE SEAS AGAIN
a rule which is predicated on the size of the vessel or the number of
states in which it navigates.61
The Wilburn Boat case has left the admiralty bar in a state of
utter confusion.6" We have a situation in which Congress has not
acted. If the majority had found a Supreme Court decision passing
upon the effect of a breach of warranty in a marine policy it pre-
sumably would have stated that federal admiralty law exists and is
applicable. It might then have followed its former decision, or
overruled it, but in any event it would have been declaring federal
admiralty law. Finding no such decision, the issue in Wilburn Boat
is disposed of by applying state law. Does this mean that whenever
Congress has not legislated and the Court has not already spoken
and declared federal admiralty law state law shall determine the
issue? Such a situation has been aptly described as "nightmarish !''68
The Supreme Court has held that, whether the forum be state
or federal, rights of seamen to maintenance and cure are to be de-
termined by federal admiralty law ;64 that the placing of the burden
of proof when a seaman's release is attacked for fraud is determined
by federal admiralty law ;65 that the effect of contributory negligence
is governed by the comparative negligence rule of admiralty and not
the common law rule of the state in which the cause of action arose.66
The rule that rights of parties to a marine insurance policy are to
be determined by the law of some state instead of by a federal
admiralty rule, either declared by Congress or, in the absence of
congressional action, by the Court, is so revolutionary in character
that one cannot help but venture the prediction that Wilburn Boat
,' Ibid.
*2For a few of the many law review criticisms of the case, see The Su-
preme Court, 1954 Term, 69 HARV. L. REv. 119, 169 (1955); 54 Mica. L.
Rnv. 277 (1955); 40 MINN. L. R1v. 168 (1956).
GILMORE & BLAcK, ADmIRALiTy 62 (1957).
O, Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
"Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). It is interesting
to note that Justice Black when speaking for the Court in Wilburn.Boat
permitted state law to determine the substantive rights of parties to a marine
insurance policy. But two years earlier, when also speaking for the Court
in Hawn, just cited, he expressed quite a different attitude. He then said,
"Nor can we agree that Hawn's rights must be determined by the law of
Pennsylvania, under which, it is said, any contributory negligence would
bar all recovery in this personal injury action. True, Hawn was hurt in-
side Pennsylvania . . . [But] the basis of Hawn's action is maritime
tort .... His right of recovery.., is rooted in federal maritime law." Id.
at 409.
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in time will be whittled away by future decisions of the Court so
as to become barely recognizable.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing6 7 involved marine liability
insurance, limitation of liability and a Louisiana state statute giving
injured parties a direct action against a liability insurance company.
The case is unique in that the Supreme Court divided 4-4-1. In
order to break the deadlock, one group of four accepted the opinion
of the solitary Justice.
Despite the legal complexities, the facts were simple. The Jane
Smith, a towboat under charter, was proceeding on a Louisiana
River when she collided with a concrete pier and capsized. As a
result five seamen were drowned. The owner and charterer filed
consolidated petitions in admiralty to limit liability under the federal
limitation act.68 The district court issued an injunction prohibiting
suit against the owner and charterer other than in the limitation
proceeding. Later the personal representatives of the deceased sea-
men brought a consolidated action under the Louisiana direct action
statute69 in the same federal court against the liability insurance
underwriters of the owner and charterer. Jurisdiction was based
on the Jones Act and diversity. One of the policies sued on was an
employer's liability policy and had been issued by the Maryland
Casualty Company to the charterer of the vessel in the amount of
$10,000. The other policy was a "protection and indemnity" policy
issued to both the owner and charterer of the vessel in the amount
of $170,000. Under the terms of both policies the insurer assumed
no liability until the insured had been held liable to pay damages.
70
The district court granted a motion for summary judgment dis-
missing the direct action.71 It held that to permit the action to lie
would contravene the purpose of the federal limitation of liability
act. The court of appeals reversed and ordered the action rein-
stated.72 On certiorari four Justices, headed by Justice Frankfurter,
were of the opinion that the district court was correct in dismissing
the action. Not only would maintenance of the action encroach
.7347 U.S. 409 (1954), discussed in The Supreme Court, 1953 Term, 68
HARv. L. REv. 157 (1954); Note, 33 N.C.L. Rnv. 464 (1955); 103 U. PA.
L. REv. 263 (1956).
08 49 Stat. 1479 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1958).
"'LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1959).
70 347 U.S. at 411 n.3.
99 F. Supp. 681 (E.D. La. 1951).
198 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1952).
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"upon the federal statutory system for bringing all claims into con-
course, the direct action statute is in conflict with the congressional
policy of limited liability.'1 3 Justice Frankfurter pointed out that
the damages sought in the direct action totalled $600,000 and that
the maximum insurance provided by the policies was $180,000.
Although the towboat had not been finally valued, a stipulation had
been filed in the limitation proceeding putting her value at $25,000.
If the charterer and owner of the vessel were found to be entitled
to limitation their maximum liability would be $25,000. This lia-
bility would be amply covered by the $180,000 liability insurance.
But, Justice Frankfurter pointed out, if a judgment against the
insurers is recovered in the direct action for an amount equal to,
or more than $180,000, the liability of the insurers would be fully
complied with by the payment of $180,000; the insurance fund would
have been exhausted and the shipowner and charterer "would then
have to face whatever claims may be presented stripped of their
insurance protection."7 4
Another group of four Justices, headed by Justice Black, were
of the opinion the direct action should be permitted to continue. In
Justice Black's opinion, permitting insurance companies to obtain a
dismissal of these actions would be giving those companies the
benefit of the federal limitation of liability act which was designed
to protect shipowners and charterers and not insurance companies. 75
Enforcing the Louisiana statute would not, he said, impair the uni-
formity of maritime law. As to destroying the rights of the ship-
owner and charterer under the limitation act, Justice Black finds
that "it was conceded at the bar . . . that the ship here is without
value-a total loss. If this is true there would be no fund in the
limitation proceedings and no possibility of any recovery at all against
the shipowner." 76 But, even if the ship had some value, Justice Black
says, the liability insurance was bought to protect the injured persons.
Such insurance, he says, is not like hull insurance which cannot be
reached by injured claimants77
73 347 U.S. at 417-18. "Id. at 418.
7 Id. at 427. 7 Id. at 433.
71 Id. at 435, citing The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468 (1886). It was
in The City of Norwich that a divided Supreme Court held hull insurance
proceeds could not be reached by claimants in a limitation proceeding. See
LiihITATIOx OF LIABILITY, infra at note 12. Both justices Frankfurter and
Clark deemed the rule of The City of Norwich applicable to liability insur-
ance. Justice Clark said, "Though the holding in The City of Norwich does
not control, I think that the reasoning of that case is pertinent; in other
19621
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Further, the policies were written after the enactment of the
Louisiana statute. Justice Black sees no reason for holding that
states cannot "assure seamen that they instead of the shipowner
can get the full benefit of liability polices bought in order to pay
their just claims for injuries caused by the ship."78  Justice Black
is in no way concerned that judgments of $180,000 or more in the
direct action would exhaust the insurance fund and leave the ship-
owner to bear whatever might be determined to be his liability in
the limitation proceeding. In fact, Justice Black in some manner,
by no means clear to the writer, is of the opinion that if the ship-
owner is to receive the benefit of the liability insurance he purchased
he may make money on the deal. Thus he says, "The result of
holding that the Act gives the shipowner this insurance benefit is,
at least in some circumstances, to leave him with more money after
a wreck if he injures people than if he does not."
79
Justice Clark wrote a separate opinion in which he stated he saw
no reason for invalidating Louisiana's law by dismissing the direct
actions. He would direct the district court to first conclude the
limitation proceeding. Under his view, if in that proceeding the
value of the vessel were established at $25,000 and the charterer and
shipowner were held entitled to limitation, the maximum liability
of the charterer and shipowner would not exceed $25,000. The
insurance companies would be required to pay into the limitation
fund, in discharge of their obligation to the insured, the amount of
any judgment against the insured up to $25,000. After that, Justice
Clark would let the direct actions continue against the insurance
companies. Whether they would be liable for the remaining balance
of the $180,000, or any portion thereof, he said, would be a matter
of Louisiana state law. s° This procedure, he pointed out, would not
words, the owner of the ship has the same right to protect his investment in
the ship by insurance against damage claims arising in its operation and
which are chargeable to it as he has to protect his investment from damage
to the ship itself." 347 U.S. at 424 (concurring opinion).
78 Id. at 435.70Ibid.
" Id. at 425. Justice Clark does not suggest what the liability under
state law would be. It is not amiss to note that the Louisiana direct action
statute in question, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1959), says in part: "It
is also the intent of this Section that all liability policies within their terms
and limits are executed for the benefit of all injured persons, his or her
survivors or heirs, to whom the insured is liable . . ." (Italics supplied.)
Further, the insurance policies issued contained the clause, "Liability here-
under shall in no event exceed that which would be imposed on the assured
by law in the absence of contract." These clauses would not necessarily
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enable the shipowner to make money, as Justice Black suggested,
but would merely enable him to get the protection for which he paid.
The four Justices headed by Justice Frankfurter "in order to
break the deadlock"'" and to dispose of the litigation accepted Jus-
tice Clark's solution, vacated the judgment of the court of- appeals
and ordered the case remanded to the district court to be continued
until after the completion of the limitation proceeding.
It is obvious that the Cushing case is weak authority indeed.
It must be recognized as expressing really the opinion of only one
Justice. But it is submitted that the result reached is admirable. It
protects both the shipowner and the injured. It gives sway to both
the federal limitation act and the state direct action statute. If, in
the long run, the insurers are held responsible for the balance of the
insurance over and above the liability fixed on the insured in the
limitation proceeding there may be pressure to increase the insurance
premiums. But, since those premiums are normally estimated on
the amount of coverage purchased, and since, in no event would the
liability of the insurers exceed the face amount of their policies, it
does not seem likely that a material increase, if any, would be made.
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
"[M]en would be deterred from employing ships, if they lay
under the perpetual fear of being answerable for the acts of their
masters to an unlimited extent." Thus wrote the renowned Dutch
jurist, Hugo Grotius, in 1625.1 To impose liability on shipowners
for acts of their masters would be "neither consonant to natural
equity.., nor ... conducive to the public good."2 Referring to the
law of his own nation, Grotius continued, "[I]t is an established
rule that no action can be maintained against the owner for any
greater sum than the value of the ship and cargo."3
relieve the insurers under Louisiana law. The state has held that personal
defenses of an insured, such as a plea of coverture, cannot be pleaded in a
direct action against the insurer. See Louisiana authorities collected in Har-
vey v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 6 So. 2d 774 (La. App. 1942), and in a
discussion of the Ciushing case in 103 U. PA. L. Rnv. 263 (1956).
"'347 U.S. at 423.
GRoTiUs, DE JtrE BzMLI AC PAcIs 139 (Campbell transl. 1901).
Ibid.
'Ibid. When Grotius here refers to "cargo" he is speaking of the ship-
owner's interest in the cargo, namely, the freight charges and it is in that
sense that he has been understood by the commentators and the courts. See
Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 116 n.t (1871).
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Although by no means uniform, some sort of rule of limited
liability on the part of the shipowner has been the law of the leading
maritime nations of continental Europe since the middle ages.4 And
while not a part of the common law of England, limitation in one
form or another has been the law of that country since the enactment
of 7 Geo. Z, c. 15, in 1734.1 Originally, our own American courts
'For an excellent historical survey of the maritime law of limitation of
liability from the middle ages to the nineteenth century, see the opinions of
the following jurists: Judge Ware in The Rebecca, 20 Fed. Cas. 373 (No.
11619) (C.C.D. Me. 1831); Justice Woodbury in New Jersey Steam Nay.
Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (8 How.) 344, 434 (1848) ; Justice Bradley
in Norwich Co. v. Wright, supra note 3; Justice Brown in The Main v.
Williams, 152 U.S. 122 (1894).
It is interesting to note that under the early limitation of liability statutes
adopted in England the liability of the shipowner was limited to the value of
the vessel and freight immediately before the damage was inflicted. Thus
under those statutes, if the act causing the injury also caused a complete loss
of the vessel, the shipowner was liable in an amount equal to the value of the
vessel and freight before the loss. This was in direct conflict with the then
general maritime law and the interpretation given to our American statute
as first enacted, namely, that liability was limited to the value of the vessel
and freight after the injury. See the collection of English cases and the
comment by Justice Bradley discussing this distinction in Norwich Co. v,
Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 118 (1871). In later years English law
provided for a limitation fund based on the tonnage of the vessel.
In 1924 several leading nations adopted the International Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation of Liability of
Owners of Seagoing Vessels. This is commonly referred to as the Brussels
Convention of 1924. The United States was not a party to that Convention.
In 1957 thirty two nations, including the United States, sent delegations
to the Tenth Conference on Private Maritime Law convened at Brussels. A
new Convention on Limitation of Liability was drafted designed to replace
the Brussels Convention of 1924. The new Convention, commonly referred
to as the Brussels Limitation Convention of 1957, was signed by many leading
maritime nations of the world. It was not signed by the United States and
is as yet not the law of this country.
Without going into detail (copy of the Convention can be found in 6
BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY (Supp. 1961, at 46-51)) the Convention fixes the
limit of liability on the basis of the tonnage of the vessel with no regard to
the vessel's value. The limit of liability where only property damage claims
are involved is $67 per ton. If only personal injury or death claims result
from the occurrence the limit is $207 per ton. If both property damage and
personal injury or death claims result the maximum liability is $207 per
ton, the first $140 to be applied to the personal injury and death claims and
the balance of $67 to be applied ratably to property damage claims and any
unpaid balance on personal injury or death claims.
Among the nations signing the 1957 Convention are Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, West
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portu-
gal and Spain. A complete list will be found in 6 BENEDIT, ADMIRALTY
(Supp. 1961, at 46).
There is a conflict among the members of the admiralty bar as to whether
the United States should become a party. In October 1961, a committee of
the Maritime Law Association of the United States filed a divided report on
the question of whether the 1957 Convention should be adopted by this
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refused to accept the principle of limitation as a part of the general
maritime law they would enforce.0 But it has been a most signifi-
cant aspect of the maritime law of this country since the enactment
by Congress of the Limitation of Liability Act of 185 1. Under that
act the liability of the owner of a vessel for any loss which was
occasioned without the privity or knowledge' of the owner was
limited to the value of his interest in the vessel and pending freight.9
The Act of 1851 has been amended from time to time and has
been supplemented by Admiralty Rules adopted by the United States
Supreme Court which spell out the limitation process and procedure.'"
By far the most important amendment to the act was made in
1935 following the great loss of life in the Morro Castle" disaster.
country. The majority of the committee recommended adoption and noted
that legislation was currently before committees of Congress looking to that
end. A minority membership of the committee opposed the adoption of the
Convention. For a copy of the majority and minority reports, see THE
MARITIME LAW AssOcIATIoN OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF TIE COM-
MITTEE ON SHIPOWNERS' LIMITATION OF LIABILITY AND THE COLLISION AND
ARREST OF SHIPS CONVENTIONS No. 450 (Oct. 23, 1961). Those opposing
the adoption of the 1957 Convention assert that it favors shipowners and is
unfavorable to claimants. Those supporting the Convention state that its
adoption will further international uniformity on the subject of Limitation
of Liability.
At the annual fall meeting of the Maritime Association held in New York
City on November 3, 1961, that association by a vote of 157 to 111 adopted
a resolution approving "the basic principles of the Brussels Limitation of
Liability Convention of 1957 and the legislation proposed to carry it into
effect." See THE MARITIME LAW ASSOCIATION OF TIE UNITED STATES, RE-
PORT No. 452, at 4852-53 (Feb. 1962).
'See the opinion of Justice Woodbury in New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v.
Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 434 (1848).
" See REV. STAT. § 4283 (1875), for the original act, and 49 Stat. 1479
(1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1958), for the act as now amended.
' There has been much litigation involving the interpretation to be placed
on these italicized words. Suffice it to say at this time that when a vessel is
owned by an individual and his own negligence causes the loss there will
be no right of limitation. If the vessel is owned by a corporation, liability
may not be limited "where the negligence is that of an executive officer,
manager or superintendent whose scope of authority includes supervision
over the phase of the business out of which the loss or injury occurred. .. ."
See opinion of Justice Douglas speaking for the Court in Coryell v. Phipps,
317 U.S. 406, 410 (1943). For an extended discussion of the construction
placed on the words "privity or knowledge," see 3 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY
§§489-90 (6th ed. 1940).
'Justice Holmes expressed the limitation idea as follows: "The notion
as applicable to a collision case seems to us to be that if you surrender the
offending vessel you are free, just as it was said by a judge in the time of
Edward III, 'If my dog kills your sheep and I freshly after the fact ten-
der you the dog you are without recourse against me.' Fitz. Abr., Barre,
290." Liverpool, Brazil & River Plate Steam Nay. Co. v. Brooklyn E. Dist.
Terminal, 251 U.S. 48, 53 (1919).
1oADMIRALTY RULES 51-55.
"In the early morning of September 8, 1934, the $5,000,000 luxury cruise
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Under the amendment the minimum liability of the shipowner of a
seagoing vessel, as defined in the amending act, for personal injury
or loss of life is fixed at $60 per ton of the vessel's gross tonnage.
Thus, even though the vessel may be a total loss, personal injury and
death claimants have the benefit of a certain limitation fund, pro-
vided, of course, that the shipowner is solvent. Property damage
claimants are not protected by the tonnage limitation fund and, in
the event of a total loss of the vessel and freight, have no recourse,
unless there has been such privity or knowledge on the part of the
shipowner as would deny him the right of limitation as to all types of
claimants.
Except for the $60 per ton provision, the liability of the owner
in an appropriate case is limited to his interest in the vessel and
pending freight. In one of its early five to four decisions in the
admiralty field the Supreme Court held that hull insurance recovered
by the owner of a vessel which had been lost was not an interest in
the vessel reachable by claimants in a limitation proceeding. 2 There
ship, Morro Castle, after completing a Caribbean cruise, was but a few
hours sailing distance from New York when it was swept by a totally devas-
tating fire which resulted in the loss of 134 lives. (Tragedy had already
struck the steamer the night before by the sudden death of her master, Cap-
tain Robert T. Wilmot.) For weeks the charred hulk of the Morro Castle
lay beached on the sands off of Asbury Park, New Jersey. There was no
value in the burned out hulk and on a limitation petition the vessel's owners
sought to limit their liability to $20,000 which represented passenger fares
and freight after deducting expenses of caring for persons who had reached
shore. Claims totalling $13.500,000 were filed and the right to limitation
was contested. Prior to trial the litigation was settled by the ship's owners
paying into a settlement fund $890,000. This amount was then apportioned
among the claimants all, except three who were separately settled with,
having approved the settlement agreement. Valuations of the claims were
fixed by a committee provided for in the settlement and the total claims as
finally valued amounted to $1,450,000. As a result, claimants received
approximately 60% of the valuations put on their claims. For further details,
see Morro Castle (Settlement), 17 Am. Mar. Cas. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
"2The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468 (1886). The majority were of
the opinion that "insurance which a person has on property is not an interest
in the property itself, but is a collateral contract, personal to the insured,
guaranteeing him against loss of the property by fire or other specified
casualty, but not conferring upon him any interest in the property." The
dissenters deemed it eminently unjust that the shipowner be made whole by
collecting the full value of the vessel through hull insurance while the claim-
ants received little or nothing.
It is of interest to note that the Morro Castle's hull was insured for
$4,200,000. Of that insurance $2,600,000 went to the United States as mort-
gagee. This left $1,600,000 of the hull insurance which, if it had been
available to the claimants, would have fully taken care of their claims which
were finally valued at $1,450,000, as set out in note 11 supra.
It also is not amiss to observe that the owners of the Morro Castle were
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has been no departure from that view either by way of judicial
decision or legislation.
The original act of 1851 made no special reference to foreign as
distinguished from domestic shipowners. It simply conferred the
right of limitation on the "owner or owners of any ship or vessel."1
However, the Supreme Court, both prior to and in the litigation
arising out of the fateful voyage of the Titanic, held that a foreign
shipowner who is sued in the American courts may invoke the
limitation provisions of the American statute even though the extent
of his liability under the law of the ship's flag would be greater. 4
fully reimbursed for the $890,000 they had placed in the settlement fund by
the insurance carrier that covered them for personal injury and property
damage. See Morro Castle (P. & I. Insurance), 18 Am. Mar. Cas. 366
(S.D.N.Y. 1940).
" Note 7 supra.
The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24 (1881). A British vessel, The Scotland,
collided with an American vessel, The Kate Dyer, and both sank as a result
of the collision. In an in personan; suit against the owners of The Scotland
limitation was permitted under the American statute.
La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. 95 (1908). On July 4, 1898, the French vessel
La Bourgogne sank at sea following a collision with a British ship. Most
of the passengers and crew on board were lost. A multiplicity of suits against
the owners of the La Bourgogne followed in both federal and state courts.
In line with the rule declared in The Scotland, the owners of the La Bour-
gogne were allowed to limit their liability in accordance with the American
act. The litigation in this case lasted over a period of ten years.
The landmark decision in this area is the opinion of Justice Holmes in
The Titanic, 233 U.S. 718 (1914). In the early morning hours of April 15,
1912, that much heralded "unsinkable" vessel was lost at sea while making
her maiden voyage. At 11:40 P.M. of the 14th the pride of the White Star
Line collided with an iceberg. In less than three hours, she and over 1,500
of the 2,200 persons who had sailed with her lay beneath the chill waters of
the Atlantic. The roster of passengers included a veritable social register.
Colonel John Jacob Aster, Benjamin Guggenheim, Washington Roebling, II,
George Widener and J. B. Thayer were but a few of those elite who went
to their graves with the most modern and luxurious vessel of the times.
For a fascinating and most vivid account of the Titanic disaster, see Lor,
A NIGHT To REiMEMn3ER (1955).
Death claims arising out of the Titanic disaster amounted to $22,000,000.
The law of England, under whose flag the Titantic sailed, at that time pro-
vided for a limitation fund based upon the tonnage of the vessel (15 pounds
per ton for personal injury and death claims) similar to the limitation fund
provided for in the 1935 amendment of the American statute.
But under the American law, as then in force, the interest of the owner
in the vessel and pending freight after the disaster formed the basis of the
limitation fund. In the case of the Titanic this amounted to $98,000 for
pending freight, the vessel being a total loss. The limitation fund under the
English law for personal injury and death would have been about $3,750,000.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, held that when a claimant seeks
relief in American courts he must accept as controlling the American law
of limitation. Thus, for all practical purposes, recovery was denied the
claimants. Curiously enough, however, it is interesting to note that had
the claimants sued in England they also would not have recovered any
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And when the $60 per ton amendment was enacted in 1935 for
personal injury and death claims it was specifically made applicable
to both American and foreign shipowners. 5
Meanwhile, in 1920, Congress had enacted the Death on the
High Seas Act. 6 That statute creates a cause of action for a wrong-
ful death caused on the high seas more than a marine league distant
from the shore of any state, the District of Columbia, or any terri-
tory of the United States. However, the statute specifically provides
that if a right of action for such wrongful death is granted by the
law of any foreign state such right may be maintained in an ad-
miralty court of the United States but without abatement in respect
to the amount for which recovery is authorized notwithstanding
any statute of the United States to the contrary. By virtue of the
last stated provision, it has been held in the second circuit that
claimants suing for death resulting from the sinking of a British
vessel on the high seas in a single ship disaster were not subject
to the limitation provisions of the American Limitation Act."
substantial sums because the passenger tickets contained clauses relieving the
shipowners from all but nominal liability which stipulations British courts
enforced. See 3 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 486 (6th ed. 1940).
"' 49 Stat. 960 (1935). In the following year the amendment was further
clarified and procedural steps indicated. See 49 Stat. 1479 (1936), 46 U.S.C.
§ 183(b) (1958).
As appears from the cases referred to in note 14 supra, when a petition
for limitation of liability was filed in an American admiralty court the
Supreme Court has applied the American act. Nevertheless, despite those
cases and the 1935 amendment, when foreign vessels are involved, or the
damage is sustained in foreign waters, the careful proctor does not merely
invoke the American limitation act in his petition but pleads foreign statutes
or conventions which might conceivably be held applicable. Thus, for ex-
ample, at the time of the litigation following the Andrea Doria-Stockholm
disaster in 1956, proctors for the Swedish line prayed for limitation under
the American statutes, the Brussels Convention of 1924 and the Swedish
law using the "and/or" terminology. Proctors for the Italian line in their
petition prayed for limitation as provided in the American statutes "or in
any applicable Convention or Foreign law." Settlement of the litigation
forestalled a court ruling but it was generally assumed the American law
of limitation would apply in line with the authorities cited in the footnote
just preceding.
141 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1958).
1'The Vestris, 53 F.2d 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). There is no Supreme
Court decision on this point. However, it would appear that if the Death
on the High Seas Act had been in force at the time of the Titanic litigation
the death claimants would not have been barred under the then limitation
provisions of the American act but would have had the benefit of the tonnage
provisions of the English statute limiting the liability of shipowners. See
note 14 supra. Whether the Supreme Court would have enforced the stipu-
lation contained in passenger tickets which relieved the shipowner of all but
nominal liability, see note 14 supra, is a matter of conflicts of law. Much
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. In connection with the possible effect, of foreign law on limita-
tion under our American statute, reference should be made to a five
to four decision rendered by the Supreme Court in 1949.8 The
American vessel Norwalk Victory was proceeding down the Schelde
River in Belgium when it collided with and sank the British ship,
Merganser. Owners of cargo lost on the Merganser sued in a federal
court in New York. A limitation petition was filed and although
the admitted value of the Noriwalk Victory was $1,000,000 the peti-
tioner deposited a bond in the amount of only $325,000. This was
done on the theory that under the' law of Belgium where the tort
occurred the petitioner's maximum limit' of liability was $325,000.,
Cargo owners claimed the bond filed was inadequate and the 'district
court, without determining the nature of the Belgian law, dismissed
the limitation petition. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal.
On certiorari the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Frankfurter, reversed the lower courts and remanded the case to
the district court with instructions'that it determine the nature of
the Belgian law applicable. If on so doing the-district judge found
that under Belgian law the substantive limit of liability was $325,000,
then a bond in that amount should be accepted. If, on the other
hand, he found the Belgian limitation of $325,000 was merely pro-
cedural, then he should exact a bond for $1,000,000 in accordance"
with the American statute. As Justice Frankfurter saw it, if Belgian
law created no greater liability than $325,000, to require a larger
bond would disregard the principle that "the right to recover for a
tort depends upon and is measured by the law of the place where the
would have depended on the theory the Court chose to adopt, i.e., place of
contract, intention of parties, law of forum, etc. Such stipulations in pas-
senger contracts which either exempt the shipowner of all liability for negli-
gence or limit the extent of his liability have been deemed contrary to the
public policy of the United States but have been enforced in England.
In 1936 Congress expressly provided that any such stipulation was against
public policy and null and void. 49 Stat. 1479 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 183(c)
1958). This provision has been enforced by the lower courts in cases
involving foreign shipowners. See Hawthorne v. Holland-American Line,
160 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1958). For a discussion of the conflicts of law
problem raised in this type of case, see RoBixsoN, ADmIRALTY § 78 (1939).
While the decision in The Vestris denying the British owner the benefit
of the American limitation act as to death claims was affirmed, 57 F.2d 176
(2d Cir. 1932), the question became moot because the district court then
rendered an opinion that the right to limit should be denied anyway by rea-
son of the owner's privity or knowledge. 60 F.2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
Thereupon the claims were settled and further litigation eliminated.
" Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, Ltd., 336 U.S.
386 (1949).
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tort occurred.""9 In the meantime, since the Belgian law has not
yet been determined, a bond for $1,000,000 should be required in
case the Belgian limitation be found to be merely procedural.
The four dissenting Justices took the position that when a peti-
tion for limitation is filed in American courts the American statute
should be complied with and under that statute the bond or limita-
tion fund in this case should have been $1,000,000. Although resort
to Belgian law might later reveal that the claimants' substantive
right to recovery does not exceed $325,000, that, said the minority,
is no justification for rewriting the fund provisions of the American
statute so as to permit limitation upon filing a bond for less than
one third of the vessel's value. There are no subsequent reports of
the case; so in all likelihood the parties negotiated a settlement.
In spelling out the limitation procedure, the Supreme Court
provided in Admiralty Rule 53 that in a limitation proceeding the
shipowner can set up in his petition facts and circumstances by
reason of which he claims exoneration from liability as well as
limitation of liability. Persons claiming damages and who file their
claims under oath as provided in Rule 52 are given the right to file
an answer contesting either the right of the shipowner to exonera-
tion or limitation or both. Thus it is normal procedure -for the
shipowner to file one petition in Admiralty in which he sets out all
relevant facts and prays that he be exonerated from liability but that
if the court find him liable that he then be accorded the right of
limitation.20
Formerly there was no time limit for the filing of the petition
and it could be filed after judgment had been obtained by a claimant
in any court. Since the 1936 amendment, a petition to limit liability
must be filed by the shipowner within six months after the claimant
has given the shipowner written notice of the claim.21
If a claimant wishes to sue the shipowner in personam he may do
so either in admiralty where there is no jury, or he may proceed
under the "saving to suitors" 22 clause in a common law court where
'o Id. at 396.
Following the Andrea Doria-Stockholm catastrophe in 1956 both the
Swedish owners of the Stockholm and the Italian owners of the Andrea Doria
filed independent petitions for exoneration and limitation in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. The voluminous text
of the Swedish petition is set out verbatim in N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1956, § 1,
p. 16, and makes most interesting reading for any student of admiralty law.
249 Stat. 148 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, while granting exclusive original
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he will have the benefit of a jury trial. When a shipowner files a
petition for limitation, he also prays for an injunction restraining
the prosecution of claims against him in all courts except the ad-
miralty court where the limitation petition has been filed. The
granting of such an injunction results in a concursus of claims in
admiralty. Multiplicity of suits is eliminated and the right of
claimants to a jury trial is lost. Such concursus is usually desired
by shipowners. It is normally unwanted by claimants who, at least
in most cases, appear with personal injury or death claims and much
prefer the largesse of jurors to the well considered appraisal of an
admiralty judge.
In the light of this conflict of interests, it is not surprising to
find the Supreme Court endeavoring to favor the shipowner in one
instance and the claimant in another. Nor is it surprising to find
that the Supreme Court Justices disagree as to which party's wishes
are to prevail in a given situation.
Conceivably, the Supreme Court could have declared that in
any case When a petition for limitation is filed by a shipowner all
claims must be prosecuted in the admiralty court and all actions by
claimants in other courts are to be perpetually enjoined. Had the
Court done so, every shipowner could have effectively deprived a
claimant of his common law remedy with its jury trial by merely
filing the limitation petition in every case. But this one sided ap-
proach has not been adopted by the Court despite some very broad
language in some cases which would seem to ifidicate complete and
sole jurisdiction in admiralty once the shipowner files for limitation.
Various situations may arise. In some it will seem in order to
let admiralty proceed. In others the Court, or at least some of its
members, would forbid admiralty from being the sole arbiter of a
claimant's rights. For example: if limitation is allowed and the
fund is inadequate to take care of all claims is the same procedure
to be followed 'When the fund is adequate? Suppose limitation is
denied the shipowner because of his privity or knowledge? What
if there is only one claimant? In the following pages we will con-
jurisdiction of civil causes in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the
federal district courts, expressly saved to suitors the right of a common law
remedy where the common law is competent to give it. The section was
rewritten in the Judiciary Code of 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958), and the"saving" clause now reads, "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies
to which they are otherwise entitled." The rewrite was intended to cover
equitable as well as common law remedies, but it must be conceded that
more apt language could have bdn used.
1962]
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sider the action of the court in the different situations indicated by
the sub-titles.
1. Multiple Claims, Limitation Allowed and Limitation Fund
Inadequate
In respect to this situation there is no difficulty. The Limitation
Act speaks in terms of plurality of claimants. Thus the fund is for
the benefit of "claimants" and "all claims and proceedings against.
the owner" elsewhere are to be enjoined.23 Claimants are to receive
compensation out of the fund "in proportion to their respective
losses." 4 The concursus is had; claimants must prove their claims
in the limitation proceeding; the admiralty court makes the necessary
adjudications and then distributes the fund pro rata. It is this
sort of situation the majority is speaking of when in the fairly recent
case of Lake Tankers Corp. v. Hennr5 the Court said, "It is, there-
fore, crystal clear that the operation of the [Limitation] Act is
directed at misfortunes at sea where the losses incurred exceed the
value of the vessel and pending freight."26
To deny a concursus in such a situation, the Court said, would
be to frustrate the purpose of the act, for "only in this manner may
there be a marshalling of all the statutory assets [limitation fund]
remaining after the disaster and a concourse of claimants." 7 Where
the fund is less than the total claims "concursus is vital to the pro-
tection of the offending owner's statutory right of limitation."2
Since there is no disagreement as to this type of case we will pro-
ceed with other situations.
2. Multiple Claims-Limitation Denied Because of Privity or
Knowledge of Shipowner
If the shipowner does not file a petition for limitation, claimants
are free to press their claims in law actions. There is no concursus.
If the shipowner does file a petition for limitation and the admiralty
court finds limitation should be denied.because of the shipowner's
privity or knowledge, are the claimants free to proceed with law
actions or must they now have their claims adjudicated in admiralty?
This question was first presented to the Supreme Court in 1927.
Chief Justice Taft rendered the Court's opinion in the now much
2 49 Stat. 148 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
-4 19 Stat. 251 (1877), 46 U.S.C. § 184 (1958).
2- 354 U.S. 147 (1957). 2.Id. at 151.
" Id. at 151-52. 23 Id. at 154.
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cited case of Hartford Accident & .ndemnity Co. v. Southern. Pa-
cific Co.2  The shipowner had filed a petition for limitation. A
stipulation on which the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company
appeared as surety was filed by the shipowner for the value of the
vessel and pending freight. Claims were filed in the limitation
proceeding. The district court took proof as to the claims and
allowed some in full, others in part. However, the court denied the
shipowner's petition to limit on the ground of his privity or knowl-
edge. It then ordered that the stipulated fund be paid 'into court
for pro rata distribution amorig the successful claimants. The cir-
•cuit court of appeals affirmed on appeal by Hartford.
On certiorari the contention was made in behalf of Hartford that
once the district court had disallowed the limitation petition the
power of admiralty was at an end and claimants would have to pro-
ceed with their claims in such law courts as might have jur'isdiction.
It is to be noted that the claimants were content to abide by the action
of the admiralty court in adjudicating their claims and it is the
surety for the shipowner who objects. This fact should not be lost
sight of as we shall point out later on.
In holding that the admiralty court could proceed and fully
adjudicate all claims even though limitation had been denied, Chief
Justice Taft said,
It would be most inequitable if parties and claimants, brought
in against their will and prevented from establishing their
claims in other courts, should be. unable to perfect a remedy
in this proceeding promptly, and should be delayed, until
after the possible insolvency of the petitioner, to seek a com-
plete remedy in another court, solely because the owner can
not make his case of personal immunity.3"
In commenting on the equitable 'aspects of an-admiralty court's
power in limitation proceedings, the Chief Justice said,
It is quite evident ... that this Court has by its rules and
decisions given the statute a very broad and equitable con-
struction for the purpose of carrying out its purpose and for
facilitating a settlement of the whole controversy over such
losses as are comprehended within it, and that all the ease
with which rights can be adjusted in equity is intended to be
2"273 U.S. 207 (1927). toId. at 217.
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given to the proceeding. It is the administration of equity
in an admiralty court."
In concluding the Chief Justice said that the litigation pending
in admiralty "may properly be carried to a complete settlement of
all claims, without regard to whether the prayer for limitation of
liability is denied or not."32
Five years later the Supreme Court decided Spencer Kellogg &
Sons, Inc. v. Hicks.3 3  Several workmen had lost their lives by
reason of the sinking of the Linseed King in the Hudson River.
Various actions at law had been instituted as well as workmen's
compensation suits. The shipowner filed a petition to limit liability.
All other actions were enjoined. Claims were filed in the admiralty
court. Limitation was denied. On the power of the admiralty
court to adjudicate the rights of claimants the Supreme Court, citing
the Hartford case, said, "[W]e think that the admiralty court,
having taken jurisdiction and brought all claimants into concourse,
should have given complete relief.' "a'
Again, as in Hartford, the claimants were agreeable that their
claims be disposed of in the limitation proceeding and it was the
shipowner, whose limitation petition had been denied, that con-
tended certain claimants should be remitted to prosecuting their
claims in a state workmen's compensation tribunal rather than in
the limitation proceeding.
In 1940 the Court decided Just v. Chambers.4  There were
several claimants and limitation sought by the shipowner had been
denied by the admiralty court. The particular issue involved was
whether a tort action survived against the tortfeasor in admiralty.
The district court held it did. The circuit court of appeals was of
the opinion it did not. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit and
upheld the action. Then in referring to the question of disposition
of claims in admiralty when limitation has been denied, the Court,
again citing the Hartford case, said,
When the jurisdiction of the court in admiralty has at-
tached through a petition for limitation, the jurisdiction to
determine claims is not lost merely because the shipowner
fails to establish his right to limitation .... There is thus
'Id. at 215-16. 21d. at 220.
"285 U.S. 502 (1932). "'Id. at 512.
312 U.S. 383 (1941).
[Vol. 40
DOWN TO THE SEAS AGAIN
jurisdiction to fulfill the obligation to do equity to claimants
by furnishing them a complete remedy although limitation is
refused. 5
It should be noted again that in the Chambers case, as in Hart-
ford and the Linseed King, it was the shipowner who was opposing
recovery in admiralty. The claimants, having been brought into
admiralty, now desired that court to give relief.
Whether, in a case where the shipowner's limitation petition is
denied, the individual claimants will be free to prosecute their actions
at law has not as yet been determined by the Supreme Court. It
is one thing to say that a shipowner who has invoked the jurisdiction
of admiralty through his limitation petition must abide by the action
of that court in disposing of the many cornered controversy even
if limitation is denied. It is quite another to say that a shipowner,
by invoking admiralty's jurisdiction through a petition to limit lia-
bility which is found without merit, may deny to claimants their
own desire to proceed at common law. Particularly would this be
true if the vessel were a total loss and no freight was pending. In
such a "no fund" case the second circuit has suggested that claimants
ought to be free to proceed with their law actions .
3
3. The Case of the Single Claimant
What is to be the rule if there is only one claimant? Concursus
is out of the question. Yet, since one claim may be just as finan-
cially devastating to the shipowner as a number of smaller claims,
he should have the right to have his liability limited to the value of
his interest in the vessel and pending freight irrespective of what
tribunal ultimately fixes the amount of the claimant's damages. As
is so often the case in admiralty matters, the lower courts differed
when confronted with this situation. Some denied the shipowner
the right of limitation even though the single claim, exceeded the
Id. at 386.
, See In re Wood's Petition, 230 F.2d 197, 199-200 n.10 (2d Cir. 1956),
where the court in referring to the Hartford, Linseed King and Chambers
cases said, "However, they merely establish the continuing jurisdiction in
admiralty to dispose of the remaining issues after denying limitation and the
rights of the claimants to insist upon the exercise of such jurisdiction."
(Emphasis is by the court.) See also Pershing Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Gaffney,
279 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1960), where the court states that when the shipowner
is denied limitation the admiralty court may make certain that the claimants,
should they so desire, shall be free to proceed with actions at law.
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value of the vessel and freight; others allowed limitation. In 1914
the Supreme Court decided the question in favor of the allowance
of limitation in admiralty by its decision in the single claim case
of White v. Island Transportation Co.8
In that litigation the claimant had instituted an action in a
Washington state court in which she sought to recover $21,350 for
personal injuries. In its petition to limit liability the shipowner
claimed that the value of the vessel did not exceed $10,000. The
claimant challenged the jurisdiction of the admiralty court to enter-
tain a limitation proceeding when only one claimant was involved.
She refused to take further steps in the cause. The district court
then found the limitation petition was in order and adjudged that
the claimant take nothing in the proceeding. The Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's action specifically stating that even though
there be but a single claim a limitation proceeding in admiralty is in
order.
Since the decision in White, the Supreme Court has had only
one other case before it which involved the question of how to
handle the case of the single claimant when the shipowner has sought
to limit his liability. That case is Langnes v. Green30 which first
appeared in the Supreme Court in 1931 and then reappeared in that
Court in 1932 under the title Ex parte Green.4
Green had sued Langnes, the owner of the vessel Aloha, in a
Washington state court and sought to recover $25,000 for personal
injuries. Four months later, Langnes filed a petition in admiralty to
limit his liability to $5,000, the conceded value of the vessel. The
district court promptly enjoined Green's action at law and Green
filed his claim in the limitation proceeding. There were no other
claimants.
Green then moved in the district court for an order dissolving the
injunction and urged that he be permitted to proceed in the state
court for two reasons: (1) since he was the only claimant a con-
cursus in admiralty was not involved, and (2) Langnes could take
advantage of the limitation act by proper pleading in the state court.
Green's motion was denied. The admiralty judge then stated that
he would first take evidence on liability and, if liability were found,
would then consider whether or not under the circumstances the
8 See collection of cases in 79 U. P-. L. REv. 1103, 1107 (1931).
*"233 U.S. 346 (1914). 0°282 U.S. 531 (1931).40286 U.S. 437 (1932).
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shipowner was entitled to limitation. On evidence presented by
Green the district court found no liability and accordingly entered a
decree in favor of the shipowner.
Green appealed to the circuit court of appeals where he also
urged two grounds: (1) that since there was but a single claimant
the shipowner should have sought limitation in the state court action,
and (2) that the record disclosed the privity and knowledge of the
shipowner which fact deprived the admiralty judge of jurisdiction.
The circuit court of appeals rejected the first contention but held that
the pleadings and evidence did establish the privity and knowledge
of the shipowner and therefore the district court was without juris-
diction. Accordingly, it reversed.
On certiorari brought by the shipowner, the Supreme Court
concluded in its first opinion that both lower courts had been in
error. The Court set out the following conclusions:
1. Green, as claimant, could properly bring his action in the
state court ;
4
2. This being a case of only one claimant, the shipowner,
Langnes, could take advantage of the limitation statute by
proper pleading in the state action ;42
3. Notwithstanding this (No. 2 above) the shipowner could
also invoke admiralty's jurisdiction by a petition to limit
liability ;43
4. Its jurisdiction having been invoked by the shipowner,
the admiralty court could, in its discretion, proceed to dis-
pose of the case or decline to exercise its jurisdiction ;44
5. In the exercise of a sound discretion, the admiralty court
should have dissolved the restraining order and permitted
the cause to proceed in the state court ;45
6. The admiralty court should now dissolve its restraining
order BUT should retain the limitation petition as a matter
of precaution to be dealt with by it in "the unlikely event
that the right of petitioner [shipowner] to a limited lia-
bility might be brought into question in the state court,
or the case otherwise assume such form in that court as
to bring it within the exclusive power of a court of ad-
miralty."
48
" 282 U.S. at 539.
," Id. at 539.
45 Ibid.
," Id. at 540-41.
" Id. at 541.
"1 Id. at 541-42.
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The Supreme Court then reversed the decrees of both lower
courts and remanded the case to the district court for further pro-
ceedings in conformity with its opinion.
That counsel and the admiralty judge might be confused by this
opinion was a foregone conclusion. In the Court's conclusion num-
bered Z above, we were told the shipowner could take advantage of
the limitation act by proper pleading in the state court. Then in
conclusion numbered 6 above, we are told that the admiralty judge
should retain the limitation petition and act on it if by any chance
the right to limit might be questioned in the state court.
Complying with the Court's mandate the district court judge
dissolved the injunction and retained the limitation petition awaiting
to see what would happen in the state court. In the latter court
Green forthwith challenged the right of the shipowner to limitation
and Langnes promptly called this to the district court judge's atten-
tion. That judge then in the light of the conclusions expressed by
the Supreme Court (paragraph numbered 6 above), informed Green
that if he persisted in attacking the shipowner's right to limit liability
in the state court, the district court would reissue the restraining
order.
Thereupon, Green applied to the United States Supreme Court
for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus against the district
judge compelling him to conform to the court's opinion. It is the
decision of the Supreme Court on this application that is reported
under the title of Ex parte Green." The Court this time affirmed
the action of the district court judge and suggested that the district
court give Green further leave to withdraw from the state court his
attack on the shipowner's right to limit his liability. Upon Green's
failure to so do the admiralty court is to restrain the prosecution of
the state court's action.
Following the two Green opinions it was still unclear to the
lower courts whether in the single claim case the claimant, in order
to stay in the state court, had to concede that the shipowner was in
fact entitled to limitation or whether he only had to concede tfie right
of the shipowner to litigate in admiralty the question of whether or
not he was to be allowed limitation. The better view, which has
been adopted by the second circuit, would seem to be that only the
right to seek limitation in admiralty need be conceded.48
' 286 U.S. 437 (1932).
48 Petition of Red Star Barge Line, Inc., 160 F.2d 436 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 850 (1947).
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Since, in the trial at law, it is conceivable that issues would be
determined in establishing negligence which would also deprive the
shipowner of the right to limitation, the claimant if he wishes to be
free to go on with the law suit should not only agree to the limitation
issue being tried out in admiralty but should also agree that any
judgment he might obtain in the law action is not to be given a res
adjudicata effect in the limitation proceeding.
It must be conceded that the single claim situation is by no means
one that can be safely called "settled." Almost thirty years have
passed since the second Green opinion and in that interval a con-
siderable change of personnel has taken place in the Supreme Court
to say nothing of a change in attitudes. Whereas, at one time the
Court was much concerned with protecting the interests of the ship-
owner, in recent years it is the personal injury claimant who has
been the favored litigant.49  The Supreme Court has conferred on
jurors the right to call persons "seamen" who obviously are not such
but who as "seamen" receive the blessings of jury verdicts.50  It
would not be too surprising to find that in the next single claim
case appearing before the Supreme Court that tribunal also leaves
to a common law jury the right to accord or deny a shipowner limi-
tation of liability.
4. Multiple Claims-Limitation Petition Filed-Total Claims Less
Than Limitation Fund
We have seen under the first sub-title that when a shipowner is
entitled to limitation and the claims exceed the limitation fund a
concursus in admiralty is necessary in order that the claimants may
receive their pro rata shares out of the fund. Should admiralty
require a concursus and enjoin actions by claimants at law if it
appears that the limitation fund exceeds the possible claims? In
1956 the Supreme Court had this question before it in Lake Tankers
Corp. v. Henn.51
One of Lake Tankers' tugs was pushing a Lake Tankers' barge
when it collided with the Blackstone, a pleasure yacht. As a result
one person on the Blackstone drowned and several were injured.
Various actions at law were instituted, the demand in the death
claim alone being for $500,000. Thereupon, Lake Tankers filed a
"' See Baer, At Sea With the United States Supreme Court, 38 N.C.L.
REv. 307 (1960).
Id. at 371-78. 1354 U.S. 147 (1956).
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petition for limitation and deposited two bonds in the limitation
proceedings, one for $118,542, representing its interest in the tug,
and another for $165,000, its interest in the barge. These totalled
$283,542, considerably less than the demands made in the law actions.
The death claimant then filed a claim in the limitation proceeding
for only $250,000 and all other possible claimants filed claims in that
proceeding totalling $9,525 so that the claims filed in admiralty were
now less than the limitation fund. The claimants also expressly
relinquished all right .to damages in excess of the amount of their
claims as filed in the limitation proceeding and the death claimant
allocated $100,000 of her alleged damage to the tug and $150,000
to the barge. Stipulations were entered into assuring that these
amounts would not be increased, that no judgment would be entered
in'excess of these claims, and that the judgment in the law actions
would not be res adjudicata as to the right of Lake Tankers to limit
its liability in the event the state court should pass upon facts deter-
minative of that issue.
The district court then vacated the restraining order on the
ground that the limitation fund exceeded the amount of the claims.
The court of appeals affirmed and provided in its order for the appro-
priate protection of Lake Tankers in the event the jury found that
either the barge or the tug was solely responsible.52
On certiorari the majority of the Supreme Court upheld the
lower courts' action. After recognizing the rule that concursus is
necessary where the fund is less than the total claims the court said,
On the other hand, where the value of the vessel and the
pending freight, the fund paid into the proceeding by the of-
fending owner, exceeds the claims made against it, there is no
necessity for the maintenance of the concourse.5 a
" The order of the court of appeals provided, "If the claimant obtains a
judgment in her state court suit for an amount in excess of $100,000, an
injunction will issue permanently enjoining her from collecting such excess
unless the judgment rests on a special verdict allocating the amount as be-
tween the libellant as owner of the tug and as owner of the barge respectively.
Thus, if the judgment exceeds $100,000 and the jury finds libellant liable
solely as owner of the tug, she will be enjoined from collecting any excess.
If the jury finds that the libellant is liable solely as owner of the barge, she
will be enjoined from collecting any amount in excess of $150,000." 232
F.2d 573, 577 (2d Cir.), reaffirmed on a rehearing by the court sitting in
banc, 235 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1956).
53354 U.S. at 152. Conceivably there may be cases where there is honest
doubt as to the adequacy of the limitation fund to take care of all claims.
The Court in its next sentence following the quotation given in the text says,
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The fact that the claims as initially filed in the state court ex-
ceeded the limitation fund was, to the majority, immaterial.
While it is true that the claims as initially filed in the state
court exceeded the fund created in the limitation proceeding,
still when the admiralty court dissolved the injunction against
the state suit these claims, as filed in and limited by stipula-
tion and order of the admiralty court in the limitation pro-
ceeding, aggregated less than the fund.54
Since the state court proceedings could have no possible effect,
under the circumstances, on the shipowner's right to limitation the
majority sees no reason for depriving claimants of their right to a
jury trial at law. Justice Clark, speaking for the Court, calls attention
to the fact that an airline, a bus company, or a railroad cannot com-
pel a concursus and deprive claimants of their right to jury trial but
must suffer a multiplicity of suits. With the limitation right of the
shipowner protected, he sees no reason why it should be treated more
favorably than these other common carriers. Any language of the
Court in other cases to the effect that "concursus is the heart of the
limitation system" refers only, says Justice Clark, to "those cases
where the claims exceed the value of the vessel and the pending
freight. ' 55
Justice Harlan spoke for the dissenters. His position is that at
the time the limitation petition was filed the total claims asserted
in the law actions far exceeded the value of both the tug and barge.
Limitation therefore was in order. Subsequent steps taken by claim-
ants to reduce their demands below the limitation fund should not
defeat the full operation of the limitation proceeding any more than
a subsequent reduction of the demand of a plaintiff, whose case has
been removed to the federal court because of diversity, will result in
a remand to the state court.
Summarizing the Court's action in regard to the situations which
have been presented to it as set out in the above four sub-titles we
may conclude:
"This is not to say that coicursus is not available where a vessel owner in
good faith believes the fund inadequate, but here there is no contention that
there might be further claims; the value of the vessels is undisputed and the
claims are fixed; it follows indubitably that the fund is sufficient to pay all
claims in full." It would seem that, irrespective of the good or bad faith
of the shipowner, wherever it is made to appear that the total claims may
exceed the limitation fund a concursus in admiralty should be required.
5 Ibid. 15 Id. at 154.
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1. The right to determine whether or not a shipowner is to
be permitted to limit his liability to his interest in the vessel
and pending freight is only to be determined by the ad-
miralty court on petition filed by the shipowner.
2. If the total claims exceed or may exceed the limitation
fund, suits at law are to be enjoined and the claims will be
passed upon in a concursus by the admiralty court.
3. When because of his privity or knowledge a shipowner
has been denied the right to limit his liability claimants
may proceed to have their claims adjudicated in the limi-
tation proceeding despite the wishes of the shipowner to
the contrary.
4. Whether, when a shipowner has been denied limitation
because of his privity or knowledge, claimants may pro-
ceed with their actions at law has not as yet been deter-
mined by the Supreme Court. It would seem that if claim-
ants are free to proceed in their law actions when their
claims do not exceed the limitation fund (sub-title 4) they
should also be free to do so when the admiralty court has
determined that the shipowner is not entitled to limitation
at all.56
5. In the case of a single claimant admiralty will not enjoin
claimant's action at law provided the right to limitation
is conceded to the admiralty court and the judgment in
the law action is not to be given a res adjudicata effect in
the limitation proceeding.
6. When the amount in the limitation fund clearly exceeds
the total claims possible claimants will be free to prosecute
their actions at law upon the stipulation that judgments
in the law actions are not to be given res adjudicata effect
as to the right to limitation in the admiralty proceeding.
5. Are Cross-Claims by the Petitioner or by Claimants Permissible
in Limitation Proceedings?
Prior to 1957 the lower federal courts had been in disagreement
as to whether a limitation proceeding was purely defensive in charac-
ter or whether in such a proceeding the party seeking limitation
could obtain an affirmative judgment against a claimant and whether
" See court of appeals cases cited in note 36 supra.
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one claimant could obtain affirmative relief against another claim-
ant.57 Irrespective of which view was taken, it was generally con-
ceded that the decision of the limitation court on the issue of
liability was res adjudicata in subsequent actions brought for affir-
mative relief.5" In 1957 the question was first passed upon by the
Supreme Court in British Transport Commission v. United States.59
In a six to three decision the majority sustained the right to affirma-
tive relief in each such instance. Because, in this case of first im-
pression, affirmative relief was given against a foreign claimant in
a limitation proceeding a detailed examination of the facts and the
procedure followed is in order.
On May 6, 1953, a collision occurred in the English Channel
between the United States navy transport, Haiti Victory, and a
British owned ferry, the Duke of York. The latter vessel sank as
a result and several persons lost their lives while many were injured.
The value of the Duke before the collision was $1,500,000. The
Haiti, which sustained damage to the extent of $65,000, returned
to the United States and a petition for exoneration or limitation
of liability was filed by the United States in a federal district court
in Virginia. The British Transport Commission, which was the
owner of the Duke, filed a claim in the limitation proceeding for
$1,500,000 and denied any responsibility for the accident which it
asserted was solely caused by the negligence of the Haiti with the
privity or knowledge of her owner.
While the Haiti had sustained damage, as aforesaid, no claim
was made in the limitation proceeding by the United States against
the owner of the Duke initially because it was thought that the
Duke was a British government vessel and that no claim could be
made by virtue of the "Knock for Knock" agreement."' Subse-
" In support of the defensive theory, see The Steel Inventor, 24 Fed. 657
(2d Cir. 1928). Favoring affirmative relief for one claimant against another
was Judge Dobie's opinion in British Transp. Comm'n v. United States, 230
F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1956).
"8 See British Transp. Comm'n v. United States, supra note 57; Algomo
Central & Hudson Bay Ry. v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 86 F.2d 708 (2d
Cir. 1937).
- 354 U.S. 129 (1957).
" This belated filing is explained by the Supreme Court: "The United
States had not filed a cross-claim against the Duke for damage to its vessel
because, as it alleges, its counsel felt that it had waived recovery of any claim
against a vessel of the British Government by virtue of the 'Knock for
Knock' Agreement, 56 Stat. 1780, E. A. S. 282, Dec. 4, 1942. Subsequently,
while the appeal was pending, the British Government advised that it did
not consider the Duke as a government vessel. Consequently, following the
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quently, while an appeal was pending in the court of appeals the
United States was informed the Duke was not a British government
vessel and following the court of appeals decision the United States
filed a cross-claim against the British Transport Commission in the
limitation proceedings before the district court.
Various claimants filed against the United States in the limita-
tion proceedings and at the same time filed cross-claims against the
British Transport Commission as owner of the Duke. The district
judge dismissed the cross-claims against the Commission on the
ground that a limitation proceeding did not afford one claimant the
right to seek affirmative relief against another claimant. In due
course the district court found that the accident was solely due to
the negligent operation of the Duke. On appeal by the Commission
and other claimants to the court of appeals it was held that the dis-
trict court's action in exonerating the Haiti should be affirmed, that
the sole responsibility was on the Duke in traveling at excessive
speed when in a fog bank, and that the cross-claims of other claim-
ants filed against the Commission should not have been dismissed.
The case was remanded by the court of appeals to the district court.
Nothing was said by the court of appeals as to the right of the
Commission to file a petition to limit its liability to the cross-
claimants.
On certiorari the Supreme Court majority affirmed the action
of the court of appeals. The basic theory of the Supreme Court is
expressed in the following language of the majority:
It appears to us, therefore, that fairness in litigation requires
that those who seek affirmative recovery in a court should
be subject therein to like exposure for damage resulting from
their acts connected with the identical incident. The claim-
ants here ask no more.61
Whether such recovery against a claimant in a limitation pro-
ceeding be permitted by analogy to Admiralty Rule 56 which allows
cross-claims in libel proceedings, or whether by virtue of Admiralty
Rule 44, a district court could provide for the allowance of cross-
claims in limitation proceedings under its limited power to regulate
practice in a manner not inconsistent with other Admiralty Rules,
Court of Appeals decision, the United States filed a cross-claim against the
Duke in the proceedings before the District Court." 354 U.S. at 132.
61 Id. at 142.
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is not considered material. The Commission is held subject to
cross-claims because it entered the limitation proceeding seeking
affirmative relief. Jurisdiction to award a judgment in favor of the
Commission is deemed to encompass jurisdiction to award a judg-
ment against the Commission. Accordingly, the case is remanded
to the district court where the cross-claims of claimants and the
claim of the United States for damages to the Haiti are to be enter-
tained. Although, like the court of appeals, nothing was said by the
Supreme Court as to the right of the Commission to limit its lia-
bility, it is to be presumed that such procedure will be allowed and
is probably contemplated in the closing words of the majority:
"Other questions of procedural detail raised by petitioner we leave
to the trial courts."
6 2
Justice Brennan, writing for the three dissenters, notes that while
Admiralty Rule 56 authorizes cross-claims in libel actions it does
not purport to cover limitation proceedings. He accordingly is of
the opinion that if cross-claims are to be allowed in limitation cases
amendment to the Admiralty Rules is required. Further, he finds it
most inequitable for the Supreme Court to announce for the first time
in this case of a foreign claimant that because it filed in the limitation
proceeding it now may have an affirmative judgment rendered against
it. He sets out in detail the notice given advising claimants to file
their claims in the limitation proceedings and stresses the fact that
nothing in the notice indicated a possibility of an affirmative judg-
ment against a claimant who filed in response to the notice. Further,
he points out that under British law the Commission had defenses
available against passengers which it would not have in an American
court. Finally, the minority concludes that the majority "denies
equity in the name of equity"" when it holds that the Commission,
which had no notice it would have to defend cross-claims, must now
litigate such claims in the limitation proceeding.
Although it is conceivable that had the Commission known it
would have been subject to cross-claims it might not have filed in
the limitation proceedings, one thing is certain-and that is that
hereafter parties making claims in limitation proceedings will do so
with the knowledge that affirmative judgments may be obtained
against them either by other claimants or by the party who initiated
the limitation proceeding. Whatever inequity one may find in the
1962]
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case of the Commission, such inequity cannot be asserted by future
claimants. It must be conceded that all claims between parties to a
limitation proceeding which arise out of the same incident should be
disposed of in one proceeding. The decision of the majority has
cleared the way for such effective practice.
INDEMNITY RIGHTS OF SHIPOWNERS AGAINST STEVEDORING AND
OTHER LANDBASED CONTRACTORS
In 1946 the Supreme Court decided Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki.' As a result of that decision and those following it, a
shipowner is liable to an employee of a stevedoring or ship refitting
company who is injured on board the vessel by reason of the unsea-
worthiness of the vessel or the shipowner's negligence. Since the
.employee's injuries may well have been caused by both the negligence
of his own employer, as well as the unseaworthiness of the vessel or
negligence of the shipowner, the question of the shipowner's right
to contribution or indemnity against the negligent employer was
bound to arise.
In 1952 the problem was presented to the Court in Halcyon Lines
v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.2 Baccile, an employee of
Haenn, was injured while making repairs on board a vessel owned
by Halcyon. He sued Halcyon in the federal district court alleging
his injuries were due to Halcyon's negligence and the unseaworthi-
ness of its vessel. On the theory that Haenn's negligence had con-
tributed to the injuries, Halcyon brought in Haenn as a third party
defendant and sought contribution. The district court allowed evi-
dence as to the degree of negligence of the parties. The jury verdict
established that Haenn was 75% at fault and Halcyon 25%. Bac-
cile recovered a judgment of $65,000.
The district court3 refused to apportion the damages on the basis
of the percentage findings above but held that the damages should
be shared equally by Haenn and Halcyon. The court of appeals4
sustained the right of Halcyon for contribution but it held that
Haenn's contribution could not exceed the amount for which it
would be liable to Baccile under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
'328 U.S. 85 (1946). For a discussion of this case and those following it,
see Baer, At Sea With The United States Suprene Court, 38 N.C.L. Rv.
307, 352-65 (1960).
2342 U.S. 282 (1952).
'89 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
' 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951).
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Workers' Act. On certiorari the Supreme Court divided seven to
two. The majority held that in the absence of legislation providing
for contribution the Court would not fashion such a rule. Justice
Black, speaking for the majority, pointed out that common law
courts have generally held they cannot on their own initiative create
an enforceable right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. Fur-
ther, the Court indicated that if contribution were to be awarded the
question would arise whether contribution should be based on the
percentage degrees of fault, on a fifty-fifty basis irrespective of dif-
ferences in degree, or whether the employer's contribution should be
limited to the amount he would be called upon to pay under the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act. Such a policy determination,
the majority thought, should be left for legislative action. The
result of the Court's decision was to make the shipowner, who was
only 25 % to blame, pay 100%o of the loss. Dissenting Justices Reed
and Burton believed the district court was correct in making Haenn
and Halcyon each share one half of the loss.
The following year, 1953, the Supreme Court again refused to
allow contribution under similar circumstances in Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Hawn.5 Hawn, a carpenter, employed by Haenn Ship Ceiling
& Refitting Corporation was injured when he fell though an open
hatch hole on board one of Pope & Talbot's vessels. He sued Pope
& Talbot both on the grounds of unseaworthiness and negligence.
Pope & Talbot brought in Haenn as a third party defendant against
whom it sought contribution. A jury found that both Haenn and
Pope & Talbot had been negligent, that the vessel was unseaworthy,
and that Hawn had contributed 17/ 2 7% of his damage by his own
negligence. Hawn's total damage was found to be $38,000.
The district court6 accordingly entered a judgment for Hawn
in the amount of $29,700 making the necessary deduction for Hawn's
own negligence. It also entered a judgment in favor of Pope &
Talbot and against Haenn for contribution in the amount of $8,331
which was the extent of Haenn's liability under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Act. The court of appeals7 reversed the judg-
ment for contribution on the authority of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in the Halcyon case discussed above. On certiorari the Supreme
Court now divided six to three. The majority affirmed the court
r'346 U.S. 406 (1953).
'100 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
'198 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1952).
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of appeal's reversal of the contribution judgment on the authority of
Halcyon. The dissenters did not discuss the contribution aspect.
They were of the opinion that no recovery should have been allowed
Hawn in the first instance on the ground that he was not the type of
person entitled to the benefit of the Sieracki doctrine.
Despite the suggestion of the Court, Congress failed to take any
action to relieve the inequitable results of the Halcyon and Pope &
Talbot cases. The absolute liability of the shipowner for unsea-
worthiness and the fact that its vessel could easily be rendered un-
seaworthy without its knowledge by the acts of a land based con-
tractor created a situation which cried out for relief. The old adage
that "there is more than one way to skin a cat" was soon to make
itself felt. If tort law was not to be modified so as to give the ship-
owner relief by way of contribution, there still remained the possi-
bility of utilizing implied indemnity principles of contract law. The
landbased operator, be it a stevedoring company or ship refitting
company, normally enters into a contract with the shipowner for
the performance of services. Conceivably the contract may include
express terms whereby the landbased operator agrees to indemnify
the shipowner for any damages he may be called upon to pay by
reason of the acts of said operator. If the contract contains no such
express terms, it is not too great a stretch of the imagination to read
into it implied indemnity provisions.
That is exactly what was done three years later in 1956 by the
Supreme Court in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.'
By using the contract formula relief was given the shipowner which
had been denied him when the problem was looked upon as one of
contribution between joint tortfeasors. The change was effected by
a narrow margin. The Court divided five to four. As might be
expected the majority opinion is written by Justice Burton, one of
the dissenters in Halcyon, while the dissenting opinion is written
by Justice Black who had spoken for the majority in that case. A
close analysis of the fact situation and the reasoning of the majority
in Ryan is in order.
Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation operated the vessel Canton
Victory. As evidenced by letters, but without a formal stevedoring
contract or indemnity agreement, Pan-Atlantic engaged Ryan Steve-
doring Company to load and unload its vessel. Part of the cargo
8 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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was a quantity of pulpboard rolls which were insufficiently secured
when loaded by Ryan at Georgetown, South Carolina. There was
little evidence as to just what took place during the loading although
the normal procedure was for it to be done by Ryan's longshoremen
under the immediate direction of Ryan's hatch foremen with Pan-
Atlantic cargo officers supervising the loading of the entire ship and
having authority to reject unsafe loading. When the vessel arrived
in New York, Ryan's men proceeded to unload it. One of its long-
shoremen, Palazzolo, while working on the vessel was injured when
one of the pulpboard rolls broke loose and struck him. Palazzolo
was not negligent and the cause of the accident was the inadequate
securing of the rolls when stowed by Ryan at Georgetown.
Ryan's insurance carrier paid Palazzolo compensation and medi-
cal expenses due under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Act without any formal award and Palazzolo then instituted an
action at law against Pan-Atlantic in the New York Supreme Court.
The case was removed to the federal district court where Pan-
Atlantic filed a third party complaint against Ryan. Palazzolo
recovered a verdict of $75,000. The district court9 dismissed Pan-
Atlantic's third party complaint. The court of appeals"0 affirmed the
judgment in favor of Palazzolo against Pan-Atlantic. It found
ample evidence that the ship was unseaworthy by virtue of improper
stowage and also found negligence on the part of Pan-Atlantic in the
'failure of its cargo officers to properly supervise the safe and careful
loading of the vessel. However, the hazardous condition had been
produced by Ryan in improperly stowing the rolls and Ryan's negli-
gence is found to be the "primary and active cause of the accident."'
The court of appeals also found that Ryan was under an implied
obligation to perform its work in a reasonably safe manner. This
duty it had breached, as a result of which Pan-Atlantic suffered a
loss. Accordingly, the court of appeals held Ryan must make good
this loss and it ordered judgment entered in favor of Pan-Atlantic
against Ryan on the third party complaint reversing the district court
in this respect.
On certiorari the Supreme Court initially affirmed the court of
appeals decision without opinion by a divided vote of four to four.
1 2
The case was restored to the docket for reargument before a full
S111 F. Supp. 505 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).10211 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1954). n Id. at 279.
12349 U.S. 901 (1955).
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Court and again affirmed by a five to four decision.' 8 The first
question discussed by Justice Burton, who spoke for the majority,
was whether or not the language of section 5 of the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Act, which states that the liability of the
employer to pay compensation "shall be exclusive and in place of all
other liability of such employer to the employee . . . and anyone
otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or
in admiralty on account of such injury or death,"' 4 prevented a lia-
bility against the employer in favor of the shipowner under an
indemnity contract. The Court held that this language of the Long-
shoremen's Act was designed to make the statutory liability of the
employer to pay compensation on account of the injury to its em-
ployee or anyone claiming under or through him exclusive. It found
nothing in the act that prevented a shipowner from enforcing in-
demnity rights he might have under a contract with the employer.
Certainly the employer could expressly agree to indemnify the ship-
owner against loss by reason of the employer's negligence. Had
there been such an expressed formal indemnity agreement it would
be clear that the shipowner's action against the employer would be
bottomed on contract and not founded on tort.
Consequently, the Court then considered the question of whether
or not an implied contract of indemnity could be found in the absence
of an express indemnity provision. It answered in the affirmative,
finding that an agreement to load a vessel necessarily includes an
agreement to load it properly and safely. This obligation, the Court
said, "is of the essence of petitioner's stevedoring contract."" There
is in effect a warranty given by the stevedoring company.
It is petitioner's warranty of workmanlike service that is
comparable to a manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of
its manufactured product. The shipowner's action is not
changed from one for a breach of contract to one for a tort
simply because recovery may turn upon the standard of the
performance of petitioner's stevedoring service.' 6
The last question considered by the Court was whether or not
the fact that the shipowner had an obligation to supervise stowage
and had the right to reject unsafe stowage should bar recovery by
18 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
2' 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1958).
15 350 U.S. at 133. 'old. at 133-34.
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it on the aforesaid indemnity agreement. In holding that there was
no bar, the Court declared that the stevedoring company, which had
itself been negligent, could not use as a defense to its indemnity
obligation the fact that as between the injured longshoreman and
the shipowner the latter was liable for failing to discover and correct
the improper stowage performed by the stevedoring company.
As to the Halcyon17 case, in which the shipowner failed to get
contribution, the Court said that decision was no barrier to the
shipowner's right to indemnity because the attempted recovery in
Halcyon had been predicated on the theory of contribution between
joint tortfeasors, whereas Ryan is prosecuted and decided on the
theory of a right of contractual indemnity residing in the shipowner.
In his dissent, Justice Black, speaking for the Chief Justice and
Justices Douglas and Clark, stressed the fact that the liability with-
out fault which is imposed by the Longshoremen's Act was intended
to relieve the employer from any other liability by reason of injuries
to his employee. He pointed out that under section 33 of that act
the employer was to be reimbursed the compensation paid by him
out of any recovery the employee might make against a third party.
But, he concluded, the end result of the majority's decision is that
the "employer is actually mulcted in damages because its employee
successfully prosecuted a third-party action."'"
Justice Black agreed that if the employer had made an express
contract, oral or written, in which he had agreed to indemnify the
shipowner against payments which it would be called upon to make to
the injured employee, the Court would enforce such indemnity agree-
ment because nothing in the Longshoremen's Act forbids the em-
ployer from making such an agreement with the shipowner. But
there was no such express agreement and, said Justic Black, none
was to be implied.
Of further concern to the dissent was the fact that the majority
decision not only, according to Justice Black, expunged the em-
ployer's limited liability under the Longshoremen's Act, but also
made the employee's right to recover against the third party ship-
owner "a barren promise."' 9 Justice Black pointed out that, if the
employee accepted compensation under an award, only the employer
had the right to sue the third party as statutory assignee of the
employee's claim. Under such a proceeding, if the employer, as
"' 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
"Old. at 144.
8 350 U.S. at 141.
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assignee, recovered against the third party, he would first be reim-
bursed the compensation he had paid plus the costs of the litigation
and the excess of the recovery would be paid to the employee. Now,
under Ryan, if the employer were to bring such third party action
against the shipowner he would know that "every dime of the judg-
ment will have to be paid by the employer himself."20
It is quite obvious, as Justice Black pointed out, that the employer
would not be eager to finance suits against himself. If the employer,
out of a sense of duty toward the employee, did sue the shipowner,
Justice Black noted that counsel for the employer prosecuting that
case would know that, if he happened to win the jury verdict his
own client would be the loser, and conversely, if he lost the case his
own client would be the winner.
Since under the Longshoremen's Act, as it was at the time of
Ryan, the employer only had control of the action against the third
party if he had paid the employee under an award made under that
statute, the employer would tend not to make voluntary payments
of compensation but would insist on a formal award. If he should
make payments without a formal award he would know that the
employee could proceed against the shipowner and a recovery by
him would eventually, under Ryan, have to be paid by the employer.
The net result of the Ryan case, according to the dissent, was that
employees such as Palazzolo, Sieracki and Hawn would find it prac-
tically impossible to have their claims against the third party ship-
owners prosecuted.2"
It is very important to note at this point, that Justice Black was
writing his dissent in Ryan in 1956. In 1959 section 33 of the
Longshoremen's Act was amended" and the plight of the employee
which Justice Black foresaw does not now exist. Under the statute,
as it was at the time of Ryan, the acceptance of compensation under
an award made by the deputy commissioner operated as an assign-
ment to the employer of all right of the person entitled to compensa-
tion to proceed against the third party. Out of a recovery by the
employer against the third party the employer was first to be secured
his payments under the Longshoremen's Act plus the expenses of
20 Id. at 145. 2" Id. at 146.
2273 Stat. 391 (1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933 (Supp. II, 1961). The amendment
is a rewrite of section 33. In addition to making the changes indicated in
the above text the statute now expressly states in section 933 (a) that the
person entitled to compensation need not elect whether to receive compensa-
tion or to recover damages against the third party.
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the third party action and any excess went to the party entitled to
compensation.
Today, section 33 of the Longshoremen's Act provides that if
compensation is accepted under an award made by the deputy com-:
missioner, the person taking compensation has a period of six
months after the award within which to sue the third party if he
chooses. If at the end of the six months no suit has been brought
by the party getting compensation the third party claim is assigned to
the employer. The new statute also provides that out of any re-
covery made by the employer, the employer is to be secured his
payments under the Longshoremen's Act and the expenses of the
third party litigation. Any excess in the recovery is to be divided,
one fifth to the employer and four fifths to the party entitled to
compensation.
Before considering the cases involving suits by shipowners for
indemnity against stevedoring companies which followed Ryan cer-
tain observations are pertinent. First, in Ryan recovery is predi-
cated on implied terms of indemnity which the Court found existed
in a contract between the shipowner and stevedoring company.
Second, the dangerous condition in Ryan which brought about the
unseaworthiness of the vessel and the ultimate injury to the em-
ployee was all due to the active performance of the employer steve-
doring concern in improperly stowing cargo. The negligence on
the part of the shipowner which led to its liability to the employee
was its failure to discover and have corrected the improper stowage
performed by the employer. In this situation, it hardly lay in the
employer's mouth to say by way of defense to the indemnity action,
"Yes, I carelessly performed the stowage which caused the injury
and the resultant liability on your part to my employee, but you
should not have let me get by with that negligent sort of work!"
Conceivably an employee of the landbased operator may be
injured on board the vessel by reason of a dangerous situation
created (1) solely by his employer, (2) solely by the shipowner and
(3) jointly by the acts of his employer and the shipowner. It is in
the third category that we might reasonably expect the courts to
have difficulty.
In 1958 Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating
Co.23 followed Ryan to the Supreme Court. Weyerhaeuser had
23355 U.S. 563 (1958).
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engaged Nacirema to unload its vessel at both New York and Bos-
ton. When the vessel arrived at New York longshoremen employed
by Nacirema went on board and erected a temporary shelter of scrap
lumber and tarpaulin to protect the winch drivers. Unloading at
New York was without mishap and in due course the vessel pro-
ceeded to Boston where further cargo was to be unloaded. While
customarily winch shelters of the type in question are torn down by
the ship's crew before proceeding to sea because they are considered
a hazard in the winds at sea, the particular shelter was not taken
down but remained on the vessel and was available to Nacirema's
longshoremen when the vessel arrived at Boston. Ship officers of
Weyerhaeuser admitted that it was carelessness to let the shelter
remain up when the ship put to sea.
At Boston Nacirema's employees utilized the shelter. Connolly,
one of Nacirema's employees, was injured on board the vessel by
reason of a piece of wood falling from the top of the shelter. He
sued the shipowner for his injuries basing recovery in one count on
negligence and in another count on unseaworthiness of the vessel.
The shipowner, Weyerhaeuser, in turn filed a third party complaint
against Nacirema alleging that Connolly's injuries were due to
Nacirema's negligence and that Nacirema's contract required Naci-
rema to indemnify Weyerhaeuser if Connolly recovered against it.
The case was tried before a jury which rendered a verdict in
favor of Weyerhaeuser on the unseaworthy count and against it on
the negligence count. Although the trial judge had told the jury in
submitting Connolly's case to them that he would later submit to
them the cross action by Weyerhaeuser against Nacirema, he did
not do so. Instead, on the coming in of the verdict against Weyer-
haeuser on the negligence count, he directed a verdict in favor of
Nacirema on the third party complaint. Weyerhaeuser paid the
Connolly judgment and took an appeal from the judgment against it
in the third party action.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial judge." The theory of
that court was that Weyerhaeuser's negligence consisted in failing
to remove the shelter on going out to sea from New York and then
offering the use of the shelter to Nacirema's workers on arrival in
Boston. It said that this negligence on the part of the shipowner
was not foreseeable by Nacirema.
2 236 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1956). Judge Lumbard dissented.
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On certiorari the Supreme Court in an unanimous opinion re-
versed the court of appeals and sent the case back for retrial on the
issue of Nacirema's liability to the shipowners. A verdict in favor
of Connolly against the shipowner did not, ipso facto, said the Court,
mean that the stevedoring company was entitled to a directed verdict
in the third party action. Nacirema's contractual obligation to
Weyerhaeuser to perform its duties with reasonable safety did not
only apply to the handling of cargo, as in Ryan, but also to the use
of equipment such as the winch shelter. "If in that regard re-
spondent [Nacirema] rendered a substandard performance which
led to foreseeable liability of petitioner [Weyerhaeuser], the latter
was entitled to indemnity absent conduct on its part sufficient to
preclude recovery."2  Justice Clark, speaking for the Court, pro-
ceeded,
The evidence bearing on these issues-petitioner's action in
making the shelter on its ship available to respondent's em-
ployees in Boston although it apparently was unsafe, as well
as respondent's continued use of the shelter for five days
thereafter without inspection-was for jury consideration
under appropriate instruction.26
The Supreme Court did not reveal to the trial court what kind
of instruction should be given to the jury when it submitted the
shipowner's claim to them. "Appropriate instructions" were to be
given. Judge Lumbard in dissenting in the court of appeals had
used such terms as "active" and "passive" negligence. The Supreme
Court in concluding its opinion said,
In view of the new trial to which petitioner is entitled, we
believe sound judicial administration requires us to point out
that in the area of contractual indemnity an application of
the theories of "active" or "passive" as well as "primary" or
"secondary" negligence is inappropriate. 7
Just what negligence on the part of the shipowner would defeat
its recovery against the stevedoring company? Some aid may be
gathered from the following portion of the Court's opinion,
While the jury found petitioner "guilty of some act of negli-
gence," that ultimate finding might have been predicated,
2 1d355 U.S. at 567.27 Id. at 569.
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inter alia, on a failure of petitioner to remove the shelter when
the ship left New York, or a failure to correct or warn re-
spondent of a latent dangerous condition known to petitioner
when respondent began the Boston unloading. Likewise, the
finding might have been predicated on a failure of petitioner
during the five days in Boston to inspect the shelter, detect
and: correct the unsafe condition. Although any of these
possibilities could provide Connolly a basis of recovery, at
least the latter would not, under Ryan, prevent recovery by
petitioner in the third party action.28
Apparently, the Supreme Court did not wish to declare what con-
duct on the part of the shipowner would bar recovery on the third
party complaint. This task it left to the district judge, advising him
only, that if the negligence of the shipowner, as found by the jury,
was only the failure to inspect the shelter, detect and correct the
unsafe condition during the five days the vessel was at Boston, it
could recover against the stevedoring company.
It is clear from the Court's action in Weyerhaeuser that certain
conduct on the part of the shipowner will preclude it from recovering
in an indemnity action against the stevedoring concern. Just what
that conduct may be is the unanswered question. Fact situations
are rarely the same, and we shall have to await the adjudication of
future cases by the Court before generalization can be attempted.
It will be interesting to observe if the Court continues to consider
the use of such terms as "passive" or "active" as well as "primary"
or "secondary" negligence inappropriate as guides for decision.
Meanwhile, we pass to a consideration of a further development of
the law of shipowners' third party indemnity actions as evidenced
by the most recent action of the Court in this field.
Both in Ryan and in Weyerhaeuser considerable emphasis was
placed upon the direct contractual relationship between the ship-
owner and the stevedoring concern. The obligation to indemnify
was implied in the contract entered between the parties. Since
Weyerhaeuser, and up to the date of this writing, two more ship-
owner's indemnity cases have been passed upon by the Supreme
Court. In neither of these later cases was there a contract existing
between the shipowner and the stevedoring company. In the first,
Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser,29 the vessel had been
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chartered and the contract- for stevedoring services was made be-'
tween -the" chatterer and the stevedoring concern. In the second,
Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc.," . the
stevedoring company had b.een.engaged by the consignee of cargo.1
In both cases the Supreme Court held the indemnity rights recog-
nized in Ryan and Weyerhaeuser were available to the vessel or its
dwxter despite the lack of contract between it and the stevedoring.
co paoy..
In Crumady, the charterer of the vessel, Joachim Hendrik Fisser,
had engaged Nacirema Operating Company, a stevedoring concern,
to unload the cargo. In,'the.,process of unloading, Crumady, one of
Nacirema's employees, was injured by the falling of a boom then
being operated by Nacirema. Crumady brought a libel in rem in
admiralty against the vessel. The vessel in turn impleaded Nacirema
seeking thereby to obtain indemnification for any loss it might suffer
through the suit.
The district court"1 held the vessel liable to Crumady. It found
the winch supplied by the vessel and used in unloading was unsea-
worthy, having been set to cut off at an operating load of six tons
when the safe load was three tons. The district court also found that
the negligence of Nacirema in operating the unloading equipment.
was the active and primary cause of the falling of the boom and that
its negligence had brought into play the unseaworthy condition of
the vessel's equipment. It then held that Nacirema was liable to
indemnify the vessel even though there was no contract between
Nacirema and the vessel's owners. This right of indemnity, the
district court found, arose from a duty Nacirema owed to the Vessel
to unload it with due care. The court of appeals32 reversed the judg-
ments of the district court. This reversal was based on a fact finding
made by the court of appeals that the ship's equipment was seaworthy
and that the falling of the boom was caused entirely by the negligence
of Nacirema's employees.
On certiorari the Supreme Court33 divided six to three. The
majority reversed the court of appeals and ordered the judgment of
the district court reinstated. While the Supreme Court did not use
the terms "active" or "primary," which were used by the district
court, it found there was ample evidence that Crumady's injury had
"364 U.S. 421 (1960).
"142 F. Supp. 389 (D.N.J. 1956).
22249 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1957). "358 U.S. 423 (1959).
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been caused by an unseaworthy condition of the vessel which had
been brought into play by the stevedoring concern. The Court con-
curred in the district court's judgment for indemnity against
Nacirema notwithstanding the absence of a contract between Na-
cirema and the owners of the vessel. Justice Douglas, speaking for
the Court, pointed out that the contract between Nacirema and the
charterer had named the vessel to be unloaded and that Nacirema had
agreed with the charterer to "faithfully furnish such stevedoring
services."" 4 The vessel is said by the Court to be a third party bene-
ficiary of that contract. The pertinent language of the court is,
-We think this case is governed by the principle announced
in the Ryan case. The warranty which a stevedore owes when
he goes aboard a vessel to perform services is plainly for the
benefit of the vessel whether the vessel's owners are parties to
the contract or not. That is enough to bring the vessel into
the zone of modern law that recognizes rights in third-party
beneficiaries.
3 5
Justice Harlan wrote the dissenting opinion.36 He concurs in
the finding of facts as made by the court of appeals and sees no basis
to reverse that finding. As to the indemnity rights accorded the
vessel against the stevedoring concern, Justice Harlan also dissents.
He interprets Ryan as affording the shipowner an indemnity right
only if the unseaworthy or dangerous condition was caused by the
stevedoring concern. Since, under the majority's own view in
Crumady, the shipowner was itself responsible for the unseaworthy
condition which Nacirema merely brought into play, Justice Harlan
does not believe the rule of Ryan applies and concludes no indemnity
award should be given.
In Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc.87
a stevedore employed by Dugan was injured while engaged in un-
loading Waterman's vessel, the Afoundria. The injury was caused
by a vertical column of sugar bags falling on the stevedore because
of lack of collateral support. The stevedore sued Waterman in a
federal district court. Waterman settled the stevedore's claim and
filed a third party complaint against Dugan. It alleged that im-
proper stowage of the sugar cargo, which had been loaded by an-
a' Id. at 428. r Ibid.::Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker joined in the dissent.
*364 U.S. 421 (1960).
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other stevedoring concern, had created an unseaworthy condition
which imposed absolute liability on Waterman for injuries sustained
by the stevedore. This unseaworthy condition, Waterman further
alleged, had been brought into play by Dugan, in that Dugan failed
to perform the unloading services in a safe and careful manner. This
neglect on the part of Dugan, contended Waterman, was the direct,
proximate, active and substantial cause of the stevedore's injuries.
The district court gave judgment for Dugan on the third party
complaint because the contract with Dugan to unload had been' made
by the consignee of the cargo and not by Waterman. The case was
argued three times before the court of appeals, twice when it was
sitting in banc. The majority of that court affirmed the -district
courtY8  It distinguished Crumady by pointing out that there the
contract with the stevedoring concern had been made by the char-
terer who operated the vessel. That contract was deemed to enure
to the benefit of the vessel in an in rein proceeding. It refused to
extend Crumady to cover the Waterman situation where the contract
was neither made by the vessel's owner nor her operator.
On certiorari the Supreme Court was unanimous in reversing
the court of appeals. Justice Stewart in speaking for the Court said
that Crumady was controlling. After referring to the Ryan and
Weyerhaeuser cases, which he said had placed emphasis on the
contractual relationship between the shipowner and stevedore, Jus-
tice Stewart concluded,
If those decisions stood alone, it might well be thought an
open question whether such contractual privity is essential to
support the stevedore's duty to indemnify. But the fact is
that this bridge was crossed in the Crumady case.
3 1
Justice Stewart quoted the Court's language in Crumady in
which the Court had referred to the vessel as a third party bene-
ficiary of the contract between the charterer and the stevedoring
concern. This reasoning he said was also applicable in Waterman.
In short, the shipowner is deemed to be a third party beneficiary of
a contract to unload cargo made between the consignee of the cargo
and a stevedoring concern.
38272 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1959).
3o 364 U.S. at 423.
33,
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s the.Contract Theory Essential to the Shipowner's Recovery?
- As a result of the ingenuity of shipowners' counsel, recovery
whiffh was denied in Halcyon and Pope & Talbot is granted in
Ryan and Weyerhaeuser by utilizing the contract existing between
the stevedoring concern and shipowner and reading into that con-
tract provisions for indemnity. When, in Crumady and Waterman,
it. is found the contract for stevedoring services was not made by
the shipowner, relief is obtained by relying on the contract made
with the stevedoring concern by the charterer of the vessel or the
consignee of cargo and applying to that contract the third party
beneficiary doctrine.
Is the contract theory necessary to the shipowner's recovery? It
is the writer's opinion that it is not, and that absent a contract the
shipowner is entitled to indemnity in the appropriate case. Let us
illustrate by taking an imaginary situation. Assume that Shipowner
is asked by Acme Motion Picture Company for permission to come
on board and take pictures of the loading of the vessel. Shipowner
grants permission and Acme comes on board. While Acme is in
the process of removing its equipment from the vessel, it negligently
creates a dangerous condition on a stairway of the vessel as a result
of which a longshoreman employed by the stevedoring company which
is unloading the vessel is injured. The longshoreman recovers from
Shipowner on the ground that the stairway as left by Acme ren-
dered that portion of the vessel unseaworthy. Has Shipowner no
rights against Acme merely because there was no contract?
It is submitted he has a right to be reimbursed the loss which
was occasioned to him as a result of the negligent acts of Acme. If
Acme had negligently damaged the vessel to the extent of $10,000
while removing its equipment, no one would deny Shipowner's right
to recover. If Acme by its negligence imposes a liability on the part
of Shipowner to the longshoreman for $10,000, it is submitted that
Shipowner is equally entitled to recover. In both instances failure
of Acme to exercise due care has imposed a financial loss on Ship-
owner. In both instances the same relationship exists between the
parties. In neither instance is a contract present. There is no sound
reason for imposing liability on Acme in the one instance and not
in the other.
It is the relationship of Acme to the shipowner and the ship
which creates a duty on Acme's part to use due care. That duty is
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recognized by law irrespective of contract.' The same duty rests
on the part of the stevedoring concern which unloads the vessel. It
owes an obligation to the shipowner to use due care irrespective of
any contract that it may have with the shipowner, charterer or
consignee of cargo. If it breaches that duty and thus causes the
shipowner to suffer a foreseeable loss, the latter is "entitled to in-
demnity absent conduct on its part sufficient to preclude recovery."4
TOWAGE AND PLOTAGE CONTRACrS
Effect of Exculpatory and Fictitious Employment Clauses
Local state laws may require that vessels maneuvering in state
waters be put in charge of pilots licensed by the state.' When a
vessel is being operated by such a compulsory pilot'and it causes
damage due to the pilot's negligence the vessel is liable in an action
in rem but there is no personal liability on the owner.' When,
however, a vessel is being towed by a tug and due to the sole negli-
gence of the tug the vessel collides with another vessel or otherwise
causes damage, neither the towed vessel nor its owners are liable.
The sole liability is that of the tug and its owners or operators. 8
In this state of the law, proctors for tug owners have for many
years inserted in towage contracts provisions designed to release
the tugs and their owners or operators from liability for negligence
and to shift the risks of the operation on the vessel towed. These
clauses frequently did not specifically refer to the negligence of the
tug or its operators but were in the form of provisions that the
towage was done at the "sole risk" of the tow. Conflict occasionally
arose in the courts as to whether such a "sole risk" clause should be
construed to include losses due to the tug's negligence.4 Various
forms of verbiage were used to overcome this difficulty and to clearly
cover loss occasioned by negligence of the tug. Clauses were also
inserted in towage contracts which provided that the employees of
o We have here used the words of the Court in Weyerhaewser when it
was speaking of the consequences of a breach by the stevedoring concern of
the duty arising out of the contract between it and the shipowner. See text
at note 25 supra.
1 The validity of such pilotage statutes was early established in Cooley
v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
'The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1868).' Sturgis v. Boyer, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 110 (1860).
'See the majority and dissenting opinions in The Oceanica, 170 Fed.
893 (2d Cir. 1909), and the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter in
Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 101 -(1955). "
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the tug became the employees of the tow during the operation and
that, if the master of the tug went on board the tow and piloted it
during-the towage he became the servant of the tow.
However, even when there was no question of construction in-
volved and the exculpatory intent of the clauses was clear, the lower
federal courts differed as to whether they were valid.5 The court
of appeals of the second circuit consistently upheld such provisions.0
It stressed the fact that a tug is not a common carrier. 7 The Court
of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit declared the exculpatory clauses in-
valid as against public policy." In 1955 the question of the validity
and effect of various kinds of provisions seeking to shift the burden of
loss on the tow irrespective of the acts of the tug or its employees
was presented to the Supreme Court for decision in a series of three
5 This conflict arose by reason of contradictory interpretations being
placed by lower federal courts on the Supreme Court's decision in The
Steamer Syracuse, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 167 (1870). Some courts construed
the decision as declaring that all contracts exempting the tug from liability
are invalid. Other courts took the position that the contract provision in
The Steamer Syracuse imposed risk of loss on the tow provided the tug was
navigated with due care, and since the tug was found to have been navigated
negligently, the risk of loss provision was of no avail to the tug.
Confusion as to the validity of exculpatory clauses in towage contracts
was further fostered by two later decisions of the Supreme Court. In the
first of these, Compania de Navegacion Interior, S. A. v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 66 (1928) (commonly referred to as The Wash Gray),
the Court held that a clause in a towing contract declaring that the towing
boat shall not be responsible in any way for loss or damage to the tow did
not release the tower from liability for damage done to the tow by the tower's
negligence. In the second case, Sun Oil Co. v. Dalzell Towing Co., 287 U.S.
291 (1932), the towing contract provided that when the captain of the tug
goes on board the tow to pilot it, he becomes the servant of the tow and
neither the tug nor its owners or operators shall be liable for damage
resulting from said pilotage. The Court held that the provision barred the
tow from recovering damages sustained by it occasioned by the negligence
of the tug captain who had gone on board and was piloting the tow.
The lower courts were not alone in conflict as to what the decisions of
the Supreme Court, especially that in The Steamer Syracuse, stood for. Thus
in Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955), the majority and
dissenting Justices differ as to the interpretation to be placed on the Court's
holding in that case.
The Oceanica, 170 Fed. 893 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 599 (1909),
is the lead-off case for later decisions in the second circuit. See also Nielson
v. United States, 209 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1954), affirming 112 F. Supp. 730
(E.D.N.Y. 1953); The Cutchogue, 10 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1926).
'Citing The Margaret, 94 U.S. 494 (1876), in which the Supreme Court
said "The tug was not a common carrier, and the law of that relation has no
application here. She was not an insurer." Id. at 496-97.
' Sacramento Nav. Co. v. Salz, 3 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1925); Mylroie v.
British Columbia Mills Tug & Barge Co., 268 Fed. 449 (9th Cir. 1920);
Alaska Commercial Co. v. Williams, 128 Fed. 362 (9th Cir. 1904). See
collection of cases in Annot., 54 A.L.R. 104, 252 (1928).
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cases. Thes'e are Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp.,' Boston-Metals
Co. v. The Winding Gulf,10 and United States v. Nielson." We
take them up in order.
In Bisso the towing contract provided that the towing was to be
done "at the sole risk" of the tow and that the masters, crews and
employees of the tug would become the "servants of the craft to be
towed" irrespective of whether they were aboard the tow or "in
command thereof."' 2  On the occasion in question, the tug, Cairo,
was towing the barge, Bisso No. 9, on the Mississippi River. The
barge had no motive power, steering apparatus, officers or crew and
its movements were completely controlled by the tug. Negligent
towage by those operating the tug caused the barge to collide with
a bridge pier as a result of which it sank. Suit was brought in
admiralty against the owners of the tug to recover for the loss of
the barge. The district court 3 held that the "sole risk" clause in the
towing contract did not exonerate the tug from liability for its
negligence.' 4 But that court further held that the clause making the
employees of the tug the servants of the tow evidenced a clear intent
that the tug be released from liability for negligence. It held such
provision valid and accordingly dismissed the libel. 5 The court of
appeals'" affirmed the dismissal. However, it declared that both
the "sole risk" clause and the clause making the personnel of the
tug the servants of the tow (which it referred to as the "pilotage
clause") required dismissal of the action.
On certiorari the Supreme Court divided five to three. Justice
Harlan did not sit on any of the three cases. The majority reversed
the court of appeals. Speaking through Justice Black, the Court
stated that "the question presented is whether a towboat may validly
contract against all liability for its own negligent towing."' 7  It
noted the disagreement that had existed in the federal courts and
referred to the varying interpretations that had been placed upon
The Steamer Syracuse.'" It declined to accept the view expressed by
°349 U.S. 85 (1955). 1o 349 U.S. 122 (1955).
1 349 U.S. 129 (1955).
" The terms of the towing contract will be found in the district court's
opinion. 114 F. Supp. 713, 714 (E.D. La. 1953).
" 114 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. La. 1953).
" Id. at 714, citing The Steamer Syracuse, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 167 (1871).
" Id. at 718, citing Sun Oil Co. v. Dalzell Towing Co., 287 U.S. 291
(1932).18211 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1954). 17349 U.S. at 85.
1879 U.S. (12 Wall.) 167 (1871). -
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thesecond circuit in The Oceanica10 and stated that both The Steamer
Syracuse and The Wash Gray20 "strongly point to the existence of
a judicial rule, based on public policy, invalidating contracts releasing
towers from all liability for their negligence."21 Then, in an attempt
to dispel all doubts, the Court said, "Because of this judicial history
and cogent reasons in support of a rule outlawing such contracts we
now, despite past uncertainty and difference among the circuits,
accept this as the controlling rule."2
The Court found two main reasons for the adoption of a rule
preventing towers from contracting out of liability for their own
negligence. These were "(1) to discourage negligence by making
wrongdoers pay damages, and (2) to protect those in need of ...
services from being overreached by others who have power to drive
hard' bargains."28 The opinion continues,
And both reasons apply with equal force whether tugs operate
as common carriers or contract carriers. The dangers of
modern machines make it all the more necessary that negli-
gence be discouraged. And increased maritime traffic of
today makes it not less but more important that vessels in
American ports be able to obtain towage free of monopolistic
compulsions.24
It will be recalled that in Sun Oil Co. v. Dalzell Towing Co.25 the
Supreme Court had upheld the validity of a pilotage provision in a
towing contract which barred the tow from recovering against the
tug if the loss was occasioned by the negligence of the tug's captain
who had come on board the tow and was in the process of piloting
it. The majority in Bisso did not dispute the holding in Sun Oil.
Instead, that decision is distinguished and held inapplicable to either
of the provisions in the Bisso contract. In Bisso no pilot was on
the barge. Loss was occasioned by negligence of the employees of
the tug in the act of towing. The opinion of the Court continues,
It is one thing to permit a company to exempt itself from lia-
bility for the negligence of a licensed pilot navigating another
company's vessel on that vessel's own power. That was the
Sun Oil case. It is quite a different thing, however, to permit
9 170 Fed. 893 (2d Cir. 1909). 20 277 U.S. 66 (1928).
21349 U.S. at 90. 2 2 Ibid.
23 Id. at 91. 21 Ibid.
2'287 U.S. 291 (1932), discussed in note 5.supra.
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a towing company to exempt itself by contract from all lia-
bility for its own employees' negligent towage of a vessel.
Thus, holding the pilotage contract valid in the Sun Oil case
in no way conflicts with the rule against .permitting towers
by contract wholly to escape liability for their own negligent
towing.
26
The Court concludes its opinion by stating that,
The rule against contractual exemption of a towboat from
responsibility for its own negligence cannot be defeated by
the simple expedient of providing in a contract that all em-
ployees of a towboat shall be employees of the towed vessel
when the latter "employment" is purely a fiction.27
Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in which he assumed
that under the rule of The Steamer Syracuse28 and The Wash Gray29
a tug may not contract against her own negligence. He stated he did
not know enough of the economics of the towing business to deter-
mine whether or not the rule of those cases as understood by him
should be changed, and therefore he concurred with the majority.
Justice Frankfurter spoke for the dissent."0 In an opinion cover-
ing twenty-two pages he carefully analyzed the prior decisions of
the Supreme Court as well as those in the various circuits. He con-
cluded, as we have seen the judges in the second circuit did, that
The Steamer Syracuse is not authority for holding invalid a clause
which clearly releases the tower from liability for negligence. He
referred to the fact that, under English law,3' towers may contract
against their own negligence and he noted that several text authori-
ties3 2 in this country had concluded that exculpatory clauses which
are clear in intent are valid. He is of the opinion that the majority
has abandoned the doctrine of stare decisis in an area of commercial
affairs where such doctrine "has strong justification." 33  In short,
Justice Frankfurter objects to the Court making new law and mis-
reading former decisions.
20 349 U.S. at 94. Id. at 95. (Emphasis added.)
2879 U.S. (12 Wall.) 167 (1871). 29277 U.S. 661 (1928).
80 He was joined by Justices Reed and Burton.
3 1E.g., The Albion, [1953] 2 All E.R. 679 (C.A.).82Although Justice Frankfurter cited and quoted from 1 BENEDICT, AD-
miRALTY (5th ed. 1925), we find the same language contained in 1 BENEDICT,
ADmIRALTY 307-08 (6th ed. 1940), to wit: "The towage contractor ... may
by contract limit or disclaim liability for negligence. . ..8 349 U.S. at 99.
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Whether the majority or the dissent was correct in its reading of
former law, it appeared, for a while at least,34 that exculpatory
clauses in towing contracts which sought to release the tug from
liability for loss occasioned to the tow by reason of negligent towing
were invalid."8
In Boston Metals,s7 the second of the 1955 triumvirate, an obso-
lete destroyer owned by Boston Metals Company was being towed
by the tug Pete Moran when it collided with a third vessel, the
Winding Gulf. At the time the destroyer was without power or
crew. As a result of the collision the destroyer sank and the Wind-
ing Gulf sustained damage. The towage contract contained provi-
sions to the effect that the towing was done at the sole risk of the
tow; that the tug company would not be responsible for any negli-
gence of the master or crew of the tug; that the master and crew of
the tug company became the servants of the tow and that the tow
would indemnify and hold harmless the tug company for any damages
or other loss that might arise out of the towing operation. 8 Boston
Metals, owner of the destroyer, brought suit in admiralty against the
Winding Gulf and her owners seeking damages for the loss of the
destroyer. The owners of the Winding Gulf filed a cross libel and
charged that the collision was due to the unseaworthiness of the
destroyer.
The district court3 9 found that the collision was due to the negli-
gent navigation of the Winding Gulf and to inadequate lights on the
destroyer plus the absence of a crew on it to keep the lights burning.
Failure to adequately man and light the destroyer was found by the
"The reason for the italics at this point will appear later herein when
the author discusses Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals
Corp., 360 U.S. 411 (1959). See text at note 60 infra.
It should be noted that the cause of the loss was negligent towing and
not negligent piloting of the tow by an employee of the tug placed on board
the tow under a contract declaring him to be the servant of the tow as in the
Sun Oil case.
" It was on the strength of Bisso that textwriters in 1957 declared, "The
Supreme Court, in Bisso v. Inland Waterways, has settled the invalidity of
such clauses." GILmORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 426 (1957).
37349 U.S. 122 (1955).
The pertinent terms of the towing contract will be found in the con-
curring opinion of Justice Frankfurter. 349 U.S. at 124-25. Where "tow"
is used in the text above it refers to Boston Metals as owner of the destroyer
being towed.
" 72 F. Supp. 50 (D. Md. 1947). After long and unsuccessful efforts on
the part of the parties to stipulate the amount of the damages further hearing
was held by the district court on this question and final determination thereof
made in 85 F. Supp. 806 (D. Md. 1949).
[Vol. 40
DOWN TO THE SEAS AGAIN
district court to be the fault of the master of the tug. By reason of
the terms of the towage contract mentioned above, the district court
held that the negligence of the tug captain constituted the negligence
of the owners of the tow and made them responsible. He then pro-
ceeded to apply the American admiralty rule and divided the damages
between the Winding Gulf and the owners of the destroyer. The
court of appeals4" affirmed on the same basis. It found no reason to
require the Winding Gulf to first go against the tug and then to
have the tug seek indemnity against the tow. Admiralty could, said
Judge Soper, speaking for the court of appeals, "skip the by-ways
and head direct for the goal."'"
On certiorari the Supreme Court, now divided six to two, re-
versed. Justice Black wrote the opinion for the Court which con-
sisted of only two paragraphs. On the basis of Bisso, the contract
provisions by which the tow would be responsible for the negligence
of the tug were held invalid. The material portion of the court's
opinion reads,
In Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., ... decided today,
we held invalid a contract designed to shift responsibility for
a towboat's negligence from the towboat to its innocent tow.
That holding controls this case. For whatever this contract
said, here as in the Bisso case, the persons who conducted
these towing operations were in fact acting as employees of
the towing company, not as employees of the owner of the
tow. Under these circumstances it was error to hold peti-
tioner liable for negligence of the towing company's em-
ployees.42
It will be recalled that in Bisso the dissentors were Justices
Frankfurter, Reed and Burton with Justice Frankfurther writing the
opinion. Now in Boston Metals Justice Frankfurter writes a con-
curring opinion and the only dissentors are Justices Reed and
Burton.
In his concurring opinion Justice Frankfurter says,
The issue before us in this case is not the bare question
whether the tow has contracted away its right to recover
damages caused by the negligence of the tug. It is whether
in addition the tow has undertaken to become directly-liable
, 209 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1954).
42349 U.S. at 123. 4
1 Id. at 414.
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to all third parties injured as a consequence of the negligence
of the tug.
8
Upon analyzing the provisions of the towing contract, which he
sets out in detail, Justice Frankfurter finds that by those provisions
the tow agreed to "indemnify the tug against liability in the circum-
stances here involved." '44 But, he continues, "a promise to indemnify
is a promise running to the indemnitee, here the tug, and is not ordi-
narily construed as a contract for the benefit of a third party."4
In short, Justice Frankfurter does not strike down the clause as
invalid (as did the Court) but concludes that the clause is not to
be construed as giving the Winding Gulf, or her owners, the rights
of a third party beneficiary. He is not impressed with the argument
of the court of appeals that circuity of action will be avoided by
holding the tow directly responsible to the Winding Gulf in the
present suit. The joint dissent, written by Justice Burton and
joined in by Justice Reed, upholds the validity of the contract pro-
visions making the master and crew of the tug the servants of the
tow. This provision, says the dissent, "is sufficient to make the
tow owners directly liable to third parties for the acts of the Master
and crew [of the tug] who thus become their servants."4
The third and last of the 1955 series is the Nielson case.4 7 The
Dauntless Towing Line contracted to use two of its tugs in assisting
in moving the Gale, a vessel owned by the United States, from Ho-
boken to a Brooklyn pier. The Gale was being moved under its
own power and lines of the two assisting tugs were attached to it.
One of the tugboat captains was on board the Gale and directing
the movements of the tugs and vessel. Due to negligent pilotage
orders, given by the said tug captain while on board the Gale, one
of the tugs was crushed between the Gale and a pier. Suit in ad-
miralty was then brought against the United States by Dauntless
Towing Line to recover for the damages thus sustained by its tug.
The contract involved contained a pilotage clause which pro-
vided that, when the captain of any tug engaged in the assisting
services of a vessel which is operating under her own motive power
goes on board the vessel, he becomes the servant of the owners of
the vessel assisted in respect to his giving orders and handling the
43 Id. at 124. 11 Id. at 126.
'5 Ibid. "Id. at 128.
7United States v. Nielson, 349 U.S. 129 (1955).
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vessel; and that neither the tugs nor their owners shall be liable for
any damage resulting therefrom.48
The district court49 held the pilotage provision was valid and
that by reason thereof the tug owners could recover damages against
the United States as owners of the assisted vessel. The court cited
in support of its ruling Sun Oil Co. v. Dalzell Towing Co.5" The
court of appeals51 affirmed on the basis of the district court's opinion.
The Supreme Court reversed,52 again dividing six to two. Jus-
tice Black, as in the other cases, spoke for the Court. He neither
expresses approval nor disapproval with the Sun Oil decision relied
upon by the lower courts. He concedes that the pilotage contract
in that case was "substantially the same as the one here."' 8  But in
Sun Oil the provision was held to bar recovery by the tow from the
tug when damage was done to the tow by reason of the negligence
of the tug captain who had boarded the tow and was piloting it.
In Nielson, it is the tug that seeks to recover against the tow for
damages caused to it by the negligence of the tug captain on board
the tow. To say that the tow may not recover damages against the
tug is one thing. To say that the tow under these circumstances must
pay damages to the tug is quite another.
Justice Black sees no reason to stretch the contract language so
as to impose this liability on the tow. "A person supplying his own
employees for use by another in a common undertaking cannot
usually collect damages because of negligent work by the employee
supplied." 4  But, and this would appear significant, Justice Black
concludes, "Clear contractual language might justify imposition of
such liability. But the contractual language here does not meet such
a test and we do not construe it as authorizing respondent to recover
damages from petitioner. ' 5
Justices Burton and Reed filed a brief dissent. They stressed
the language in the pilotage clause by which it was agreed that, in
the circumstances of this case, the tugboat captain became the ser-
vant of the vessel assisted. They found the provision valid and
"' Provisions of the contract are set out in the trial court's opinion. 112
F. Supp. 730, 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
"112 F. Supp. 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1953)."287 U.S. 291 (1932), discussed in note 5 supra.
51209 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1954).
1349 U.S. 129 (1955). As in the other two cases, Justice Harlan took
no part in the decision.
6 Id. at 131. "Ibid.
IlId. at 131-32. (Emphasis added.)
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would give if the same -force and effect as did the lower courts,
namely, hold the assisted vessel responsible to the tug for the damage
sustained by the latter.
Summary of the Bisso, Boston Metals and Nielson Cases
It would, indeed, be heartening to those who are obliged to
engage towing services, if one could say that by its action in Bisso,
Boston Metals and Nielson, the Supreme Court struck down as
invalid all clauses in towage contracts which seek to transfer the
risk and responsibility for loss to the tow and its owners irrespective
of whether the cause of the loss be negligent towing or negligent
pilotage by the tug captain who has boarded the tow for that pur-
pose. But no such all out victory was achieved.
Most significant is the fact that the Court, not only did not dis-
turb its ruling in Sun Oil,'6 but on the contrary, expressly declared
it was not rejecting that decision, saying, "There are distinctions
between a pilotage and a towage exemption clause which make it
entirely reasonable to hold one valid and the other invalid. '5 7  Sum-
marizing the action of the Court in Bisso, Boston Metals and Nielson
we can say:
1. Bisso and Boston Metals struck down all exculpatory
clauses including fictitious employment clauses, which seek
to shift the risk of loss and responsibility for negligent
towing5" from the tug to the tow.5"
2. Nielson reaffirmed the rule of Sun Oil that a pilotage
clause, which provides that the tug captain is the servant
of the tow when he boards the tow and pilots it and that
the tug is not liable for any damage caused by his negli-
gence in so piloting, absolves the tug from all liability to the
tow for damages suffered by the tow as a result of said
tug captain's negligence in piloting the tow.
3. Nielson actually held that such a pilotage clause as referred
to in paragraph 2 above was not to be construed as giving
Sun Oil Co. v. Dalzell Towing Co., 287 U.S. 291 (1932), discussed in
note 5 supra.
" Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 93 (1955).
8 As distinguished from negligent piloting of the tow by the tug's captain
who had boarded the tow.
" In this connection the word "tow" refers not only to the vessel being
towed but also to its owners and operators. Similarly, the word "tug" refers
to the tug, its owners and operators.
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the tug a right of action against the tow for damages occa-
sioned to the tug by reason of negligent pilotage of the tug
captain on board the tow.
4. Although under the contractual language used in Nielson
and set out in paragraph 2 above, the Court held the tow
was not liable to the tug for damages sustained by it (para-
graph 3 above), the court expressly said, "Clear contrac-
tual language might justify imposition of such liability."
Whatever might be the rights and liabilities of the parties under
the terms of a particular pilotage provision when the tug captain
boards and pilots the tow, it was apparently settled by Bisso that no
exculpatory clause could shift responsibility from the tug to the tow
for negligent towage, as distinguished from pilotage. But certainty
in that limited area alone was not to last for long. In 1959, a bare
four years after Bisso, the "settled invalidity" of exculpatory towage
clauses was distinctly unsettled by the action of the Supreme Court
in Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp.60
as to those towers who are operating under certificates of public
convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and who, in accordance with the requirements of the Inter-
state Commerce Act,6 have filed tariffs with the Commission con-
taining exculpatory clauses.
River Terminals Corporation (hereinafter referred to as River)
was a water carrier engaged in operating tugboats and duly certifi-
cated under the Interstate Commerce Act.62 As such certificated
carrier it was required by the statute to file tariff schedules with the
Interstate Commerce Commission.63 River complied with the filing
requirements and the tariff filed by it contained the following
provision:
"When shipments are transported in barges furnished by
owner, shippers, consignees or parties other than the carrier,
such barges and (or) cargoes will be handled at owner's
risk only, whether the loss or damage is caused by negligence
or otherwise."6 4
"0 360 U.S. 411 (1959).
6154 Stat. 929 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§901-23 (1958), as
amended, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 903, 908-09 (Supp. 1961).
62 54 Stat. 941 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 909 (Supp. 1961).
"54 Stat. 935 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 906 (1958).
"The exculpatory provision will be found in the district court's opinion.
153 F. Supp. 923, 925 (E.D. La. 1957).
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Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Compafny was the charterer of
a barge which was towed by River from Reserve, Louisiana to Texas
City, Texas and there berthed. The barge sank at its berth and
Southwestern filed a libel against River seeking to recover damages
for the loss of cargo and for expenses incurred in raising and re-
pairing the barge. It alleged the sinking was due to River's negli-
gence in the navigation and management of the towing operation.
The district court" held that the services rendered by River were
those of towage and not carriage or affreightment. Relying on
Bisso 6 that court held the exculpatory provisions in the bill of
lading (which were those set out in the tariff filed with the Interstate
Commerce Commission) were invalid. The district court then found
the sinking was due to the negligence of River in the course of the
towage operation and accordingly held Southwestern was entitled
to damages as charterer of the barge and owner of the cargo of
molasses on board.
In the court of appeals River urged several grounds for reversal.
One was that the district court had erred in failing to find that the
cause of the loss was the sole negligence of Southwestern. Another
was that the trial court had erred in holding that the exculpatory
provisions were, under Bisso, invalid as a matter of law. The court
of appeals67 confined itself to a consideration of the validity of the
exculpatory provisions and did not pass upon the other grounds of
appeal. It noted that River could not, under the Interstate Com-
merce Act, charge more or less than provided for in the filed tariffs.
It observed that the Commission could, of its own motion, or at the
instance of an aggrieved party, inquire into the legality and reason-
ableness of the terms of the filed tariff. The record failed to disclose
that any objections had been made concerning the provisions of the
tariffs to the Commission which had permitted them to become
effective.
The court of appeals observed that the Commission may find the
rates charged in the tariff are lower than they would be if the tower
could not absolve itself from liability. It concluded that before the
courts should declare exculpatory provisions in the filed tariffs in-
valid, Southwestern should have an opportunity to attack those
provisions before the Commission. It accordingly remanded the
153 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. La. 1957).
66 Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
6 253 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1958).
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case to the district court with instructions that a reasonable oppor-
tunity be afforded Southwestern to take appropriate proceedings
before the Interstate Commerce Commission to test the validity of
the exculpatory clause and, in the absence of such action, the district
court should give full effect to said provision.
On certiorari the Supreme Court divided six to three and this
time Justice Harlan, who had not taken part in Bisso, Boston Metals
and Nielson, spoke for the Court." At the outset, the Court held
that the court of appeals erred in not deciding the other issues, in-
cluding the issue of whose negligence caused the loss, when the case
was before it. Disposition of one or more of those issues might
have made unnecessary the litigation before the Interstate Com-
merce Commission suggested by the court of appeals. But, even if
such disposition might render moot the question of the validity of
the exculpatory clause in the circumstances of this case, the Court
deemed it appropriate to review the determination of the court of
appeals that the exculpatory clause was not invalid as a matter of
law.
Southwestern urged before the Supreme Court that the exculpa-
tory provision, inherently illegal under Bisso, gained nothing by
being filed with the Commission. In overruling this argument the
Court intimated the course of action it would pursue:
We think that this reasoning begs the true question here pre-
sented, which is whether considerations of public policy which
may be called upon by courts to strike down private contrac-
tual arrangements between tug and tow are necessarily appli-
cable to provisions of a tariff filed with, and subject to the
pervasive regulatory authority of, an expert administrative
body. In Bisso the clause struck down was part of a contract
over the terms of which the I. C. C., the body primarily
charged by Congress with the regulation of the terms and
conditions upon which water carriers subject to its jurisdic-
tion shall offer their services, had no control. In the present
case the courts below have assumed, and petitioner does not
challenge, the applicability to the transportation which re-
sulted in loss to petitioner of a duly filed tariff containing this
exculpatory clause.69
-8 360 U.S. 411 (1959). The three dissentors were Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Black and Douglas.
" Id. at 416-17.
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To automatically extend the rule of Bisso to the circumstances
of this case, continued the Court, "would be moving too fast. °
Conceivably the "rate specified in the relevant tariff is computed
on the understanding that the exculpatory clause shall apply ... and
is a reasonable rate so computed."" If such is the case the Court
found it "might be hard to say that public policy demands that the
tow should at once have the benefit of a rate so computed and be
able to repudiate the correlative obligation of procuring its own
insurance."
72
As long as the rates charged by the tug are subject to regulatory
control by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the possibility of
the tug overreaching through charging high rates in addition to
disclaiming liability can be prevented by action of the Commission.
In the light of this fact the Court said, "The rule of Bisso, however
applicable where the towboat owner has 'the power to drive hard
bargains,' may well call for modification when that power is effec-
tively controlled by a pervasive regulatory scheme."
73
The Court noted that several factors might influence the Com-
mission in approving the exculpatory clause in the tariff filed. Thus,
the fact the barge was delivered loaded to River might have a bearing
in that River could not inspect it thoroughly. Also, it might be
material if River offered a higher rate under which it assumed
responsibility. In any event, those matters the Court left for con-
sideration by the Commission.
But the Court emphasized that, in the absence of action by Con-
gress, the question whether the exculpatory clause "offends against
public policy is one appropriate ultimately for judicial rather than
administrative resolution. '74  Nevertheless, even though ultimate
responsibility for ruling on the validity of the exculpatory clause will
be on the courts, that does not mean that they should deny themselves
the benefit which may be derived "from a consideration of the rele-
vant economic and other facts which the administrative agency
charged with regulation of the transaction . . . is peculiarly well
equipped to marshall and initially evaluate."7
Accordingly, the Court upholds the action of the court of appeals
in refusing to declare the exculpatory clause invalid as a matter of
law. It remands the case to that court with instructions that it pass
70Id. at 417. 7lId. at 418.
12 Ibid. a Ibid."Id. at 420. (Emphasis added.) " Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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upon the other matters presented by the appeal and that, if resolution
of those matters does not dispose of the case, it should then remand
the case to the district court "with instructions to hold it in abeyance
while the parties seek the views of the I.C.C., in any form of pro-
ceeding which that body may deem appropriate, as to the circum-
stances bearing on the validity of . . . [the] exculpatory clause in
the context of this litigation.
'7 6
Although there is no written dissenting opinion, the report notes
that the Chief Justice and Justices Black and Douglas "believe that
the rule of law announced in Bisso should not be changed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and would therefore reverse this
judgment.
77
On remand the court of appeals78 considered the basic question
of negligence which had been raised by the tug operator in its appeal
from the district court. After detailed analysis of the evidence, the
court of appeals, contrary to the district court, found that the loss
occasioned was in no way attributable to negligence of River Termi-
nals Corporation, the operator of the tug, and accordingly entered a
judgment in favor of that corporation of no liability. In this situa-
tion, the question of the validity of the exculpatory clause in the filed
tariff did not have to be, and in fact was not, 7 referred to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission.
What Is the Status of Exculpatory Towage Provisions Today?
In answering this question we must bear in mind that the Court
in the River Terminals case, just discussed, did not reverse Bisso.
It merely refused to extend, as a matter of law, the rule of Bisso to
those cases where the tug operator was subject to the regulatory
control of the Interstate Commerce Commission and, pursuant to
statute, had filed its tariffs with that Commission. Accordingly, the
following conclusions would seem to be in order:
1. Exculpatory provisions relieving the tug from liability to
the tow for negligent towage are still invalid as to those
tug operators who are not subject to regulatory control
and who accordingly have not filed tariffs with the I.C.C.
70 Id. at 421-22. '7 Id. at 422.
78 274 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1960).
"g Letters from Carl G. Stearns and Charles Kohlmeyer, Jr., of Lemle &
Kelleher, proctors for River Terminals Corporation, to author, January 9 and
17, 1962.
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2. Exculpatory provisions in tariffs filed pursuant to law with
the I.C.C., which relieve the tug from liability to the tow
for negligent towage, may or may not be valid. Determi-
nation of their validity will in the last instance be made by
the courts after receiving the views of the I.C.C. in regard
thereto.
3. The determination referred to in paragraph 2 above will
be based on the various circumstances involved in the case,
as well as on the views of the I.C.C., but the courts shall
not be bound to follow the conclusions of that Commission.
4. Since different circumstances may exist in various cases
in which the tug was required to and did file its rates with
the I.C.C., it is possible that in some instances the excul-
patory provisions will not be found to be against public
policy while in others they will.
Thus we see that the invalidity of exculpatory towage clauses is,
as of now, only settled as to those tug operators who are not subject
to the regulatory provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. As
to those that are so regulated, each case, under the rule of the River
Terminals decision, will have to be decided upon a consideration of
the specific fact situation presented. And, in these latter cases, the
exculpatory towage clause will, in the final analysis be held valid,
or invalid, depending upon whether the majority of the Supreme
Court conclude that giving effect to the clause is consonant with or
violates public policy.
CARGO CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF COLLISION AND OTHERWISE
1. Demise of the "Both-To-Blame" Clause
One of the most important admiralty decisions of the Supreme
Court in the past decade is United States v. Atlantic Mutual Ins.
Co.' In that case the majority of seven Justices declared the cus-
tomary "both-to-blame" clause found in bills of lading to be in-
valid.2 In order to understand the significance of the decision and
343 U.S. 236 (1952).
2 The clause reads as follows, "If the ship comes into collision with another
ship as a result of the negligence of the other ship and any act, neglect or
default of the Master, mariner, pilot or the servants of the Carrier in the
navigation or in the management of the ship, the owners of the goods carried
hereunder will indemnify the Carrier against all loss or liability to the other
or non-carrying ship or her owners in so far as such loss or liability repre-
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the theories of the majority and dissenting Justices it is necessary
that we review the development of the law in this country relating
to the carrier's liability for negligence to the owner of cargo.
Prior to the passage of the Harter Act8 in 1893, a carrier in this
country was liable to the owner of cargo for any loss or damage
occasioned to cargo by reason of the carrier's negligence. Stipula-
tions in bills of lading absolving the carrier for his negligence were
held invalid by the American courts although they were sustained
in England. The Harter Act provided that if the carrier had exer-
cised due diligence to make its vessel seaworthy, properly manned,
equipped and supplied, it would not be liable to its cargo for negli-
gence in the navigation or management of the vessel. Hence, if due
to carelessness on the part of the navigator, a seaworthy vessel was
wrecked on a reef and cargo lost, the cargo owner had no recourse
against the carrier.
If, however, the wreck which caused the loss of cargo was the
result of a collision between two vessels which were both to blame,
the owner of the cargo on one vessel could recover against the other
non-carrying vessel for his full loss. He could recover nothing from
his own carrier.
Under the American rule applicable to the division of damages
where both vessels are at fault, each vessel is liable for one half of
the total damages. This results in the carrier suffering the smallest
loss paying to the other carrier one half of the difference between
its loss and that of the other carrier. In arriving at this amount,
any damages paid by the non-carrying vessel to the owners of cargo
aboard the carrying vessel are included as a part of the non-carrier's
damages. As a result, the carrying vessel is thus indirectly liable
for one half of the damages sustained by its own cargo owners. But,
as we have seen, it was the purpose of the Harter Act to absolve the
carrier from any obligation to reimburse its cargo owners by reason
of loss through its negligence in navigation.
This conflict was presented to the Supreme Court six years after
the passage of the Harter Act in The Chattahoochee.' In that case,
sents loss of, or damage to, or any claim whatsoever of the owners of said
goods, paid or payable by the other or non-carrying ship or her owners to
the owners of said goods and setoff, recouped or recovered by the other or
non-carrying ship or her owners as part of their claim against the carrying
ship or Carrier."
27 Stat. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1958).
'173 U.S. 540 (1899).
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the carrier claimed that by virtue of the policy enunciated by the
Harter Act it should not be held liable to contribute half the cargo
damages payable by the non-carrying vessel. A majority of the
Court held that the Harter Act was not intended to affect the liabili-
ties as between the two vessels at fault. It accordingly sustained a
decree requiring the carrying vessel to contribute as its share of the
total loss one half of the loss sustained by its cargo owners for all
of which the non-carrier was initially liable. The result of The
Chattahoochee decision was to place the carrying vessel in a worse
position as to its cargo if it was only partly responsible for the loss
than it would be if it were the sole vessel at fault.
It was to correct this anomalous situation that led carriers to
insert the "both-to-blame" clause in bills of lading. This clause in
substance provided that where both vessels are at fault the cargo
owner will reimburse his carrier for any amount the carrier has had
to pay to the non-carrying vessel, or has had set off against it by
said vessel, by reason of the non-carrier having paid the cargo
owner's loss. This clause, while taking care of the carrier, produced
an equally anomalous situation for the cargo owner in that if only
one vessel, the non-carrier, was at fault, cargo could recover its full
loss, but if two vessels were at fault and one was the carrier, cargo
could recover only half its loss.
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,' enacted by Congress in 1936,
adopts essentially the same provisions of the Harter Act in that it
relieves the carrier from liability to its cargo by reason of negli-
gence in the navigation of the vessel. When its enactment was con-
templated by Congress it was suggested by some shippers that a
provision should be inserted specifically invalidating the both-to-
blame clause. That proposal was rejected.'
The first reported decision ruling on the validity of the both-to-
blame clause was rendered in 1936 by the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of New York.7 It upheld the clause. To do
otherwise, the court said, would "destroy the apparent purport and
intention of the Harter Act . . .passed to relieve cargo carrying
349 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1958).
See reference to committee hearings in judge Medina's opinion when
the Atlantic Mutual case was before him in the district court under the name
of United States v. The Esso Belgium, 90 F. Supp. 836, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
" The W. W. Bruce, 14 F. Supp. 894 (E.D.N.Y. 1936), reversed on other
grounds, 94 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1938).
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ships of responsibility for damages to owners of cargo.' '8  The next
reported decision was in 1950 when the problem was again presented
to a federal district court in New York in United States v. Atlantic
Mutual Ins. Co.9 mentioned at the beginning of this section. Judge
Medina sat in the trial court. He upheld the validity of the both-to-
blame clause, found nothing offensive in it, and on the contrary,
found that it carried out the intent and purpose of the Harter Act
and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. However, Judge Medina
was reversed by a divided court of appeals."0
On certiorari the Supreme Court divided seven to two with the
majority affirming the court of appeals and declaring the both-to-
blame clause invalid. Compared to the opinions of both lower courts
the opinion of the Supreme Court majority is very short. In order
to understand the rationale of the majority and the dissenting opin-
ions in Atlantic Mutual it is necessary that we step back a bit and
consider The Irrawaddy" and The Jason2 as well as The Chatta-
hoochee18 heretofore mentioned.
Prior to the Harter Act, when a sacrifice had been made or
expenses incurred by the vessel to relieve it from a disaster due to
negligence in navigation, and as a result of which cargo was saved,
there was no right on the part of the vessel to a general average con-
tribution by cargo. In 1898, five years after the enactment of Har-
ter, the Irrawaddy case came up. The vessel had been stranded by
reason of the master's negligent navigation. It was conceded that
by virtue of the Harter Act the carrier was not liable for direct
damage done to cargo by the stranding. The vessel was relieved
from the strand as a result of jettisoning some of its cargo and
certain sacrifices and expenditures incurred by the vessel. Upon
arrival in New York, the carrier claimed to be entitled to contribu-
tions from the remainder of the cargo on principles of general aver-
age. There was no provision in the bills of lading providing for
such general average and the contention was made by the carrier
that it was entitled thereto by virtue of the Harter Act. The Su-
preme Court ruled against the carrier declaring that while Harter
' 14 F. Supp. at 897.
°90 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
10 191 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1951). Judges Clark and Swan declared the
clause invalid. Judge Augustus N. Hand upheld the clause for the reasons
expressed by Judge Medina below.
11171 U.S. 187 (1898). 225 U.S. 32 (1912).
13 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
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was designed to relieve the carrier from liability to its cargo for loss
occasioned by its negligence in navigation, it was not intended to
give the carrier the right to claim general average contributions from
its cargo where the loss was occasioned by the negligent navigation
of the vessel.
Sixteen years after The Irrawaddy the Court had before it The
Jason.4 The vessel Jason had been stranded due to the negligence
of its navigator. As in Irrawaddy certain cargo had been jettisoned
and the ship had incurred losses and expenditures which enabled it
to complete the voyage. Upon arrival the vessel claimed general
average against cargo saved. No difference in the facts existed be-
tween the two cases of significance except that the bills of lading in
The Jason contained a clause (hereinafter referred to as the Jason
clause) which, among other things, provided that if the carrier had
used due diligence to make his vessel seaworthy and properly
manned, equipped and supplied, both the consignee of cargo and the
shipowner shall contribute in general average in case of loss resulting
from negligent navigation just as if the loss had not resulted from
such negligence. 5
The Supreme Court held that the Jason clause was valid and that
the Harter Act did not forbid a reciprocal general average agreement
in the bill of lading. Irrawaddy had merely decided that the Harter
Act of its own force did not create the right of general average where
there was negligent navigation. But the Court found nothing in the
policy of the Harter Act which forbids the parties from contracting
for such general average even though there has been negligence in
navigation which rendered the sacrifice necessary for the common
good.
It is in the light of this background that we must consider the
action of the Court in Atlantic Mutual. Just as Irrawaddy had de-
1 225 U.S. 32 (1912).
" The full text of the clause is as follows, "If the owner of the ship shall
have exercised due diligence to make said ship in all respects seaworthy and
properly manned, equipped and supplied, it is hereby agreed that in case of
danger, damage or disaster resulting from fault or negligence of the pilot,
master or crew, in the navigation or management of the ship, or from latent
or other defects, or unseaworthiness of the ship, whether existing at time of
shipment or at beginning of the voyage, but not discoverable by due diligence,
the consignees or owners of the cargo shall not be exempted from liability
for contribution in General Average or for any special charges incurred, but
with the shipowner shall contribute in General Average, and shall pay such
special charges, as if such danger, damage or disaster had not resulted from
such fault, negligence, latent or other defect or unseaworthiness."
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dared that the Harter Act of its own force did not give rise to general
average where there was negligence in navigation, so did Chatta-
hoochee declare that of its own force the Harter Act did not entitle
the carrier to recover from its cargo half of the damages the cargo
had recovered from the non-carrier in a collision situation where
both vessels were at fault. While Jason upheld .a provision in the
bill of lading providing for general average, not allowed under
Irrawaddy, American Mutual declared invalid a both-to-blame pro-
vision in the bill of lading which sought to give the carrier the relief
denied it in Chattahoochee. As might be expected the dissenting
Justices in Atlantic Mutual stress what appears to them to be a con-
trolling parallel between Irrawaddy-Jason and Chattahoochee-
American Mutual. The majority makes no mention of Jason in the
body of its opinion but by way of footnote states it has not over-
looked that case.
Justice Black spoke for the Court in Atlantic Mutual. He con-
ceded that invalidating the both-to-blame clause would result in
imposing liability on the carrier for half the cargo loss when another
vessel was jointly guilty of negligence with the carrier while the
carrier would be completely absolved under the Harter Act if it were
solely at fault. But he stressed the fact that to uphold the clause
would result in a cargo owner recovering his full loss from the non-
carrying vessel if it alone was at fault but being required to share his
recovery with the carrier if both vessels were to blame. No matter
how the decision went there would be an anomalous result either as
to the carrier or the cargo owner. Justice Black found no indication
in the Harter Act that it was designed to change the American rule
that when both vessels are at fault the total loss is shared equally.
The both-to-blame clause, if given effect, would violate this Ameri-
can principle and shift a burden that rests on the carrying vessel to
its cargo.
Justice Frankfurter in speaking for the dissent said that the
both-to-blame clause actually effectuated the purpose of the Harter
Act. Under that act the vessel is to be held harmless for any loss
to cargo occasioned by negligent navigation when the vessel was
solely at fault. A contract provision which results in holding the
vessel harmless when the loss to cargo results from the joint negli-
gence of the carrying vessel and another is in harmony with the
purpose of the act.
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. It is obvious that persuasive arguments can be made in support,
as well as against, the both-to-blame clause. While one would be
presumptious to predict the future, since Atlantic Mvtual the both-to-
blame clause has been a dead letter. Whether, at some later date,
an act of Congress, or a realignment of the Nine, will result in
bringing the clause back to life one cannot tell. Meanwhile, efforts
are being made by shipowners to have Congress enact legislation
which would adopt the principles of the Brussels Collision Conven-
tion of 1910.6 That Convention which has been ratified and is
adhered to by the leading maritime nations of the world has never
.been adopted by the United States. Under the Convention, if cargo
or vessels are damaged as a result of the fault of two or more vessels
the liability of each vessel is proportioned according to its degree of
fault. In addition there is no joint and several liability on the part
of the vessels to cargo.
On October 23, 1961, a committee appointed by the Maritime
Law Association of the United States filed a report in which the
majority recommended that Congress enact legislation which would
adopt as law for this country the basic principles of the Brussels
Collision Convention of 1910. Adoption of the Convention was
said by the majority to be desirable both from the viewpoint of
domestic law as well as international uniformity. Several vigorous
minority reports were filed opposing adoption. Minority members
of the committee pointed out that adoption of the Convention would
merely be for the benefit of shipowners and that cargo would be the
loser in that it would no longer have available to it the joint and
several liability of shipowners existing under present American law
when damage to cargo results from the fault of two or more vessels.
The minority also pointed out that in recommending the adoption
of the Brussels Collision Convention of 1910, the majority was re-
versing the position that had been adhered to by the Maritime Law
Association of the United States for more than fifty years.17  One
"8 The text of this Convention and a list of the countries adhering thereto
will be found in 6 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY 39 (7th ed. 1957).
1' For a copy of the majority and minority committee reports, see THE
MARITIME LAW AsSocIATIoN OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON SHIPOWNERs' LIMITATION OF LIABILITY AND THE COLLISION AND
ARREST OF SHIPS CONVENTIONS No. 450 (Oct. 23, 1961). As a part of that
document there will be found a copy of H.R. 7911, which was introduced in
the House of Representatives on June 28, 1961. A similar bill was also
introduced in the Senate on July 29, 1961. Neither of these bills was
-456 [Vol. 4.0
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thing is certain: any -effort to. change the present American law of
joint and several liability of shipowners to cargo will be bitterly
fought by cargo interests in this country.
2. Validity of Bill of Lading Provision Restricting Suits for Loss or
Damage to Cargo to Courts of Genoa
We have just discussed the invalidation of the "both-to-blame"
clause in bills of lading.' Counsel for shipowners as draftsmen of
bills of lading have from time to time inserted clauses under which
the owner of cargo agrees that no legal action may be brought for
loss or damage to cargo except in the courts of a given city or coun-
try. The validity of such a clause, and whether or not it applied to
in rem as well as in personam actions, was presented to the Supreme
Court for the first time in the recent case of The Monrosa v. Carbon
Black Export, Inc.8'8
Carbon Black Export, a Delaware corporation, had shipped
cargo on the SS Monrosa at Houston and New Orleans for delivery
to Italian ports. On arrival of the Monrosa in Italy a portion of
the cargo was delivered in damaged condition and some was not
delivered at all. On return of the Monrosa to Houston, Carbon
Black Export brought a libel in rem against the vessel and another
libel in personam against the owner, Navigazione AIta Italia,' a
corporation of Italy. Damages were claimed in the amount of
$110,000. The shipowner filed an appearance in response to the
libel in personam and in the in rem proceeding put up a bond to abide
by the decree of the court.
Three months later the shipowner asked the trial court to decline
jurisdiction by reason of clause No. 27 in the bill of lading which
read as follows,
"ALSO, that no legal proceedings may be brought against the
Captain or Shipowners or their Agents in respect to any loss
enacted. Both would have adopted the principles of the Brussels Convention
of 1910.
At the annual fall meeting of the Maritime Law Association held in New
York City on November 3, 1961, that association by a vote of 166 to 84
adopted a resolution approving "the basic principles of the Brussels Collission
Convention of 1910 and the legislation proposed to carry it into effect."
The passage of the resolution was vigorously contested and charges of the
use of "steamroller" tactics were levied at the chairman by a member of the
minority group opposing the resolution. See THE MARITIME LAW AsSOCIA-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT No. 452, at 4854-57 (Feb. 1962).
359 U.S. 180 (1959), rehearing denied, 359 U.S. 999 (1959).
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of or damage to any goods herein specified except in Genoa,
it being understood and agreed that every other Tribunal in
the place or places where the goods were shipped or landed
is incompetent, not withstanding that the ship may be legally
represented there."
In a memorandum opinion, the district court declared that it
did not find the foregoing provision unreasonable and therefore de-
clined to take jurisdiction.1"  The court of appeals reversed. It
held that clause 27 merely referred to suits against the captain, ship-
owners or their agents and did not cover in rem proceedings against
the vessel. It also held that the trial judge erred in failing to take
jurisdiction of the in personam action. It found that the motion
for dismissal based on-clause 27 was in effect bottomed on the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens. It declared that "the universally
accepted rule is that agreements in advance of controversy whose
object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are contrary to public
policy and will not be enforced."'" It failed to find the balance of
interests so strongly in favor of the defendant so as to cause the court
to disturb the plaintiff's choice of forum.
On certiorari the Supreme Court divided five to four.2 The
majority agreed with that portion of the court of appeals decision
which had held that clause 27 did not encompass libels in rem.
Accordingly, it found there was no contract prohibition to the in rem
action. The Court pointed out that if the shipowner in drafting the
clause had intended it to apply to in rem proceedings, it could have
easily so provided. It also noted that in another portion of the bill
of lading, which dealt with the time in which actions might be
brought by the owner of cargo, the shipowner had referred to both
in rem and in personam proceedings. Justice Brennan, speaking for
the majority, declared the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as
improvidently granted.
As to the second aspect of the court of appeals decision dealing
with the validity of clause 27 relating to in personam actions, the
Court declined to make a ruling.
"9 Copy of the district court's language on this point will be found in
Carbon Black Export v. The SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 299 n.2 (5th Cir.
1958).
202 54 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958).
21 rd. at 300.
2359 U.S. 180 (1959).
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We do not believe that this case affords us an appro-
priate instance to pass upon the extent to which effect can be
given to such stipulations in ocean bills of lading not to resort
to the courts of this country.23
Justice Harlan, writing for the dissent,24 disagreed with the
majority's action in both respects. He is of the opinion that clause
27 applied both to in rem as well as in personam actions. There
would, he finds, have been no purpose on the part of the parties in
having the shipowner free from suit but his vessel suable. But
apart from that, he sees no justification for the majority refusing
to rule on the validity of clause 27 in regard to in personam actions.
He states that it was the question of the validity of the clause as
applied to such actions which led the court to grant certiorari. To
avoid decision now, he concludes, "serves only to leave the lower
federal courts in confusion and uncertainty and to make it necessary
for us to mortgage our future and constantly mounting calendars
with a question which we could and should decide today."2
Since the majority refused to decide the question of the validity
of clause 27 as applied to in personam suits, Justice Harlan says,
"it would be inappropriate for me to express my own view upon it."26
While we agree with the majority that clause 27 of the bill of
lading should not be construed to include in rem proceedings, it is
indeed unfortunate for both the admiralty bench and bar that the
Court refused to rule upon the validity of clauses which provide that
litigation be brought only in certain tribunals.
3. Availability of Carrier's $500 Limitation of Liability Per Package
of Cargo to Negligent Stevedore
Article 4(5) of the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act2 7 provides
for the limitation of the liability of the carrier and ship to $500 per
package of cargo unless the nature and value of the goods have been
declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of
lading. Parallel limitation provisions are found in bills of lading.
2 Id. at 182.
" He was joined by Justices Frankfurter, Whittaker and Stewart.
25 359 U.S. at 186. -2 Ibid.
" 49 Stat. 1211 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1958). The pertinent
language is, "Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become
liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the transportation of
goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package lawful money of the United
States ... unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by
the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.....
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Does a stevedore who is engaged as agent of the carrier to load cargo
have the benefit of this limitation of liability provision in the event he
negligently damages the cargo?
The lower federal courts have reached contrary conclusions on
this question. Thus in A. M. Collins & Co. v. Panama R.R.,28 the
Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit declared that the limitation
provision was not intended to be personal to the carrier, but ex-
tended to any agency by means of which the carrier performed his
contract of transportation and delivery. Accordingly, it held a
stevedore, whose negligence had caused loss to cargo, was entitled
to the benefit of the limitation when acting as agent for the carrier.
On the other hand, in Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery
Corp.,2" the Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit, in a similar
case, held that neither the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act nor the
terms of the bill of lading were intended to give the benefit of the
limitation to the stevedore. That court deemed the limitation pro-
vision to be strictly confined to the carrier and the ship.
In 1959 the conflict was resolved in favor of the view taken by
the fourth circuit when the Supreme Court affirmed that court's
judgment in the Krawill case.80
Krawill Machinery Corporation had arranged for the carriage
of sixty-two cases of goods on the SS Castillo Ampudia from Balti-
more to Spain. Loading was to be done by the carrier or its agent.
The carrier orally engaged Robert C. Herd & Company, a stevedor-
ing concern, to load the cargo. In so doing, employees of Herd &
Company negligently dropped one of the cases in the harbor causing
extensive damage. The bill of lading carried the usual $500 limita-
tion clause8' and no value of the goods had been declared by the
197 F.2d 893 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875 (1952).
29256 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1958).
20359 U.S. 297 (1959). The Court was unanimous I
21 The pertinent language of the clause is, "In consideration of a choice of
freight rates having been offered to the shipper by the Carrier, it is agreed
that in case of loss of, or damage to ... goods of an actual value exceeding
$500... per package... the value of such goods, shall be deemed to be $500
per package ... and the Carrier's liability, if any, shall be determined on the
basis of a value of $500 per package... unless the nature of such goods and
a value higher than $500 per package ... shall have been declared in writing
by the shipper upon delivery to the Carrier and noted on the face hereof and
unless payment of the extra freight charge incident thereto shall have been
made or promised . . . . in which case such declared value, or the actual
value if less, shall be the basis for computing damages and any partial loss
or damage shall be adjusted pro rata. ...
"'37. This bill of lading shall have effect subject to the Carriage of Goods
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shipper or inserted in the bill. Herd & Company sought to limit
their liability to $500 by invoking the provisions of the Carriage of
Goods By Sea Act and the terms of the bill of lading. The district
judge held that while the carrier's liability was limited to $500 the
stevedore's was not. He accordingly entered judgment for Krawill
in the sum of $47,992 which was the full amount of the damage.
The court of appeals affirmed."2  It acknowledged that a contrary
result had been reached by the majority of the court in the Collins3
case. However, it concluded that the sounder view was that ex-
pressed by Judge Holmes who had dissented in Collins and it adopted
his view.
In affirming Krawill the Supreme Court also expressly rejected
the theory of the majority in Collins. It found nothing in the legis-
lative history of the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act which indicates
in the slightest that stevedores are to have the benefit of the statutory
limitation. As to the limitations in the bill of lading, the Court
stressed the principle that contract stipulations which grant immunity
or limit liability "must be strictly construed"3 4 and confined to "in-
tended beneficiaries.""5 If the parties intended the stevedore to have
the benefit of the contract limitation, the Court said, "it must be
presumed that they would in some way have expressed it in the
contract."3 6 In declaring the Collins decision to be contrary to the
common law and the law as declared by the Supreme Court, Justice
Whittaker, speaking for the Court, said,
From its early history this Court has consistently held that an
agent is liable for all damages caused by his negligence, unless
exonerated therefrom, in whole or in part, by a statute or a
valid contract binding on the person damaged.
3 7
And thus the uncertainty as to the right of a stevedore to have
the benefit of the $500 limitation extended to him in the absence of
further statutory or contractual provisions is brought to an end. It
remains for future litigation to determine what valid means may be
used to afford the stevedore, who loads the carrier's vessel as its
agent, the same limitation of liability the carrier would have if it did
the loading itself.
by Sea Act of the U.S.A. and the Carrier and the ship shall be entitled to
all of the rights and immunities set forth in said Act."'2 256 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1958). " 197 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1952).
3, 359 U.S. at 305. 35 Ibid.
Id. at 302. • Id. at 303.
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PARTITIONING OF VESSEL-MAY IT BE DONE IN STATE COURT AND
WHAT LAW Is APPLICABLE?
In Madruga v. Superior Court of California1 the question pre-
sented was whether a state court had jurisdictional power to order
a sale of a vessel and a division of the proceeds in a partitioning
proceeding. Further, if the state court had such power, could it
apply state law or was it controlled by some national admiralty law
relative to partitioning. A majority of seven Justices held the state
court could partition and in so doing apply state law. Two dis-
senting Justices deemed the partitioning proceeding to be, for all
practical purposes, in rem and therefore not within the jurisdiction
of the state court.
Eight co-owners representing 85% interest in the Oil Screw
Vessel Liberty filed a suit for partition by sale and distribution of
the proceeds of the vessel in the superior court in San Diego County,
California. The defendant was Manuel S. Madruga who owned the
remaining 15% interest. The vessel at the time was docked at San
Diego, its home port. Madruga demurred to the complaint stating
that the superior court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter and
that exclusive jurisdiction was in the federal court sitting as a court
of admiralty. The state court overruled the demurrer and announced
it would take jurisdiction. Madruga then sought a writ of prohibi-
tion from the state supreme court. An alternative writ was issued,
but after a hearing the state supreme court denied a peremptory
writ and discharged the alternative writ. It held that the state
superior court was competent to entertain the partition proceeding.2
In sustaining the action of the state court, the majority, speaking
through Justice Black, considered four questions, to wit:
1. Does a federal admiralty court have jurisdiction to order
a vessel sold in a partitioning proceeding?
2. If admiralty has such jurisdiction does a state court have
concurrent jurisdiction?
3. Is there any national admiralty rule governing the parti-
tioning of vessels?
4. If a state court has concurrent jurisdiction, may it apply
its own law of partitioning if no national admiralty rule
1346 U.S. 556 (1954).
240 Cal. 2d 65, 251 P.2d 1 (1952).
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for partitioning has been declared by Congress or the
Supreme Court?
In answering the first question, the Court reviewed cases in
lower federal courts dealing with the partitioning of vessels. It
found that considerable divergence of views existed in those courts
as to when admiralty might entertain a partitioning proceeding.
Some of the lower federal courts had held that admiralty had parti-
tioning jurisdiction only if the dispute was between owners of equal
shares. Others had held that admiralty could decree partitioning at
the instance of either minority or majority interests. But, whatever
the lower courts may have held, the Court found that the jurisdic-
tional power of admiralty courts in partitioning proceedings had
"never been squarely decided by this Court." The Court now de-
termines the existence of that power in the affirmative. "We think
... that the power of admiralty, as Congress and the Courts have
developed it over the years, is broad enough for United States dis-
trict courts to order vessels sold for partition."4
In regard to the second question, the Court reaffirms the accepted
rule that admiralty's jurisdiction is only exclusive as to those mari-
time causes of action which are begun and carried on as proceedings
in rem, "that is, where a vessel ... is itself treated as the offender
and made the defendant by name or description . . . ."' The pro-
ceedings in the superior court of San Diego County were, says the
majority, not in rem but in personam against Madruga. He, and
"not the ship, was made defendant."6  Accordingly, the state court
is held to have concurrent jurisdiction under the Savings Clause.7
As to the third question, the defendant Madruga contended that
there is a national admiralty rule to the effect that partitioning of
vessels will only be permitted if the ownership interests are equal.
He also asserted that any state court in partitioning proceedings
relating to a vessel would be bound by this admiralty rule. Since,
the interests of the owners in the instant case were unequal, he
claimed partitioning could not be had.
The Supreme Court conceded that a state court exercising con-
current partitioning jurisdiction would have to follow any nationally
established admiralty rule. However, the Court found no such rule
346 U.S. at 558. 4Id. at 560.
" Ibid. OId. at 561.
728 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958).
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had -been: established either by Congress or the Court. "But Con-
gress has never seen fit . . to adopt a national partition rule. Nor
has any stch rule been established by decisions of this court." 8
The fourth and remaining question was whether the state
court, in the absence of a national admiralty rule relating to
partition, could apply its own law. In effect, the question before
the Court was whether it should now establish a national admiralty
rule relating to partition which state courts are to follow. Surely it
was within the power of the Court to declare such a rule. The
scarcity of reported cases involving partition, the Court said, "in-
dicates that establishment of a national partition rule is not of major
importance to the shipping world."9
The problem here presented is akin to that which was before the
Court a year later in Wilburn Boat ° where the majority of the Court
found no federal admiralty law passing upon the effect of a breach
,of warranty in a marine insurance policy and, instead of fashioning
such a rule, permitted the state court to apply its own law. Just as
the Court refused to formulate an admiralty rule in Wilburn Boat,
it refused to do it here.
We do not think the circumstances call on us to add to con-
gressional regulation by attempting establishment of a na-
tional judicial rule controlling partition of ships." . .. Nor
are we convinced that any theoretical benefits to shipping
would justify us in restricting the partition jurisdiction of
state courts by fashioning an exclusive national rule to govern
quarreling shipowners."
The result of the Court's decision is to leave state courts free to
entertain partitioning proceedings of vessels and to apply their own
law in regard to such actions.
Justice Frankfurter wrote the dissenting opinion.' 3 The state
court action, he says, sought no remedy in personam against Ma-
druga. It sought merely to effect the sale of a res and a division
of the proceeds of that res. Clearly, he notes, the state court would
not have been permitted to entertain an action in which the ship
346 U.S. at 562. 9 Ibid.
" Wilbum Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955),
discussed at length in MARINE INSURANCE, What Law Is Applicable?, supra
at 387-94.,'346 U.S. at 562. 12Id. at 562-63.1 'He was joined by Justice Jackson.
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were -named defendant. That would have been promptly classified -
as in rem and in.the sole jurisdiction of the admiralty court. To
hold that the present partition proceeding is not in ren because of
the formality of the pleading "is to make questions of jurisdiction in
matters maritime, as between federal and state courts, turn on dis-
tinctions much too frail.'
4
Justice Frankfurter concedes that Congress might authorize states
to exercise jurisdiction for the partition of vessels. He assumes that
if Congress did so act, it would "differentiate between small craft,
plying within a limited area and ocean going vessels."' 5 But, he
says, "this Court cannot on its own initiative make such differentia-
tions, regarding the power of State courts, as between small vessels
and large." 6 He concludes by saying:
Whatever power may be exercised by Congress in ceding"
national maritime jurisdiction to the States, it is not for this
Court to allow State courts to have concurrent jurisdiction
in rem, solely because the "establishment of a national parti-
tion rule is not of major importance to the shipping world."'
17
Whether or not the Supreme Court majority would adopt Jus-
tice Frankfurter's views if the vessel involved were a Queen Mary,
or if repeated suits for the partitioning of vessels of commercial im-
portance found their way into state courts, is a matter on which
one may only conjecture. Certainly, if partitioning proved of con-
siderable importance in the shipping world, the Court could and in
all likelihood would assume the burden of fashioning a federal ad-
miralty rule controlling the partitioning of vessels. Such rule would
govern irrespective of whether or not the Court continued to permit
state courts to exercise concurrent jurisdiction.
MARITME CONTRACTS AND THE STATUTE OF FUDs
The judicial power of a United States district court sitting as a
court of admiralty extends to all civil causes of admiralty and mar-
1, 346 U.S. at 565.
1 Id. at 567.
16 Ibid. It is interesting to note that the following year, in his concurring
opinion in Wilburn Boat, Justice Frankfurter did agree to the action of the
majority in that case allowing the state court to apply its own law as to the
effect of a breach of warranty in a marine insurance policy merely because
the case involved a small houseboat and not a vessel such as the Queen Mary.
See MARINE INSURANCE, What Law Is Applicable?, supra at 390-91.
1, 346 U.S. at 567.
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time jurisdiction.' Hence, if a tort can be classified as a maritime
tort, the admiralty court has jurisdiction. If a contract is a mari-
time contract, admiralty again has jurisdiction. Generally speaking,
a tort committed on navigable waters is a maritime tort. Justice
Story in the oft cited case of De Lovio v. Boit2 stated that as to torts
the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States courts was "neces-
sarily bounded by locality." Accordingly, when in The Plymouth'
sparks from a burning ship set a wharf on fire, the Supreme Court
held there was no admiralty jurisdiction, the tort having been com-
mitted on land where the injury took place. Congress, many years
later, extended admiralty jurisdiction to those cases where a vessel
causes damage or injury on land.4  There is, therefore, not much
difficulty in determining whether a cause of action for tort is within
or without admiralty jurisdiction. Such is not true as to contracts.
Justice Story in De Lovio also declared that admiralty jurisdic-
tion extended "over all contracts (wheresoever they may be made
or executed, or whatsoever may be the form of the stipulations)
which relate to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea."'
What contracts meet that test? It is in cataloging contracts as
maritime or non-maritime that the courts have left us with a truly
checkered slate of authorities. Thus it has been held that a contract
to repair a vessel is maritime,' while a contract to build one is not.
7
A policy of insurance on a vessel is a maritime contract,' but a con-
tract to obtain such a policy is not.' A charter party is a maritime
contract,'0 but a broker's contract to procure one is not." A contract
'This is by virtue of U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, and section 9 of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, REv. STAT. § 563 (1875), now carried over in modified
form in the Judicial Code of 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958).
7 Fed. Cas. 418, 444 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
870 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865).
'62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1958). The constitutionality of
this statute has been upheld in lower courts. See United States v. Matson
Navigation Co., 201 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1953).
87 Fed. Cas. at 444 (No. 3776). It was in this case that Justice Story
held a policy of insurance on a vessel was within, though not exclusively
within, federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
'New Bedford Dry Dock Co. v. Purdy, 258 U.S. 96 (1922).
'Thames Towboat Co. v. The Schooner Francis McDonald, 254 U.S. 242
(1920); People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 393 (1857).
'Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870).
'Marquardt v. French, 53 Fed. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1893). Not all kinds
of contracts have been considered by the Supreme Court and accordingly
reference is made to lower court decisions which point up the problem.
" Armour & Co. v. Fort Morgan S.S. Co., 270 U.S. 253 (1926).
"Rhederei Actien Gesellschaft Oceana v. Clutha Shipping Co., 226 Fed.
339 (D. Md. 1915).
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to supply a vessel is maritime,12 but contracts with agents to obtain
crews, freight and passengers are non-maritime. 3 A contract to
fumigate a ship is maritime,14 but a contract to sell a vessel is non-
maritime.Y5
Since jurisdiction of an admiralty court in contract cases de-
pends on the contract being maritime, it is clear from the above
recitation of what have been and have not been held to be maritime
contracts that the existence of admiralty jurisdiction in any given
contract action may not be easy to predict. As in other areas, the
Supreme Court Justices disagree among themselves as to what con-
tracts are maritime and non-maritime. In brief, admiralty jurisdic-
tion will attach if a majority of the Court chooses to classify the
contract as maritime.
However, classification of the contract as maritime or non-mari-
time can materially effect the rights of the parties even though the
action is brought under the savings clause in a state court or on the
law side of the federal court in a diversity case. This was recently
illustrated in Kossick v. United Fruit Co.'6 Kossick, through no
fault of his employer, United Fruit Company, had suffered a thyroid
ailment while employed as a chief steward on one of Uniited's vessels.
He was entitled to maintenance and cure. United wanted him to be
treated at a United States Public Health Service Hospital. Kossick
wanted to be treated by his own physician who demanded $350 for
his treatment. United refused to accede to Kossick's request but,
alleged Kossick, orally agreed that if Kossick would enter a Public
Health Service Hospital, United would assume responsibility for
all consequences of improper or inadequate treatment. Kossick
said he relied on this promise, that he went to the Public Health
Service Hospital, and that there he received injuries due to improper
treatment. He demanded damages against United in the sum of
$250,000.
Kossick brought his action in a federal district court in New
York basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. The defendant
1 The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U.S. 1 (1893).
'8 The Retriever, 93 Fed. 480 (W.D. Wash. 1899).
,Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. Ruddy Fumigant Co., 11 F. Supp. 390 (W.D.
Wash. 1935).
"The Ada, 250 Fed. 194 (2d Cir. 1918). For a further collection of
cases illustrating what contracts have been classified as maritime and non-
maritime, see 1 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY 133 (6th ed. 1940).
10365 U.S. 731 (1961).
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moved for :a dismissal on the ground that the alleged contract was
one to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person,
and.that.under the statute of frauds of the state of New York, where
the contract was allegedly made, it was void for want of a writing.
The district court granted defendant's motion. Without consider-
ing the question of whether the contract was maritime or non-
maritime, the court found that under the law of New York the
action was barred by the state statute of frauds. Since the action
in the federal court was based on diversity of citizenship, the district
court judge deemed himself controlled by Erie Railroad v. Tomp-
kins" and obliged to follow state law.
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal.' Judge Magruder,
speaking for the court, specifically held that the contract "was not a
maritime contract since it was merely a promise to pay money on
land if the former seaman should suffer injury at the hands of the
United States Public Health Service personnel, on land, in the
course of medical treatment."20  He acknowledged that in Union
Fish Co. v. Erickson2i ' the Supreme Court had held that when an
action is brought on a maritime contract in an admiralty court the
contract cannot be nullified by a state statute of frauds.22 Whether
or not Erickson would be applicable in a diversity action, or whether
or not the rule of that case may have been modified by later deci-
sions, Judge Magruder said was immaterial because Erickson ap-
plies only to maritime contracts. Since Judge Magruder found the
contract in Kossick was not maritime, Erickson and admiralty law
have nothing to do with the case. The dismissal, he held, was
proper because of the operation of the state statute of frauds on a
non-maritime contract.
On certiorari the Court divided six to three.23 The majority
reversed the lower courts and ordered the action reinstated. Justice
Harlan, speaking for the Court, said the case presented two ques-
tions: "First, was this alleged contract a maritime one? Second, if
so, was it nevertheless of such a 'local' nature that its validity should
be judged by state law ?"24
Answering the first question, Justice Harlan classified the con-
tract as maritime because he found the consideration for United's
166 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
10304 U.S. 64 (1938). 10275 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1960).
2 0 d. at 502. 11248 U.S. 308 (1919).
22275 F.2d at 502. 23365 U.S. 731 (1961).
2 Id. at 735.
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alleged promise was Kossick's "good faith forebearance to press
what he considered-perhaps erroneously-to be the full extent of
his maritime right to maintenance and cure."25  "So viewed," Jus-
tice -arlan continued, "we think that the alleged agreement was
sufficiently related to peculiarly maritime concerns as not to put it,
without more, beyond the pale of admiralty law."26
The controlling question, Justice Harlan stated, was the second
one, namely: "whether the alleged contract, though maritime, is
'maritime and local' . .. in the sense that the application of state
law would not disturb the uniformity of maritime law . .."' In
answering this question Justice Harlan comments on a series of
cases such as Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,2" The Tungus v. Skov-
gaard,20 Just v. Chambers,8" Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co."1 and others.
In Jensen, recovery was not permitted under a state workmen's
compensation act when a stevedore employed by the shipowner was
killed on the vessel in state waters. To permit the application of
state law, the Court then held, would interfere with the uniformity
essential in maritime matters. In Skovgaard, suit in admiralty was
brought for a wrongful death occurring on the navigable waters of
New Jersey. Although no death action was afforded in such case
by maritime law, the Court permitted the plaintiff to maintain his
action basing it on the New Jersey wrongful death statute. In
Chambers, the plaintiff brought suit in admiralty against the estate
of a deceased tortfeasor for a maritime tort committed by the de-
cedent on the navigable waters of Florida. Under maritime law,
actions do not survive the death of the tortfeasor. Under the
statutory law of Florida, actions do survive the tortfeasor's death.
The Court held that the action could be maintained on the basis of
the Florida statute. And, as we have seen earlier in this paper, in
Wilburn Boat the state law as to the effect of a breach of warranty
was permitted to determine the rights of the parties to a maritime
contract of insurance on a houseboat.
In considering the past action of the Court, Justice Harlan finds
that the cases illustrate a process of accommodation favoring either
the application of state law or the adherence to maritime law.
"5 Id. at 738. "Ibid.
27 Ibid. "244 U.S. 205 (1917).o358 U.S. 588 (1959). 2o312 U.S. 383 (1941).
31348 U.S. 310 (1955).
1962]
47M NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
Various, factors influence the acceptance by the Court of state law.
Thus, in cases such as Skovgaard and Chambers, permitting the
operation of state law made recovery possible for a wrong com-
mitted when maritime law afforded no remedy. Wilburn Boat per-
mitted state law to operate in an area where the majority then found
no controlling maritime authority. Jensen preserved uniformity in
an area where the Court deemed uniformity of paramount im-
portance.
Now in Kossick the Court must determine whether an alleged
oral maritime contract, enforceable under maritime law, shall be held
unenforceable in a federal diversity action 2 by reason of a state
statute of frauds. This is not a situation of the plaintiff seeking
relief for a tortious act committed by the defendant. If the plain-
tiff's allegations are true, he is seeking to enforce an obligation which
the defendant voluntarily assumed. In this situation, Justice Harlan
holds that the maritime law should control. He finds nothing of a
peculiarly local nature in the contract. Neither does he find any
interest of the state of New York which would call for the applica-
tion of state law.38
Justice Frankfurter, who was joined by Justice Stewart, wrote
a brief dissent. He would affirm the lower courts. He does not
classify the contract in question as either maritime or non-maritime.
He refers to it as a "limited and essentially local transaction" and
concludes that allowing the contract to be governed by the state
statute of frauds would not "disturb the uniformity of maritime
law." 4  But primarily, Justice Frankfurter criticizes the majority
because he finds it is relying on Jensen and "reinvigorating that 'ill-
starred decision.' "85
Justice Whittaker filed a separate five-line dissent in which he
3 Whether Kossick filed his suit in an admiralty court, or a state court, or,
as here, on the law side of the federal court, the same rule of law should
determine the rights of the parties when once it is conceded that Kossick
was seeking to enforce a maritime cause of action. See text at notes 55,
64-66, in MARINE INSURANCE, What Law Is Applicable?, supra at 392-93.
See also Madruga v. Superior Court of California, 346 U.S. 556, 561 (1954),
discussed in PARTITIONING OF VESSEL-MAY IT BE DONE IN STATE COURT
AND WHAT LAW Is APPLICABLE?, supra at 462-65.
" If New York state has any interest in the outcome of the litigation, it
presumably would be that Kossick not become a public charge on that state.
While not urged as a basis for decision, it may be noted that this interest of
New York is served by permitting maritime law to operate under which,
with the blessings of a jury in the diversity action, Kossick may be amply
provided for.
"'365 U.S. at 743. Ibid.
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stated he agreed with the court of appeals that the contract was non-
maritime and therefore controlled by the New York statute of
frauds.
Basically, the claimant's right to maintain his action must, in
the first instance, rest on the contract being classified as maritime.
In concluding that the contract was maritime the majority would
appedr to be on sound ground. The obligation of the shipowner to
supply maintenance and cure is wholly predicated on maritime law.
If the shipowner were to furnish such cure himself and to do it
negligently, it is clear that the seaman would have a cause of action
rooted in the obligation imposed by maritime law.3" When the ship-
owner has some third party supply the cure and agrees to indemnify
the seaman for negligence of that third party, it is submitted that
the nexus between the original maritime obligation and the contract
of indemnity is so close as to warrant the latter being classified as
maritime.
In the absence of controlling precedent, the Court had to make
the choice of calling the contract maritime or non-maritime. Not
only does the Court's selection seem legally sound but it also had
the advantage (or disadvantage depending on the point of view) of
leaving the plaintiff free to have his "day in court" to prove, if he
can, his case. Even if we were to assume that in some instances the
interest of a state in a maritime contract would call for the applica-
tion of state law, Justice Harlan again appears to be on sound ground
when he finds no interest of the state of New York which would call
for the application of New York law.8 7
Finally, as to Justice Franldurter's concern that the majority is
reinvigorating the Jensen case, it is clear from Justice Harlan's
opinion that his reference to Jensen, which did not apply state law,
and the other cases mentioned by him which did apply state law, is
merely to illustrate the process of accommodation the Court has used
in determining whether state law should be permitted to operate.
FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Transferrability of Admiralty Action in Which Both in Rem and in
Personam Claims Are Joined
Application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the
federal courts prior to the Judicial Code of 1948 led to the dismissal
Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367 (1932).
See note 33 supra.
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of an action which had been brought in an inconvenient one of two
or more legally available forums.' To relieve against the harshness
of this rule Congress, in 1948, provided in section 1404(a) of the
Judicial Code that, "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
In Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-5852 the question pre-
sented for decision by the Supreme Court was whether a district
court, sitting as a court of admiralty in New Orleans, could transfer
an action to the district court in Memphis, Tennessee, by virtue of
section 1404(a), above quoted, when the action contained both a
libel in rem as well as a libel in personam.
The vessel which had been the subject of the in rein libel was a
barge owned by Federal Barge Lines. Continental was the owner
of a cargo of soybeans which it loaded on the barge while it was
located on the Wolf River at Memphis. During the loading process
the barge partially sank and both barge and cargo were damaged.
Continental claimed the barge sank because it was unseaworthy and
Federal said the sinking was caused by reason of the negligent
manner in which Continental did the loading.
In due course the barge was raised and continued in use. In
the latter part of June 1958, Federal filed suit in a Tennessee state
court against Continental and sought to recover for the damages to
the barge. This action was in due course transferred to the federal
district court sitting in Memphis.
On July Z, 1958, Continental filed a libel in rem against the
barge3 in a federal district court in New Orleans at which port the
barge was then located. It joined in the same complaint a libel in per-
sonam against Federal as owner and supplier of the barge. In this
action Continental sought to recover damages occasioned to its cargo
by reason of the sinking. Federal made a motion predicated on
section 1404(a), aforesaid, to the district court in New Orleans and
'Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
2364 U.S. 19 (1960).
'The barge was not actually seized but, in accordance with the practice in
New Orleans and other major seaports of maritime litigation, the usual letter
of undertaking was given by Federal providing that in consideration of the
barge not being seized, Federal would pay any final decree that might be
rendered in the proceedings and that the rights of the parties shall be pre-
cisely the same as they would have been had the vessel been seized by the
marshal under in rem process and released upon the shipowner putting up a
bond.
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asked that the action be transferred to the federal district court in
Memphis where Federal's action against Continental was pending
The court granted the motion finding that the convenience of wit-
nesses and efficient administration of justice required the cargo
owner's claim to be disposed of by the same court in which the
barge owner's claim was awaiting trial. The court of appeals
affirmed the order of transfer.4
On certiorari a Supreme Court majority of seven Justices af-
firmed the court of appeals.5 Two dissenting Justices were of the
opinion that the transfer of the in rem libel was not permissible be-
cause such libel could not have been brought in the transferee court
at Memphis at the time of the filing of the libel action since the barge
at that time was at New Orleans. The dissent also contended that
the transfer was invalid under the Court's decision, handed down
just two weeks earlier, in Hoffman v. Blaski and Sullivan v. Be-
himer,6 which, although not admiralty cases, construed section
1404(a) of the Judicial Code. In the Blaski and Behimer cases7
the majority of the Court had held that the words "where it might
have been brought" in section 1404(a) meant in that district where
the plaintiff at the time he instituted his action had a right to bring
it. The phrase was held not to mean in the district where the action
might now be brought with defendant's consent.
It is important that we keep in mind this very recent pronounce-
ment of the Court when we are dealing with the libel in rem. Clearly,
a vessel cannot be libeled except it be in the jurisdiction of the district
court where the libel is instituted. Physical presence is the basic
essential to any libel in rem. Consequently, had the cargo owner
merely brought a libel in rem against the barge in New Orleans and
caused the seizure of the vessel under the in rem process, no one
could possibly claim that the same action could have been brought
in Memphis where there was no barge to seize. On the other hand,
if the owner of the cargo had merely brought anl in personam action
in the federal district court in New Orleans, transfer could properly
be made to some other district where the plaintiff would have had a
legal right to bring his action in the first instance.
Assuming that Continental could have brought its action in
'268 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1959). '364 U.S. 19 (1960).
'363 U.S. 335 (1960).
"Ibid. The Court rendered one opinion covering both the Blaski and
Behirner cases.
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personam against Federal in the first instance in the district court of
Memphis (actually it should have counterclaimed in Federal's action
there pending),' and assuming, as we must, that the in rem action
could not be brought in Memphis, what is to be the effect of the
joinder of both in personam and in rem actions in the same complaint
in the district court at New Orleans? Several possibilities present
themselves:
1. The district court in New Orleans might separate the two
causes of action and order only the in personam action to
be transferred to Memphis;
2. The district court in New Orleans might declare the
actions set out in the one complaint are not to be separated
for purposes of transfer and since the in rem action could
not have been brought in Memphis it must stay in New
Orleans and keep with it the in personam action;
3. The district court in New Orleans might declare the ac-
tions set out in the one complaint are not to be separated
for the purpose of transfer and since the in personam
action is transferable to Memphis it will be so transferred
and carry with it the in rem action.
The Supreme Court adopted the third course just set out. Jus-
tice Black, speaking for the Court, referred to the long standing
admiralty fiction that a vessel may be assumed to be a person for
the purpose of filing a lawsuit and enforcing a judgment. This
fiction, he said, was to enable a claimant to bring an action in any
port where the vessel might be found although the owner was not
amenable to process. It was designed to afford a convenient forum.
To apply the fiction now for the very purpose of defeating a transfer
to a convenient forum would, as he sees it, be using the fiction con-
trary to the very purpose for which it was created.
Further, while it is true that the judgment in an in rem action
8Why Continental did not counterclaim is explained by the court of
appeals. 268 F.2d at 242 n.2: "How the left hand knew nought of the right
in this multi-state, multi-forum amphibious litigation is explained in the
briefs. The underwriters on Federal's hull loss and cargo liability, as were
those on Continental's cargo loss and its public liability, were different.
Each was apparently anxious to manage its own litigation with a seeming
indifference to the strong likelihood that under F.R.Civ.P. 13 (a), 28 U.S.C.A.
concerning compulsory counterclaims, or general principles of estoppel by
judgment, res judicata, or the like, trial of one case would inevitably affect,
if not control, the other."
[Vol. 40
DOWN TO THE SEAS AGAIN
is against the vessel and technically enforceable against it, practically,
says Justice Black, the money will be paid out of the owner's pocket.
If transfer is not to be permitted in a case of this nature, a claimant
could prevent transfer of an in personam action under section
1404(a) by joining with it a libel in rem. This, of course, could
only be done if the claimant sued in the district where the vessel was
located. The action in question, even though it contains in rem and
in personam claims, should be considered as a single "civil action"
within the meaning of section 1404(a). "The crucial issues about
fault and damages suffered were identical, whether considered as a
claim against the ship or its owner."' The majority opinion con-
cludes by saying that to construe section 1404(a) to sanction a trans-
fer in this case to the district where the in personam action might
have legally been brought, "merely carries out its design to protect
litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience
and expense, not to provide a shelter for in rem admiralty proceed-
ings in costly and inconvenient forums."'"
Justice Whittaker wrote the dissenting opinion. He stresses the
personality of the ship which is looked upon as the debtor. An in
rem action in admiralty is not an attachment device to force the
appearance of the owner, nor is it a means of providing security for
the payment of a judgment obtained against the owner. This fact,
Justice Whittaker says, the Court's opinion endeavors to sweep
"under the rug."" Since the barge at the time of the libel was at
New Orleans the in rem action could not have been brought in
Memphis. Consequently, Justice Whittaker says, the Blaski and
Behimer cases must control. Consent by the barge owner to have
the in rem action transferred to Memphis cannot result in transfer-
rability of the in rem action any more than consent of a person
defendant to be sued in a more convenient forum can effect trans-
ferrability if the plaintiff at the time of institution of suit had no
legal right to bring it in the proposed forum.
The dissent also points out that the giving of the letter under-
taking'2 to avoid the seizure of the barge "did not convert the in rem
action into one in personam."' The letter undertaking, like a bond
releasing the vessel after it has been seized by the marshal in an in
' 364 U.S. at 26. 20 Id. at 27.
1 Id. at 28. 12 See note 3 supra.
"1 346 U.S. at 39.
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rem proceeding, "is substituted for and stands as the vessel in the
custody of the court.' 4
No matter how technically logical Justice Whittaker's dissent
may be, it must be conceded that efficient and economical administra-
tion of justice is attained by sanctioning the transfer. And while the
transfer was effected in this case in which an in rem claim was joined
with a concededly transferable in personam claim, one may well
ask what would have been the action of the Court if there had been
no such joinder and only an in rem action had been filed in New
Orleans.
Practically all that is said in the majority opinion in attacking
the fictional personality of the vessel and in support of the transfer
of the New Orleans, action would be equally applicable if that action
were solely a libel in rem. The following language of the Court is
indicative of its attitude:
It is relevant that the law of admiralty itself is uncon-
cerned about the technical distinctions between in rem and
in personam actions for purposes of transferring admiralty
actions from one court to a more'convenient forum ...
[Justice Black here referred to Admiralty Rule 54 which
relates to the transfer of proceedings seeking to limit the
liability of the shipowner.] And it may be further observed
that courts have not felt themselves bound by this fiction when
confronted with the argument that because in rem and in per-
sonam actions involve different parties, therefore res judicata
does not apply from an in personam action against an owner
to an in rem action against his ship.'5
Conceivably, the Court would have approved the transfer of the
action had it been solely in rem. If it had done so, however, it would
have been flying in the face of its decision in Blaski and Behimer.
The rule of those cases is clear and definitely stated. Only if the
plaintiff had a legal right to sue in the proposed transferee court at
the time his action was instituted could the transfer be made. The
Court in Blaski and Behimer had rejected Justice Frankfurter's
view (expressed in his dissent in Behimer) that transfer should be
made to the convenient forum whenever the defendant consents to
going forward in the transferee court irrespective of whether the
"' Id. at 38. (Emphasis is Justice Whitaker's.)
'1 Id. at 25.
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plaintiff had the right to sue defendant in that court in the first
instance.'16.
When the Court in Contitental approved a transfer of an in rem
libel which had been coupled with an admittedly transferable libel
in personam it effectuated the purpose of the forum non conveniens
doctrine as expressed in section 1404(a).' It was assisted by the
presence of the in personam claim. It was also cognizant of the fact
that although one cause of action was designated as a libel in rem,
the vessel, itself, not only was not in the marshal's custody, but had
never been seized. The responsible source out of which any judg-
ment 'for Continental would be paid was the undertaking or bond
furnished by Federal.
The Continental Case and Suggested Congressional Action
Effective administration of justice would not have been attained
by denying the transfer in Continental. Neither will effective admin-
istration of justice be afforded if, in an action solely in rem against
a vessel which is released upon the owner putting up a bond, the
court is unable to transfer to the convenient forum. In the absence
of a change in the language of section 1404(a) which would incor-
porate the views of Justice Frankfurter, heretofore mentioned, 7 it is
suggested that congressional action be taken which would provide
that in all libels in rem when the vessel is released or in fact never
seized -by reason of the defendant putting up a bond, transfer may
be made, under forum non conveniens principles, to any other federal
district court where the defendant might have been sued in personam
at the time when the libel in rem was brought.
ADMIRALTY'S POWER TO GIvE EQUITABLE OR QUASI-CONTRAcrr RELIEF
1. Equitable Relief
"While the court of admiralty exercises its jurisdiction upon
equitable principles, it has not the characteristic powers of a court
of equity. It cannot entertain a bill or libel for specific performance,
or to correct a mistake . . . or declare or enforce a trust or an
equitable title . . . ." This statement was made by Chief Justice
Fuller in 1890, when he spoke for the Court in The Eclipse.1 Sixty
'1 363 U.S. at 369 (dissenting opinion).
1 Ibid.
135 U.S. 599, 608 (1890).
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years later, in 1950, Justice Frankfurter. when speaking for the
Court in Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe,
S.A.,2 cited The Eclipse and said, "Unquestionably a court of ad-
miralty.will not enforce an independent equitable claim merely be-
cause it pertains to maritime property."3
Although admiralty has no power to enforce an independent
equitable claim, may it afford an equitable remedy as an incident to
and in support of its exercise of jurisdiction over a matter exclu-
sively maritime? This question was answered in the affirmative by
the Court in the Swift & Co. Packers case. Specifically the problem
was whether an admiralty court had the power to set aside the
fraudulent transfer of a vessel which was the subject of a foreign
attachment in an in personam libel to recover damages for loss of
cargo. Libelants" named as defendants the carrier and transferee
of the vessel and alleged the transfer had been made to defraud
libelants of their rights.
On motiori of the transferee, the district court4 vacated the at-
tachment on the ground that only property of the contracting carrier
could be attached and admiralty was without jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether the transfer was fraudulent. "The reasoning of the
District Court was based on the view that a claim of fraud in the
transfer of a vessel was a matter for determination by a court of
equity and therefore outside the bounds of admiralty jurisdiction."'
The court of appeals affirmed the vacation of the attachment.0
In reversing, the Supreme Court held admiralty had power, in
the circumstances of this case, to determine whether or not the trans-
fer of the vessel was fraudulent and that its power should be exer-
cised. In referring to the action of the district court the Supreme
Court said,
The reasoning of the District Court would be pertinent if the
libellants, as creditors of Transmaritima [the carrier], had
gone into admiralty by way of a creditor's bill to set aside a
pretended sale of the Caribe [the vessel attached] as a fraud-
ulent transfer. But that is not the case before us.
7
339 U.S. 684 (1950). For an excellent interim article on the equitable
and quasi-contract powers of admiralty, see Morrison, The Remedial Powers
of Admiralty, 43 YALE L.J. 1 (1933).
* 339 U.S. at 690. (Emphasis added.)
'83 F. Supp. 273 (D. Canal Zone 1948).
339 U.S. at 689-90. 175 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1949).
7339 U.S. at 690-91.
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As we have stated, the case before the Court was a suit in ad-
miralty to collect damages for non-delivery of cargo. "As an inci-
dent to that claim, in order to secure respondents' appearance and
to insure the fruits of a decree"' the libelants had made the attach-
ment pursuant to general Admiralty Rule 2. "The issue of fraud,"
said the Court, arose "in connection with the attachment as a means
of effectuating a claim incontestably in admiralty."9
To deny an admiralty court jurisdiction over this subsidiary
or derivative issue in a litigation clearly maritime would re-
quire an absolute rule that admiralty is rigorously excluded
from all contact with nonmaritime transactions and from all
equitable relief, even though such nonmaritime transactions
come into play, and such equitable relief is sought, in the
course of admiralty's exercise of its jurisdiction over a matter
exclusively maritime."0
The Court found no basis in precedent to so "hobble"" the
admiralty courts. It found no restriction upon admiralty by chan-
cery "so unrelenting as to bar the grant of any equitable relief even
when that relief is subsidiary to issues wholly within admiralty
jurisdiction."' 2 Finally, in upholding the admiralty court's- power
to set aside the fraudulent transfer, the Court said,
If colorable transfers of property were immune to challenge
in a court of admiralty when a libel in personam has been
brought in a District where the respondent cannot be per-
sonally served, admiralty jurisdiction would be sacrificed to
a sterile theory of judicial separatism.'"
The Court was careful to confine its holding as to the equitable
powers of admiralty to the suit before it. "We would be passing on
situations not before us were we to attempt now to define when the
power which we recognize should be withheld."' 4 It remains to be
seen whether the Court will in later cases find that admiralty has
power to give the equitable relief of injunction, reforination or spe-
cific performance when "that relief is subsidiary to issues wholly
within admiralty jurisdiction."' 5
8 Id. at 691. 9 Ibid.
l Ibid. I1 Ibid.12Id. at 690. '8 Id. at 693-94.
1,Id. at 695. ' Id. at 692.
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2. Quasi-Contract Relief
Over a period of years considerable controversy has raged on
the question of whether or not admiralty courts have jurisdiction in
causes of action based upon quasi-contract or unjust enrichment.
In 1939, Professor Robinson in his well known text on admiralty
categorically stated, "There is no admiralty jurisdiction in quasi-
contract even when the claim arises out of a maritime contract.""1
Several years later, Professors Gilmore and Black in their work on
Admiralty were more cautious and listed quasi-contractual claims
arising out of maritime transactions as being in a "doubtful area"
of admiralty jurisdiction "where generalization is dangerous."'"
In 1956, the Supreme Court directly tackled the question in
Archawski v. Hanioti8 and removed certain doubts. The City of
Athens was a passenger vessel owned by Hanioti. 1' Libelants
brought suit in admiralty against Hanioti seeking to recover passage
money they had paid him for a trip to Europe on the City of Athens.
The scheduled voyage never took place.20 The libel alleged that
IHanioti had wrongfully and deliberately applied the moneys received
by him to his own use in reckless disregard of his obligation to
refund the same. The district court2 held the action was on a mari-
time contract and within admiralty jurisdiction. The court of
appeals reversed. It held that the suit was not within admiralty
jurisdiction because it was an action "in the nature of the old com-
mon law indebitatus assumpsit, for money had and received, based
upon the wrongful withholding of moneys."2 The court of appeals
relied on decisions in its own circuit which had held that admiralty
has no jurisdiction to grant relief in such cases "because the implied
promise to repay the moneys which cannot in good conscience be
retained-necessary to support the action for money had and re-
ceived-is not a maritime contract."24
18 ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 197 (1939).
1 7 GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 25 (1957).
18350 U.S. 532 (1956). The Court was unanimous !
'9 Nominal ownership was in a corporation wholly controlled by Hanioti.
See opinion of Judge Walsh in Archawski v. Hanioti, 129 F. Supp. 410
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
-o This was because creditors seized the vessel which was sold to pay
claims existing at the time the passage moneys were received by Hanioti.
129 F. Supp. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).22223 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1955).
22Id. at 407.
' United Transp. & Lighterage Co. v. New York & Baltimore Transp.
Line, 185 Fed. 386, 391 (2d Cir. 1911).
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On certiorari the Supreme Court reviewed the authorities in
which lower federal courts had held admiralty has no jurisdiction
to entertain quasi-contract claims based upon unjust enrichment.2 1
The Court noted that the duty to pay is, as in the instant case, often
referable to a breach of a maritime contract. "The problem," said
the Court, "is to prevent unjust enrichment from a maritime con-
tract."2  For admiralty to prevent such unjust enrichment "does
not reach beyond the domain of maritime affairs.""7 The Court
continued, "We conclude that, so long as the claim asserted arises
out of a maritime contract, the admiralty court has jurisdiction
over it."
'28
In upholding quasi-contract relief in the instant case the Court
pointed out that the philosophy of i-ndebitatus assumpsit is not for-
eign to admiralty. Analogous conceptions of rights are found, said
the Court, in the recognized maritime rights of salvage and general
average, both of which do not arise out of any express agreement.
In concluding his opinion, Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court,
said,
How far the concept of quasi-contracts may be applied in
admiralty is unnecessary to decide. It is sufficient this day to
hold that admiralty has jurisdiction, even where the libel
reads like indebitatus assumpsit at common law, provided that
the unjust enrichment arose as a result of the breach of a
maritime contract.29
It thus appears that, given the necessary nexus with a maritime
contract, admiralty has jurisdiction of causes of action based upon
the concept of unjust enrichment which in common law courts are
denominated as actions in quasi-contract. So today, instead of re-
peating the language of Professor Robinson quoted above,3" we must
now say exactly the opposite, namely, "There is admiralty jurisdic-
tion in quasi-contract when the claim arises out of a maritime
contract."
25 350 U.S. at 534. " Id. at 535.
27 Ibid. 28 Ibid.
"Id. at 536. " See text at note 16 supra.
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